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Abstract 
The efficient and ethical management of knowledge and intelligence 
increasingly is seen as vital to the success of law enforcement agencies in the 
Information Age. Those agencies have invested significantly in new and 
emerging information technologies, and hired analytical experts to develop 
collected information in order to be knowledge-led.  Despite these efforts, the 
take-up of putatively new policing models, such as intelligence-led policing 
(ILP), has been quite modest. This study addresses the question of why it 
seems to have proved so difficult for law enforcement agencies to capitalise on 
these innovations. This analysis is largely based on case studies of the police 
organisations of Denmark and of Finland. The study explores the political, 
organisational, and social settings of both police organisations to better 
understand police cultures, the policing models operated, the police’s crime 
reduction and prevention strategies, and the information technology they used 
to achieve their goals. This analysis is undertaken against the background of a 
drive to professionalise both the policing and police intelligence and analysis 
disciplines that have been characteristic of policing in developed economies in 
the modern era. The practical implementation of intelligence work is assessed 
in the context of the Socialisation, Externalisation, Combination and 
Internalisation (SECI) knowledge management model. Semistructured 
interviews and survey questionnaires were used to collect data from the 
countries under research; thus, the chosen methodology for this study is the 
mixed method.  
 
The study identifies police cultures in which experiential knowledge and a faith 
in traditional policing methods tend to buttress resistance to the implementation 
of ideas and concepts based on research and explicit knowledge and skew the 
knowledge roles and processes of the law enforcement agencies studied. This 
also limits the impact of knowledge and intelligence management and 
significantly undermines professionalism in roles such as police information 
management, intelligence and analysis. The research also drills down into the 
theoretical foundations of police intelligence work and presents an updated 
intelligence definition of law enforcement. It introduces a definition that 
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acknowledges that intelligence in law enforcement is produced as a 
consequence not only of fast mental processes in the experience-based 
knowledge domain but also of slower processes using diverse analytical 
methods in the explicit knowledge domain. The author argues that the law 
enforcement community’s acknowledgement of this fact can assist in 
developing intelligence doctrine and in pointing the way to more effective and 
more ethical intelligence practice.  
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Introduction 
The interest in this research derives from the researcher’s professional 
background as both police officer and intelligence analyst. Indeed, the 
researcher has been able to observe the law enforcement professional world 
from different perspectives at national but also at international level. It became 
clear to the researcher, particularly when providing training courses on 
intelligence analysis to law enforcement agencies across Europe, that, despite 
the hype around knowledge-based policing models such as Intelligence-Led 
Policing, Predictive Policing and Evidence-Based Policing, the practical 
business model of law enforcement has hardly changed since the beginning of 
the ‘policing-era’. An inconceivable gap seems to exist between the 
management hype on being knowledge-led or intelligence-led and the practical 
everyday work of the frontline police officers. Thus, the researcher was 
constantly wondering why knowledge and intelligence are such difficult subjects 
for law enforcement.  
Indeed, this was one of the researcher’s major motivations to conduct research 
on this given topic, as law enforcement is challenged by its increasingly 
dynamic, complex and wide-ranging tasks (Seba & Rowley, 2010, p.623; Luen 
& Al-Hawamdeh, 2001, p.312). The law enforcement community’s cability to 
succeed with these contemporary tasks arguably requires it to develop 
knowledge about criminals, finance, infrastructures and communities (Harfield, 
2008b, pp. 486-487). Policing should, therefore, be seen as an activity 
commanded by knowledge (Collier, 2006, p.109). Certainly, organisations 
ideally enhance their learning through accumulated knowledge of collected 
information that is managed through information technology (Brown & Brudney, 
2003, p.31). This information surely provides enhanced opportunities for pre-
emptive action to support investigations and judicial prosecutions (Stanier, 
2013, p.124). Law enforcement investments in information technology have, 
therefore, increased to collect, store and analyse information in order to 
produce intelligence (Gerspacher & Lemieux, 2010, p.68; Chan, 2001, p.140). 
The notion is that enhancing the intelligence function can make the delivery of 
policing services more cost-effective by targeting limited resources towards 
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selected risks (Stanier, 2013, p.124; Innes, Fielding, & Cope, 2005, p.42). 
Therefore, information technology has become the bedrock of most police 
processes and systems (Darroch & Mazerolle, 2012, p.22). This intelligence 
task is, ultimately, also linked to knowledge management issues (James, 2013, 
p.7). 
Nevertheless, studies indicate that law enforcement organisations are not 
properly structured to generate and use knowledge to the fullest extent. Often 
missing are an adequate knowledge management structure (Coleman, 2008, 
p.319) and a knowledge management strategy (Seba & Rowley, 2010, p.622). 
Indeed, proper implementation of knowledge and intelligence structures 
requires a motivated and enlightened leadership (Darroch & Mazerolle, 2012, 
p.14; McGarrell, Freilich, & Chermak, 2007, p.152) who will ensure that 
intelligence is in every part of the organisation (McGarrell et al., 2007, p.152). 
The challenge is that any meaningful change is likely to be strongly resisted 
within law enforcement agencies that have strong organisational traditions 
(Weisburd, Shalev, & Amir, 2002, p.105); therefore, advances that do not 
require radical organisational changes and are more of the supportive type, 
such as technical and/or administrative improvements, will be more easily 
adopted (Darroch & Mazerolle, 2012, p.4; Braga & Weisburd, 2006a, p.17). It is 
also important to note that organisational culture has an impact on knowledge 
management systems (Ciganek, Mao, & Srite, 2010, p.63). 
The increased information collection and storage have also increased the need 
for analytical capacity to analyse this data (Martin, 2010, p.145; Scheider, 
Chapman & Schapiro, 2009, p.701; Innes et al., 2005, p.54). Many law 
enforcement agencies, therefore, have started to employ analysts to collect, 
map and analyse the collected data (Tilley, 2010, p.188). These analysts often 
act as ‘knowledge brokers’ (Quarmby & Young, 2010, p.25) who try to make 
conclusions with partial, vague, and potentially deceptive information (Heuer, 
2005, p.75). As Cope (2004, p.188) explains: ‘Essentially analysts are 
information translators, whose role is to review information and provide reliable 
intelligence in a practical and operational format’. There are generally two types 
of analysts. Strategic analysts focus on providing overviews for strategic 
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interventions, whilst operational analysts aim to guide law enforcement’s 
operational responses (Cope, 2004, p.188). The expectations of the analysts’ 
backgrounds often vary depending on the status of the post, that is, whether 
they are civilians or sworn police officers. Thus, the intelligence analyst 
profession, particularly in law enforcement, remains underdeveloped (Evans & 
Kebbell, 2012; Quarmby & Young, 2010, p. 247) despite the fact that the quality 
of any analysis strongly depends on the analysts’ competence and 
effectiveness (Evans & Kebbell, 2012, p.205; Cope, 2004, p.195).  
Indeed, the overall aims of this research are to examine how intelligence 
analysis is finding its place in the policing context and to understand its role in 
the law enforcement knowledge management apparatus.  
There are three main objectives to approaching to this question.  
 Firstly, it is important to understand the contemporary policing setting 
and the state of play of its knowledge structures, systems and definitions 
to comprehend how knowledge, intelligence, and analysis are 
understood in a law enforcement context.  
 Secondly it is essential to understand the impact of organisational 
knowledge concepts, such as professionalism and culture, in order to 
recognise the conditions under which intelligence analysis operates.  
 Lastly, it is essential to comperhend and evaluate the practical role of 
intelligence analysis in the law enforcement knowledge management 
apparatus. 
Accordingly, this research addresses these specific research questions: 
 What is the state of play of intelligence analysis in the contemporary 
policing context in terms of structures, systems and concepts? 
 What is the status of professionalism and organisational culture in 
relation to intelligence analysis? 
 How does intelligence analysis serve the law enforcement knowledge 
management apparatus in practice? 
This research begins to address these questions by systematically examining 
the available literature from a wide range of disciplines, such as criminology, 
knowledge management, philosophy, information management, occupational 
culture and sociology. The literature review is in two major parts to assist 
comprehension, especially when using such a large number of disciplines: ‘The 
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science of knowledge management’ and ‘Knowledge in law enforcement’. 
Although similar themes can be found in both of these parts, the first part’s 
focus is on the general literature related to knowledge management. The 
second part’s aim, then, is to understand knowledge management in the 
policing context.  
The methodology chapter that follows explains the research design and notes 
the ethical considerations. Three findings chapters then follow. The first aims to 
explore the policing context and the knowledge- and intelligence-related 
structures, systems and concepts. The objective is to answer the first research 
question and provide the setting for the remaining findings chapters. The next 
findings chapter addresses the second research question by exploring the 
levels of professionalism related to intelligence analysis in the police 
organisations under study; it also explores the cultural setting in which the 
intelligence analysis operates. The final findings chapter uses Nonaka and 
Takeuchi’s (1995) Socialisation, Externalisation, Combination and 
Internalisation knowledge management model to address the third research 
question by observing the organisational knowledge conversions. The 
discussion chapter that follows further examines these findings, using the 
research questions’ same three-tiered structure. Lastly, the conclusion chapter 
discusses the answer to the overall aim of this research to further argue the 
nature of the original contribution of this research to knowledge. The 
conclusions chapter also identifies limitations of this study and possible future 
research areas. 
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2 Literature review 
This chapter presents the available research literature on two levels. The aim of 
the first part, with the heading ‘The science of knowledge management’, is to 
generally examine the concept of knowledge from different viewpoints, from 
philosophical to practical. This section also identifies different knowledge roles 
in an organisation and explains Nonaka and Takeuchi’s (1995) classical SECI 
knowledge management model. It further discusses organisational culture and 
professionalism, two quite debated but arguably important knowledge 
management concepts. This first part concludes by introducing the role of 
management in the knowledge management context.  
The second part of the literature review, under the heading ‘Knowledge in law 
enforcement’, next addresses these same knowledge-related areas from a law 
enforcement perspective. Its aim is to identify how the concepts of knowledge, 
intelligence, and analysis are understood in a law enforcement setting. This is 
done by first exploring the evolution of policing models towards the knowledge-
based model, followed by an examination of the concept of knowledge in 
operational policing and a discussion about the status quo of intelligence and 
analysis in policing. The practical aspects of information and intelligence 
management in law enforcement are then considered, followed by an 
elaboration of the level of professionalism related to intelligence analysis in law 
enforcement and the police culture aspects to intelligence. The last part of the 
literature review compares relevant policing literature to the SECI knowledge 
management model to identify what is known on the different knowledge 
management phases in policing. 
2.1 The science of knowledge management 
2.1.1 Philosophical foundation of knowledge and intelligence  
Aristotle separated the intellectual virtues into episteme, techne, and phronesis. 
Episteme is considered scientific knowledge, which explains why it is found in 
the word epistemology. Techne is technical knowledge and can be found in the 
word technology. Phronesis is the most important of all the virtues (Flyvbjerg, 
2004, pp.284-285), as it introduces ethics and values into practice (Flyvbjerg, 
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2004, p.287). Interestingly, this separation is also found in the modern 
characterisation of knowledge as explicit, implicit and tacit. Koenig (2012) 
identified explicit knowledge as tangible (similarity with episteme); implicit 
knowledge can be made explicit (similarity with techne), while tacit knowledge is 
extremely difficult to make tangible (similarity with phronesis). Some scholars 
argue that all knowledge is rooted in tacit knowledge (Nonaka, Kodama, Hirose 
& Kohlbacher, 2014, pp.139-140). Indeed, this tacit knowledge is linked to 
intuition, which is built cumulatively on an individual’s past experiences (Eraut, 
2004, p.253). It is also the knowledge-type preferred by the police (Gundhus, 
2012).  
Another important aspect of knowledge is its relationship to information and 
data. This is often described as the ‘knowledge hierarchy’ in the information and 
knowledge literature. The implicit assumption in this hierarchy is that data is 
used to create information and information is used to create knowledge 
(Rowley, 2007, pp.163-164). An alternative viewpoint is the ‘reversed hierarchy’ 
in which knowledge comes first, followed by information and data (Tuomi, 1999, 
p.4). Indeed, as Nonaka et al. (2014, p.139) have argued, knowledge is 
information in context and involves the knower’s capacity to define a situation 
and act accordingly (Nonaka, von Krogh & Voelpel, 2006, pp.1181-1182). What, 
then, is intelligence? The Oxford Dictionary (Soanes & Stevenson, 2008) 
defines intelligence as:  
 The ability to acquire and apply knowledge and skills 
 A person with this ability 
 The gathering of information of military or political value.  
Rønn and Høffding (2013, p.697) and Brown (2007, p.337) have argued, thus, 
that intelligence is linked with information and knowledge. This definition also 
links intelligence to resources and to individual capacity. However, when it 
comes to the context of practice, the Oxford definition links intelligence only to 
the military and politics, not to policing.  
The limited literature in relation to law enforcement intelligence views it as the 
end product of an analytical process (Brown, 2007, p.338). Rønn and Høffding 
(2013, p.714) have argued that the epistemic status of intelligence is a product, 
thus anchoring intelligence to the frame of explicit knowledge. Intelligence is 
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also seen as collected raw data (Rønn & Høffding, 2013, p.699) and actionable 
knowledge (Ratcliffe, 2008, p.98). Innes and Sheptycki (2004, p.6) have noted 
that, in relation to the notion of actionable knowledge, intelligence is ‘bits of data 
that, when combined and viewed together with relevant background knowledge, 
may be used to produce intelligence’. Ratcliffe (2008, pp.96-99) introduced the 
Data, Information, Knowledge and Intelligence (DIKI) continuum, in which 
intelligence comes after knowledge in this hierarchy. Conversely, there are 
arguments for another type of knowledge hierarchy in which intelligence is 
located between information and knowledge. Intelligence is a precursor of 
knowledge for advocates of that approach (Rønn & Høffding, 2013, p.707).  
2.1.2 Knowledge assets and the SECI knowledge management model 
Knowledge is a critical asset and a key resource of any organisation (Hung, 
Durcikova, Lai & Lin, 2011, p.416; Yang, Fang & Lin, 2010, p.232), as its 
competitive advantage is rooted in knowledge the organisation possesses 
and/or can obtain (Yang et al., 2010, p.231). Different types of knowledge exist 
in an organisation. Firstly, an organisation possesses bureaucratic knowledge, 
such as structures, systems, policies and procedures (2006, p.109; Snowden, 
2002, pp.104-105). Secondly, an organisation possesses professional 
knowledge (von Krogh, Nonaka & Rechsteiner, 2012, p.242; Yang et al., 2010, 
p.232; Snowden, 2002, pp.104-105) that receives its power from claiming 
unique forms of expertise not shared with other occupational groups, according 
to Eraut (2003, p.14). Organisations also possess the private, tacit knowledge 
of individuals, such as values, skills and experiences (von Krogh et al., 2012, 
p.242; 2006, p.109; Yang et al., 2010, p.232). This informal experience- and 
value-based knowledge is also called cultural knowledge, as it is acquired 
through participation in social activities (Eraut, 2004, p.263; Snowden, 2002, 
pp.104-105). For example, in the case of policing, a police officer is in constant 
social interactions with colleagues, supervisors and the public (Charman, 2017, 
p.95). Finally, an organisation also possesses uncharted knowledge for which 
there is no experience and expertise; thus, a need exists for innovation and 
learning (Snowden, 2002, pp.104-105).  
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These knowledge assets are often categorised as ‘hard’ and ‘soft’. The hard 
assets in this division comprise information technology and other knowledge 
management tools (von Krogh et al., 2012, p.249; Nold, 2011, p.88; Albers, 
2009, pp.2-3) that act as enablers to knowledge management initiatives (Alavi 
&Leidner, 2001). Soft assets, then, include organisational culture, values, trust, 
and routines (von Krogh et al., 2012, p.249). Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995, 
pp.152-156) further divided the individuals in an organisation who are 
responsible for generating both tacit and explicit knowledge into these 
categories: 
 ‘Knowledge operators’ interface with tacit 
knowledge and are often the front-line 
employees. 
 ‘Knowledge specialists’ interface mainly with 
explicit knowledge and mobilize well-structured, 
explicit knowledge in the form of technical, 
scientific and other quantifiable data, the kind of 
knowledge that could be transmitted and stored 
in a computer.  
 ‘Knowledge engineers’ facilitate all knowledge 
conversion and could be seen as the team 
leaders. 
 ‘Knowledge officers’ are responsible for the total 
organisational knowledge-creation process at the 
organisational level and are often senior 
management. 
Nonaka and Takeuchi’s seminal work introduced one of the most influential 
knowledge management models to illustrate knowledge exchanges of tacit and 
explicit knowledge in an organisation (1995, p.62). The SECI model popularised 
knowledge management in the 1990s (Snowden, 2002, p.101); its identifier is 
an acronym for the modes of ‘Socialisation’, ‘Externalisation’, ‘Combination’ and 
‘Internalisation’. 
In the ‘Socialisation’ mode, someone’s tacit knowledge is transferred into the 
tacit knowledge of another person through, for example, apprentices’ work 
(Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995, pp.62-64). This is typical in the policing context in 
which narrative is arguably an imporant medium to transfer knowledge and 
meaning (van Hulst, 2013). Tacit knowledge, by its very nature, is more 
resource intensive to share than is explicit knowledge (Hauk, Kim, Lee, & Kim, 
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2013, p.357). Social capital is the key facilitator of organisational knowledge 
sharing (Hauk et al., 2013, p.358). Social capital, as defined by Lesser (2000, 
p.48), is ‘the ability of actors to secure benefits by virtue of membership in social 
network or other social structures’. Thus, relationships among individuals impact 
organisational knowledge creation, making it also fragile (Nonaka et al., 2006, 
p.1186). The people in organisations often have little contact with people 
outside their particular area (Brooks, 2006, p.38), which further intensifies the 
challenge to tacit knowledge sharing due to hierarchies and conflicts against the 
group interest (Nonaka et al., 2006, p.1188). Trust is needed for individuals to 
interact and share knowledge (Nold, 2011, p.85). Indeed, this is especially true 
in the police culture, in which trust is essential (Cancino & Enriquez, 2004, 
p.328).  
In the ‘Externalisation’ mode, tacit knowledge is converted into explicit 
knowledge through writing, for example (Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995, pp.64-67). 
Police officers often receive information from the public in the policing context, 
which they turn into explicit knowledge (Manning, 1992, p.359). This knowledge 
should be easily accessible to the right people at the right time (Nold, 2011, 
p.87). Information technology facilitates the collection, storage, processing, and 
distribution of information or knowledge (Brown & Brudney, 2003, p.31). The 
challenge is that it is difficult to predict the information/knowledge needs of an 
organisation due to its rapidly changing environment (Brown & Brudney, 2003, 
p.34). Another aspect of information systems is that they often rely on culturally 
shared knowledge (Tuomi, 1999, pp.5-6); thus, this technology will be unable to 
facilitate information sharing if organisational silos and/or mistrust exist (Nold, 
2011, pp.85-86).   
In the ‘Combination’ mode, explicit knowledge, such as database content, is 
reconfigured into new explicit knowledge (Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995, pp.67-69). 
This is the main task of the analysts in the policing context (Evans & Kebbell, 
2012). Providing real-time access to the organisational databases stimulates 
knowledge accumulation (Brown & Brudney, 2003, p.31). Nevertheless, 
tacit/implicit knowledge is also needed to make sense of a document stored in a 
computer system (Tuomi, 1999, pp.5-6). Thus, a need exists for an effective 
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knowledge base, as the lack of organisational knowledge can hinder this 
analytical task (Williams & Godson, 2002, p.314). Normatively, professionals 
need to constantly adjust and renew their explicit knowledge by using tacit 
experience to keep up-to-date in the changing, real-world environment (Taylor 
et al., 2013, p.481). A challenge is that tacit knowledge has an impact on 
hypothesis generation through assumptions and personal biases (Eraut, 2004, 
p.253). Indeed, these types of biases are common in the intelligence context 
(Herbert, 2006, p.669). Time pressure is particularly challenging, as its drives 
towards an intuitive approach that entails rapid interpretation and decision 
making at a more superficial level (Eraut, 2004, p.261).  
Finally, in the ‘Internalisation’ mode, explicit knowledge enriches an individual’s 
tacit knowledge base through ‘learning by doing’ (Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995, 
pp.69-70). This individual learning process is the basis for organisational 
learning (Wang & Ahmed, 2003, p.9) enabling organisations to achieve superior 
performance (Brown & Brudney, 2003, p.31). The reports produced by analysts 
in a policing environment are studied by management to make better decisions 
(Ratcliffe, 2008, p.111). The challenge is that, though individuals might learn, 
the organisation might still repeat dysfunctional activities (Brooks, 2006, p.261). 
This type of routinisation, as Argyris argued (1977, p.113), locks most 
organisations into single-loop learning in which tasks are conducted in similar, 
predictable ways. The way knowledge is transferred also has an impact. Logos 
(clarity, logic), pathos (gaining sympathy and empathy) and ethos (legitimacy) 
together shape the persuasiveness of any communication. The knowledge 
provider’s credibility is also assessed, in addition to the logic and data (Van De 
Ven & Johnson, 2006, p.804).  
2.1.3 Organisational culture and knowledge management 
The SECI model was later updated with a fifth mode called ‘Phronesis’ as the 
factor that promotes the synthesis of tacit and explicit knowledge and 
incorporates value judgments into the knowledge-creation process to create 
meaning out of the context (Nonaka et al., 2014, p.139). Values, beliefs and 
meanings are also the basis for an unregulated culture, which is based on the 
individuals’ shared experiences. This cultural knowledge is then shared through 
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social activities (Eraut, 2004, p.263). Steinwachs (1999, p.194) saw cultural 
knowledge as a pattern of shared values that influences individuals to think and 
act in a similar fashion. Although no consensus exists on the general theory of 
organisational culture (Rai, 2011, p.786), it has been argued that organisational 
culture contains deep-seated and enduring values at the most fundamental 
level (Sinclair, 1993, p.64). In this regard the literature on the police culture’s 
sense of mission, celebration of masculinity, suspiciousness, isolation, 
cynicism, pessimism and secrecy is often identified as the deep-seated values 
of the police officers (Loftus, Goold & MacGiollabhui, 2016, p.632). 
Nevertheless, an entire organisation’s culture might differ from the culture of its 
distinct professional group that holds particular values and beliefs (Charman, 
2017, p.56). 
The terms knowledge and culture are, nonetheless, two of the most difficult 
attributes of organisational dynamics to understand (Nold, 2011, p.86). Albers 
(2009, p.5) suggests that: 
Culture is one of the most critical elements of implementing 
knowledge management. An ideal knowledge management culture 
is characterized by trust, openness, teamwork, collaboration, risk 
taking, tolerance for mistakes, common language, courage, and 
time for learning.  
Organisations in which miscommunication and mistrust are prevalent are, thus, 
not equipped to share, use, or create new knowledge, and their knowledge 
management initiatives will often be unsuccessful (Ciganek et al., 2010, pp.54-
55). Another element of organisational culture relates to organisational routines, 
which can hamper information interpretation and act as a sort of organisational 
bias (Brusoni & Rosenkranz, 2014, p.150). These organisations tend to overly 
rely on problem solving by using past experience. A tendency for knowledge 
hoarding and secrecy exists that can blind the organisation to the new and 
changed circumstances, especially in organisations in which the cost of 
knowledge creation is high (Snowden, 2002, p.105). Organisational culture thus 
facilitates or hinders the utilisation of a knowledge management system and 
knowledge creation (Ciganek et al., 2010, pp.54-55) and is the main barrier to 
implicit knowledge sharing and to exchanging expertise (Seba & Rowley, 2010, 
p.623). Indeed, as professionals need to be educated and socialised into the 
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occupational domain (Schinkel & Noordegraaf, 2011, p.69), the organisational 
culture can act as the key enabler of or barrier to learning (Nold, 2011, p.90). 
This challenge is further amplified by the different professions with their own 
subcultures that exist in an organisation (Brooks, 2006, p.247) This is also the 
case in policing (Hendriks & van Hulst, 2016, p.173; Skolnick, 2008), but it also 
illuminates how police occupational culture is linked with the discussions on 
police professionalism (Gundhus, 2012).  
2.1.4 Professionalism and knowledge 
Professional experts in an occupational domain are individuals with advanced 
knowledge, skills, and abilities who form a profession’s elite (Taylor et al., 2013, 
p.479). Professions were defined historically as the privileged class of 
occupations and were characterised by expertise, merit, and peer supervision 
(Bacon, Groundwater-Smith, Nash & Sachs 2000, para 9). Some professions 
are also recognised by law or by legalised institutions (Pitman, 2013, p.131). 
Evetts (2013, p.787) distinguishes two different forms of professionalism in 
knowledge-based work: organisational and occupational professionalism. 
Organisational professionalism is characterised by hierarchy, processes and 
controls. The practitioners in occupational professionalism have more collegial 
authority, autonomy, discretionary judgement and trust. Organisational 
professionalism has been dominating the ethos of the police work and new 
forms of management are based on hierarchical authority in the policing context 
(Gundhus, 2012, p.189). 
2.1.5 Challenging role of management 
Strong leadership is essential for successful knowledge management. Leaders 
need to define a clear direction for the organisation and create an environment 
for knowledge sharing (Albers, 2009, p.5). Leaders have a high impact on the 
organisational members, affecting both organisational processes and outcomes, 
such as organisational learning (Brusoni & Rosenkranz, 2014, p.149). Nonaka 
& Takeuchi (1995, pp.154-156) argued that the essence of leadership is to 
promote the previously identified SECI process. Leaders should enable 
knowledge creation, control it (Nonaka et al., 2006, p.1192). Indeed, a key 
quality of leadership is the ability to encourage and stimulate different 
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professional groups to harvest their knowledge and foster creative ideas (von 
Krogh et al., 2012, pp.270-271). According to Goh (2002, p.29), managers 
should stimulate effective knowledge transfer in an organisation by 
 ensuring trust  
 developing a cooperative culture  
 developing a strong organisational learning culture  
 facilitating effective communication in an organisation  
 ensuring employees’ skills and competence  
 balancing formal and informal knowledge sharing, and 
 maintaining an effective rewards system. 
Thus, depending on how they use and implement knowledge, managers can 
have a strong impact on their organisations. Organisational learning acts as the 
link between management decisions and organisational routines in this sense 
(Brusoni & Rosenkranz, 2014, p.150). Still, the relationship between knowledge 
and decision making is not simple. Good decision making is critically dependent 
on how the decision is framed by the decision makers in the light of their 
situational understanding (Eraut, 2004, p.262). Indeed, Bennis and Thompson 
(2002, p.62) have argued that true leadership involves finding meaning from the 
unplanned and, often, the most negative events and learning from them. 
Nevertheless, many managers cannot articulate how their organisational 
strategy is linked with their intellectual resources and capabilities in order to 
transform organisational objectives into action (Yang et al., 2010, p.231). 
Furthermore, time pressures limit knowledge systems use; even when they are 
used, an expectation exists of an immediate reward (Eraut, 2004, p.262). 
Therefore, when the problem is easily defined and solutions are well known, 
decision makers place greater confidence in automated technology and 
information. When the problem context lacks structure and the certainty of 
outcomes is low, decision makers tend to rely on tacit, intuitive knowledge 
(Brown & Brudney, 2003, p.33). Indeed, management may overly rely on their 
past experience and, thus, avoid new knowledge creation (Lyles, 2014, p.134). 
Neverthelss, informational complexity can overwhelm human cognitive abilities 
and could create biases (Verfaillie & Vander Beken, 2008, p.537). Thus, 
managers may also misperceive a complex situation and solve the wrong 
problem by not challenging their own assumptions (Lyles, 2014, p.134). The 
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possibility also exists for management to selectively interpret and use 
knowledge as it serves their purpose (Van De Ven & Johnson, 2006, p.804; 
Brooks, 2006, p.4).  
2.2 Knowledge in law enforcement 
2.2.1 Policing and the evolution of knowledge-based models 
‘Policing’ is a universal social control process that occurs when there is at least 
the potential for conflict, deviance, or disorder (Reiner, 2010, p.8). The use and 
management of intelligence has continually evolved in a random and 
disorganised way in the policing world (Stanier, 2013, p.81). The use of 
intelligence started to increase through community and problem-oriented 
policing models in the late 1970s (Reising, 2010, p.2). Especially in the 1980s, 
political, societal and organisational changes added impetus to the transition 
towards a community-policing model (Coleman, 2008, p.312). Community-
oriented policing (COP) was born out of a reaction against conventional reactive 
policing that focused on crime control through response, deterrence and 
apprehension (Fielding, 1995). Indeed, COP is founded on a shared 
responsibility between the police and their community, focusing on prevention 
and the officers’ accountability for finding solutions to community problems 
(Adams, Rohe, & Arcury, 2002, pp.401-2). These societal changes naturally 
stimulated other new policing philosophies, paradigms and models that sought 
to respond to crime and disorder (Maguire & John, 2006, p.82). One of the most 
known, along with COP, is problem-oriented policing (POP), which aims to 
identify, understand and solve the problems causing citizens to repeatedly call 
police for service (Reising, 2010, s. 7). Both the POP and COP models 
essentially emphasise the use of systematic problem-solving processes 
(Scheider et al., 2009, pp.706-7).  
The New York Police Department (NYPD) gained the attention of police leaders 
and scholars during the early 1990s through its implementation of a crime 
analysis, intelligence and managerial accountability crime prevention program 
known as COMPSTAT (Silverman, 2006, p.281). Similar to the COMPSTAT 
model is reassurance policing, which bases its priorities according to people’s 
perceptions of safety; thus, it is not based on orthodox crime analysis (Maguire 
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& John, 2006, p.75). The so-called Volume Crime Management (VCM) model 
aims to enhance the process of volume crime investigations by ‘bringing 
offenders to justice’ with the development of a core investigative doctrine 
(Maguire & John, 2006, pp.76-77). The largely undefined Predictive Policing 
model falls into a similar category; it is still mostly an analytical challenge for 
analysts and computational scientists (Haberman & Ratcliffe, 2012, p.14).  
Evidence-Based Policing (EBP), also currently popular (Dawson & Stanko, 
2016), is dedicated to improving society by utilising high-quality scientific 
evidence to understand what works best to reduce crime and disorder (Braga, 
2009, p.113). Sherman (2013, p.383) identified three core principles that shape 
EBP. Firstly, policy should use research to target its resources. Secondly, police 
should test its method for these targets to detemine what works best to reduce 
harm. Thirdly, police should track these activities to generate an audit trail for 
assessing the deliverables. EBP’s ideology is similar to POP’s in this sense, as 
it incorpororates science and research into policing practice (Lum, Telep, Koper 
& Grieco, 2012, p.64). 
The Intelligence-Led Policing (ILP) model has been dominating UK police 
practice, along with EBP and COP and discourse for the past 20 years (Bullock, 
2013, p.125). Indeed, criminal intelligence gathering was not systematically 
performed before 1990 but was used mainly on a case-by-case basis to support 
investigations (Ratcliffe, 2011, p.264). ILP’s aim is to improve the information 
management process that allows law enforcement to better understand their 
crime problems and to best allocate their available resources to control crime 
(Ratcliffe & Guidetti, 2008, p.111). The ILP model was seen as a way to try to 
meet the demand for the police to be more effective and efficient (Ratcliffe, 
2011, p.264). The pressure to manage risks has also caused considerable 
changes in the business of policing. The breakdown of national boundaries has 
also facilitated the increase of transnational crime and favoured ILP’s further 
implementation (Ratcliffe, 2011, p.265). Police forces around the world have 
taken on many of the ILP tenets, such as buying equipment, hiring staff, and 
designing organisations for improved effectiveness and efficiency (Alach, 2012, 
p.75). In fact, the events of September 11th 2001 increased interest in ILP 
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(Ratcliffe, 2011, p.267), which was perceived as a ‘strategic, future-oriented, 
and targeted methodology’ that related well to the perspectives of many key 
decision makers (Maguire & John, 2006, p.68). Policymakers saw in it the 
means to rationalise police practices and improve effectiveness and efficiency 
(Alach, 2012, p.79; James, 2003, pp.47-49). ILP reflects the view that police 
priorities and decisions ought to be based on founded facts and knowledge 
about the criminal environment (Rønn, 2013, p.55). Therefore, ILP can be 
considered the contemporary business model for law enforcement knowledge 
management (Glomseth, Gottschalk, & Solli-Sæther, 2007, p.106; Collier, 2006, 
p.115).  
Nevertheless, ILP has been criticised for creating confusion over authority, 
causing misalignment with policy, having a tendency towards technocracy, 
using a micro-managerial approach, showing a lack of attention to decision-
making, and having pseudo-scientific pretensions (Alach, 2012, p.88). 
Furthermore, critics see ILP as a pseudo-objective methodology that hides the 
existing randomness in policing by giving a false appearance of producing 
reliable and objective intelligence/knowledge (Rønn, 2013, p.58). Critics see 
that there is little hard evidence that ILP has led to improvements in police 
effectiveness anywhere (Alach, 2012, p.88), despite claims of successful 
implementation of ILP (Darroch & Mazerolle, 2012, p.17). James (2013, p.7) 
has argued that often the challenge in implementing ILP is that those being 
asked to implement it were ignorant of the intelligence craft, along with a 
constant shifting from one model to another in a bid to meet public expectations. 
Indeed, Coleman argued (2008, p.317) that any new approaches will ultimately 
fail if not implemented as an organisational strategy that links resources, skills 
and competencies with the opportunities and risks created by its external 
environment (Gottschalk, 2009a, p.273; Bell, Dean, & Gottschalk, 2010, pp.344-
345). A proper intelligence strategy could provide a framework for structured 
problem solving (Gottschalk, 2009, p.276).  
2.2.2 Knowledge and operational policing 
Knowledge has entered into the language of operational policing (Ratcliffe, 
2008, p.96), and any lack of a clear conceptual framework to support the 
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capture, storage, retrieval, transfer and application of knowledge will have 
negative consequences in crime prevention (Ekblom, 2005, p.62). There are 
two types of knowledge in law enforcement. One is experience-based, tacit and 
intuitive ‘street knowledge’, which refers to the competence and skills of law 
enforcement officials. The other is analytical and explicit knowledge that 
includes documented crime threats, trends and statistics (Gundhus, 2012, 
p.186; Luen & Al-Hawamdeh, 2001, pp.313-314). With intelligence becoming 
increasingly important in policing, officers’ roles have shifted towards knowledge 
work (Cope, 2004, p.197), although this is not a new concept in law 
enforcement. Indeed, for investigators to catch criminals they need to first 
capture the knowledge provided by forensics, intelligence, victims, witnesses 
and suspects (Dean, Fahsing, Glomseth & Gottschalk, 2008, p. 341). Martin 
(2010, p.144) has described that investigators will use intuition/tacit knowledge 
to pick up clues to solve the case. This reactive, case-based work also requires 
the use of procedural steps in which the investigator needs to be proactive and 
use communication, creativity and risk-taking to maximise possibilities for good 
results (Dean et al, 2008, pp.342-343).  
However, this case-related knowledge is insufficient for providing knowledge for 
the whole policing domain, as the focus is often on individual cases rather than 
the overall phenomenon (Williams & Godson, 2002, p.314). Indeed, law 
enforcement agencies should possess wider knowledge of crime problems, 
crime prevention methods and how to implement these in practice. Knowledge 
of partnerships and an understanding of how to effectively target and distribute 
resources are also important (Ekblom, 2005, pp.58-59). The challenge is that 
law enforcement agencies find it difficult to move beyond the reactive approach 
due not only to a reluctance in law enforcement to take action until a crime is 
committed but also to the difficulty of justifying action against future challenges 
when there are already many existing problems, challenges and cases to deal 
with (James, 2013). The lack of a clear strategy and a reluctance to combine 
the areas of social science research, intelligence and law enforcement also 
exists (Williams & Godson, 2002, p.314). One of the main reasons for this is the 
tensions and dilemmas between the tacit, experience-based “street’ knowledge 
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and the analytical and abstract explicit knowledge promoted by management 
and intelligence analysts (Gundhus, 2012, p.186).  
2.2.3 Intelligence and analysis in policing 
Intelligence has always been a controversial subject in law enforcement due to 
its rigidity and exclusivity (Deukmedjian & de Lint, 2007, p.252). Nowadays, 
collecting and using intelligence appears to be an acceptable part of 
democracy’s “dirty work” (Innes, 2006, p.229). As previously mentioned, law 
enforcement intelligence is often confused with national security and/or military 
intelligence (Rønn & Høffding, 2013, pp.695-696; Brown, 2007, pp.336-337), 
whose dominant intelligence paradigm has an institutional basis (Sheptycki, 
2008, p.179). Although no consensus exists regarding what intelligence in 
policing is (Alach, 2012, p.76; Corkill, 2009, p.66), it can be argued that law 
enforcement intelligence is a subset of intelligence (Corkill, 2009, p.66). 
Nevertheless, law enforcement agencies do not seem to recognise a consistent 
and standardised theory of intelligence (Breakspear, 2013, p.692). This thesis 
argues that having a standardised and accepted definition of intelligence would 
assist practitioners to understand the overall strategies and the proper role of 
law enforcement in this information era (Scheider, et al., 2009, p.696; Harfield, 
2008a). Such a definition also would improve the general public’s understanding 
of intelligence and enhance auditing of intelligence functions (Breakspear, 2013, 
pp.688-689; Stanier, 2013, p.61). Thus far, however, it seems to have proved 
impossible to arrive at a definition that all can accept. 
Nonetheless, there have been many attempts to define intelligence. For 
example, Brown (2007, p.340) defines intelligence as ‘information which is 
significant or potentially significant for an enquiry or potential enquiry’. 
Intelligence is also seen as a product of the process of combining information 
and analysis (Ratcliffe, 2008, p.95), thus making ‘sense’ of a dearth of 
information (Coyne and Bell, 2011, p.23). Breakspear (2013, p.688) argues that 
intelligence represents ‘a corporate capability to forecast change in time to do 
something about it’. These definitions are not necessarily mutually exclusive; 
however, they illustrate the general lack of a consensus on law enforcement 
intelligence (Corkill, 2009, p.64).  
 
29 
 
Law enforcement intelligence is often conceptually organised around a process 
called the intelligence cycle, despite the lack of a definition, and applied 
according to four levels: criminal, crime, community and contextual. ‘Criminal’ 
relates to the activities of a known suspect or offender; ‘crime’ relates to a 
specific crime or series of crimes; ‘community’ relates to information from a 
community; and ‘contextual’ relates to the wider social, cultural or economic 
factors that may impact on crime or levels of offending (Innes et al., 2005, 
pp.43-44). Thus, though intelligence is perceived ambiguously, it is frequently 
applied to proactive crime-controlling strategies, including the use of crime 
mapping, pattern analysis and problem-oriented approaches to policing 
problems (James, 2003, p.46). 
This type of analysis in law enforcement has evolved to respect the need for an 
intelligence-led, problem-oriented and evidence-based approach to tackling 
crime (Chainey, 2009, p.58). In relation to this, Eck (2006, p.123) argued that 
good problem-solving policing should embrace theory, systematic 
measurement, comparison, and analysis. Certainly analysis is the scientific 
approach to problem solving by relying on deductive and inductive reasoning 
(Carter & Carter, 2009, p.317; Scheider et al, 2009, p.698). Analysis involves a 
set of systematic processes that aim to identify patterns and correlations 
between crime data and other relevant information sources for the purpose of 
supporting decision making that informs the design, allocation and prioritising of 
police activity (Chainey, 2009, p.57; Cope, 2004, p.188). In this sense, the 
analysts are essentially information translators tasked to review information and 
provide reliable intelligence in a practical and operational format (Cope, 2004, 
p.188). 
The analytic process thus provides integrated meaning and knowledge derived 
from diverse, raw facts (Carter & Carter, 2009, p.317). Obvious parallels exist 
between intelligence analysis and criminological research (Cope, 2004, p.199), 
and there are demands for increased collaboration between analysis units and 
academics (Braga & Weisburd, 2006b, p.149) who can bring strong analytical 
techniques and habits of thought to law enforcement (Tilley, 2010, p.189). 
Successful analysis adds value to the evidence itself, to institutional knowledge, 
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to fellow intelligence professionals, to the process, and to the institution or unit 
itself (Moore, Krizan & Moore, 2005, p.211). Indeed, the police knowledge is 
often contextual and subjective, while analysis is conducted out of context to 
develop overviews of crime problems (Cope, 2004, p.202, but the main aim of 
intelligence is, ultimately, to serve the decision-making process (Rønn & 
Høffding, 2013, p.699; Phillips, Caless & Bryant, 2007, p.443). 
2.2.4 Organisational aspects of information and intelligence management 
Organisational and structural aspects of the police shape the nature of the 
information ultimately submitted to intelligence systems (Bullock, 2013, p.132). 
A priori, different views of knowledge (and intelligence) lead to different 
perceptions and strategies of knowledge (and intelligence) management in 
organisations. When knowledge is seen as an object, organisations focus on 
building and managing knowledge stocks: when it is seen as a process, the 
organisational focus is on knowledge flows and processes for creating, sharing, 
and distributing knowledge. When knowledge is seen as a capability, then the 
organisational focus is on building core competencies, know-how, and 
intellectual capital (Alavi & Leidner, 2001, p.110).  
In UK law enforcement, the modern intelligence structure in policing originates 
from the Unit Beat Policing (UBP) model introduced in 1967. UBP established 
the local intelligence system; at its heart was the collator, an individual tasked 
with collecting and evaluating information collected by patrol officers, a 
significant milestone in the development of ILP (James, 2013, p.2). As the 
challenges of the information age proved too great, due to the availability of 
affordable information management technologies, policing began to recognise 
and embrace the opportunities for more effective information collection and 
management. The typical lone 'collator', with their paper and card-based 
intelligence records, was increasingly seen as inadequate (Stanier, 2013, p.72).  
Indeed, information technology enhanced intelligence capabilities (Cotter, 2015, 
p.4; Ratcliffe, 2011, p.264), and nowadays intelligence units manage 
information and knowledge through information and communication 
technologies (Innes et al., 2005, p.43). These systems are designed to capture 
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and store police-relevant information and, more importantly, their configuration 
ultimately shapes the decisions to formally capture, submit and store 
information by the police officers (Bullock, 2013, p.133). Thus, the process of 
capturing information at the street level should be easy to use and manage, or 
the information management process will invariably fail (Bell et al., 2010, p.348). 
However, as Stanier has argued (2013, p.129), law enforcement often fail to 
optimally use existing technology and embrace new technology in support of the 
information sharing process. Technology has indeed been shown to be a major 
impediment to progress in the intelligent application of knowledge in policing 
(Collier, 2006, p.114-15; Sheptycki, 2004). 
The issue here is that the improvement of intelligence capabilities primarily 
focuses on the further development of digital information networks (Cotter, 
2015, p.4). Nevertheless, in order to understand the knowledge and intelligence 
transfer, it is also important to understand the content and context; thus, 
knowledge and intelligence management is more than information technology 
(Snowden, 2002, p.102). Indeed, the bureaucratic boundaries of police 
organisations often cause institutional frictions and a digital divide of the 
information, along with data duplication (Sheptycki, 2004). Lemieux (2008, 
p.230) has argued that the traditional vertical organisation of a police 
organisation is an obstacle to carrying out knowledge-based policing; Braga & 
Weisburd (2006b, p.147) have argued that the hierarchical organisational 
structures in policing inhibit innovation, creativity and problem solving. Though 
there are strong arguments for flattening the organisational hierarchy to 
increase creative problem solving (Reising, 2010, p.6), the lack of a clear 
hierarchy and chain of command can be challenging for police officers to accept 
(O'Neill & McCarthy, 2014, p. 145; Weisburd et al., 2002, pp.103-104). 
2.2.5 Professionalism of intelligence in law enforcement 
Law enforcement have paid scant attention to the core competencies and 
characteristics of a successful analyst (Evans & Kebbell, 2012, p.205). The 
available literature is limited on the professionalism of law enforcement 
analysts; nevertheless, several academics have tried to identify the 
characteristics of an effective intelligence analyst, who is often seen as a 
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problem solver with a curious and critical mind. This person also has initiative, 
an ability to communicate and collaborate, skills to research and reason, and a 
wide ranging knowledge (Evans & Kebbell, 2012, p.217; Quarmby & Young, 
2010, pp.236-238; Herbert, 2006, p.680; Moore et al., 2005, pp.206-207). This 
wide range of knowledge is important, as intelligence analysts should 
understand how intelligence fits into their organisations both structurally and 
functionally (Evans & Kebbell, 2012, p.217). Creating influential intelligence 
and, thus, generating knowledge, relies on an understanding of the broad 
environment in which criminal intelligence analysts operate (Quarmby & Young, 
2010, p.241). 
Knowledge shapes the construction of analytical products and how police 
officers view them (Bullock, 2013, p.138). Analysts have lacked the knowledge 
to identify and conceptualise the operating context in some cases (Coyne & 
Bell, 2011, p.33; Cope, 2004, p.191), which illustrates the importance given to 
experiential knowledge within the policing environment (Bullock, 2013, p.138). 
Nevertheless, working as an analyst in law enforcement is a real challenge, as 
the analysts often receive inadequate instructions in their work, receive limited 
information for analysis, and have an ambiguous role and position in the police 
organisation (Cope, 2004, p.194). Furthermore, there is often lack of talent 
management, career pathways and training for analysts (Stanier, 2013, p.132).  
Indeed, Marrin (2008, p.139) has argued that intelligence analysis lacks the 
systemic formal knowledge and standards for education and entry into this 
profession. Herbert (2006, p.679) has argued that intelligence analysis, unlike 
many mature professions, lacks an agreed, unified methodology and the 
experts necessary for regulating one; therefore, the standards for intelligence 
analysis training are variable (Stanier, 2013, p.137; Quarmby & Young, 2010, 
p.38). Regardless of the absence of these standards, many of the central 
methods used to analyse crime data are similar to the established research 
methods in the social sciences (Innes et al, 2005, p.40). However, compared to 
science and business, the data used in intelligence analysis are enormously 
complex and multivariate. Thus, the intelligence analyst can be considered as 
an explainer of epistemic situations (Herbert, 2006, p.680), someone whose 
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main task is to work with information and knowledge (Quarmby & Young, 2010, 
p.25). These tasks are highly sensitive to change and exacerbated by 
digitalisation and include both repetition of past actions and scanning of new 
information or knowledge inside and outside of the organisation to create new 
knowledge (Chen & Edgington, 2005, p.281).  
If the literature is scarce on intelligence analysis, it is practically absent when it 
concerns managers of intelligence. Implementing intelligence is only possible 
through capable leadership (Darroch & Mazerolle, 2012, p.24) and that 
management must have a strong role in establishing effective crime reduction 
by changing the organisational boundaries (Darroch & Mazerolle, 2012, p.15). 
Management is also responsible for the problem identification and response 
formulation on the given topic (Boba & Crank, 2008, p.385). Ratcliffe (2005) has 
found difficulties exist in identifying a clear decision-making structure for 
intelligence management, along with a lack of understanding of ILP at the 
leadership level. In some cases, law enforcement analysts rely on authoritative 
leadership who manage by exception, whilst analytical tasks would require 
leaders who stimulate, motivate and inspire their staff (Darroch & Mazerolle, 
2012, p.11). Another major challenge is that the relevant training on knowledge 
management for leaders and managers is often absent (Coleman, 2008, p.316) 
with the result that analysts often have uninspiring management and poor 
leadership (Stanier, 2013, p.132).  
That lack of knowledge about analysis can be extended to the wider police 
workforce (Cope, 2004, p.194). Indeed, at the police officer level any lack of 
training on analysis also leads to unrealistic expectations of intelligence and 
analysis (Cope, 2004, p.194). Furthermore, Gundhus (2012, p.191) has argued 
that knowledge producers and users in law enforcement are in transition, which 
has consequences for the professionalism of the police officers. The challenge 
in this is that police officers view intelligence roles often as office work not 
requiring warranted powers (Stanier, 2013, pp.135-136). Certainly the police 
officers still see themselves as experts in crime fighting, in contrast to 
‘knowledge workers’ and information brokers (Gundhus, 2012, p.183). Thus, the 
analytical approach is contrary to traditional police practice (Cope, 2004, p.200). 
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Indeed, these changes in policing paradigm challenge the understanding of 
police professionalism and traditional police culture (Davies & Thomas, 2003, 
pp.683-684). 
2.2.6 Police culture and intelligence 
The research literature on police culture describes it as predominantly being 
prone to masculine hegemony, racism, prejudice, discrimination, exclusion 
(Charman, 2017, p.128), danger, authority, suspicion, skepticism, cynicism and 
mistrust (Skolnick, 2008, pp.36-37). Several of these characteristics have even 
been found across a wide variety of jurisdictions (Waddington, 1999, pp.295-
296), although there are arguments implying that the police culture is far more 
moderate than these mentioned characteristics (Scripture, 1997, p.174). 
Nevertheless, the police are said to have an exaggerated sense of mission and 
to crave work that has excitement (Loftus et al., 2016, p.632). 
Police culture is argued to be the result of interactions of police officers within 
the socio-political context (Chan, 1996, p.110); thus, as Waddington (1999, 
p.297) has argued, ’the fundamentals of policing is the source of police culture’. 
For example, the maintenance of order fosters conservatism. Furthermore, the 
police are often a socially isolated community with a strong group loyalty 
(Westmarland & Rowe, 2016, p.2; Paoline, Myers & Worden, 2000, p.579), 
which can also be traced back to the use of coercive authority towards citizens, 
making police officers more at ease with each other (Loftus et al., 2016, p.632; 
Waddington, 1999, p.298).  
Police culture is also shaped by a command and control disciplinary approach 
(Westmarland & Rowe, 2016, p.12), which may have also influenced the 
development of a punishment-centred blame culture (Westmarland & Rowe, 
2016, p.12; Waddington, 1999, p.301) that creates a ‘lay-low’ and ‘cover-your-
ass’ attitude in police organisations (Paoline et al., 2000, p.578). This closeness 
and hierarchical culture then makes it difficult for the police organisations to 
adapt their strategies and structures to environmental changes (Coleman, 2008, 
p.311; Kelling & Moore, 1989), thus inhibiting innovation, creativity and problem 
solving (Braga & Weisburd, 2006b, p.147).  
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The challenge in these arguments is that police culture has been mostly 
researched among uniformed police officers (Loftus et al., 2016, p.629; O'Neill 
& McCarthy, 2014, p.155) and largely ignores the diversity to be found in 
distinctive subcultures (Skolnick, 2008). For example, there is a void of research 
on police management culture (Charman, 2017, pp.138-139). Nevertheless, 
increasing numbers of academics are addressing this issue and providing 
different viewpoints to the discussion of police culture. These studies indicate 
that different working cultures exist in police organisations, from a traditional 
culture to a more open minded and pragmatic working culture (O'Neill & 
McCarthy, 2014). Indeed, as Hendriks and van Hulst (2016, p.173) have 
argued, policing cannot be positioned as a single cultural typology, as it is 
actually a cultural coexistence. Furthermore, there is no replacing of the old 
culture in policing; rather, the new practice enlarges the cultural range. 
Certainly the nature of the work impacts how the subculture develops as was 
identified in the study concerning covert surveillance work (Loftus et al., 2016, 
p.630). Similarly, the intelligence subculture is also shaped by broader 
environmental factors, such as the culture of the decision-makers whose 
unwritten rules, expectations and norms can influence how intelligence analysis 
is produced and disseminated (Marrin, 2007a, p.404). Nevertheless, there are 
tensions and dilemmas among these different subcultures, such as the mainly 
experience-based and intuitive-knowledge culture of uniformed police officers 
versus the analytical and abstract-knowledge culture of intelligence analysts 
(Gundhus, 2012, p.186). Police organisations are characteristically defensive 
about organisational boundaries (Darroch & Mazerolle, 2012, p.15), so these 
new knowledge regimes are often met with resistance due to the threat they 
pose to the perceived meaningful professional practices (Gundhus, 2012, 
p.189). The conflict between these subcultures can also result in friction on 
information sharing in the police organisations (Stanier 2013, p.123; Sheptycki 
2004). Thus, traditional police culture does not provide adequate support for 
intelligence implementation (Darroch & Mazerolle, 2012, p.25).  
Knowledge-sharing initiatives can also be hindered by the ‘‘knowledge is 
power’’ culture (Seba & Rowley, 2010, p.623; Goh, 2002, p.25). This 
‘knowledge is power’ mentality, coupled with the failure to see the big picture, 
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can create intelligence hoarding and information silos in which individuals keep 
information (Sheptycki, 2004, pp.320-321). This nonreporting is also caused by 
the ‘need to know culture’ that overwhelms intelligence work (Cope, 2004, 
p.193). Intelligence officers in this scenario have reservations about inputting 
sensitive intelligence information into a formal digital system accessible by 
officers, even without a need to know. Trust plays a significant role in facilitating 
information flow and information exchange in the digital network (Cotter, 2015, 
p.10). Indeed, there are several examples of tacit knowledge being held by 
police officers and not being converted into explicit knowledge (Collier, 2006, 
p.114).  
As Gundhus’ study (2012, p.187) has indicated, implementation of knowledge-
led policing encourages resistance by the street-level police occupational 
subculture. There is huge resistance reported in police organisations to work in 
the area of information management, which is considered a passive, paper-
moving task. This view goes against the perception of meaningful and mobile 
police work of ‘bandit-catching’ with the excitement in the hunting (Gundhus, 
2012, p.183). This working culture, which emphasise arrests, leads then to 
unrealistic expectations of intelligence and analysis (Cope, 2004, p.194). Old 
organisational routines also hinder the formation of an intelligence function in 
law enforcement (Gundhus, 2012, p.183). Indeed, routines are fundamental in 
law enforcement occupational culture, which can hinder any changes (Loftus, 
2010, pp.16-17)  
2.2.7 Knowledge (and intelligence) management in law enforcement 
Law enforcement generally accept that managing information, intelligence and 
knowledge is essential for organisational performance (Seba & Rowley, 2010, 
p.623). Intelligence has certainly been an important part of law enforcement 
knowledge management throughout its evolution, although not openly 
acknowledged until lately (Coyne & Bell, 2011, p.29). As a fluid concept, 
intelligence can serve different needs of the law enforcement community. 
Indeed, Sheptycki (2017, pp.5-6) divides police intelligence users into seven 
distinct areas: 
 criminal intelligence 
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 public order intelligence  
 serious and organised crime intelligence  
 counterterrorism and political crime intelligence  
 community security and safety intelligence 
 multi-agency coordination intelligence and 
 managerial and business intelligence.  
Nevertheless, law enforcement strategies for knowledge (and intelligence) 
management are argued to be incomplete, which can impact coordination, 
benchmarking, and improvement (Seba & Rowley, 2010, p.623), yet several 
policing models exist for capturing information and knowledge that are seen as 
practical tools intended to steer the organisational mindset from reactive 
towards proactive (Deukmedjian & de Lint, 2007, pp.245-246). These models 
have, furthermore, tried to conceptualise the analysis process within policing. 
The most influential model is COMPSTAT (McGarrell et al., 2007, p.145), which 
relies on effective analysis, relentless follow-up, and organisational 
accountability (Carter & Carter, 2009, p.320). Though the COMPSTAT model is 
mostly incident-based and focuses on incident suppressions, this model is an 
attempt to combine an accountability structure and strategic problem solving 
(Boba & Crank, 2008, p.384). The model also builds upon the strengths of 
traditional policing related to information-gathering capability and to the 
hierarchical command and accountability structure (Boba & Crank, 2008, 
p.391). Some other examples include the SARA model, whose acronym comes 
from Scanning, Analysis, Response and Assessement (Reising, 2010, pp.7-8). 
However, critics see that law enforcement are often prone to these types of 
simple step-by-step quick fixes to avoid the slow and frustrating solution 
refinement identifiable in other fields (Tilley, 2010, p.189). Still, research has 
shown that these models’ standards are rarely met by police officers (Reising, 
2010, pp.3-4) due to inadequate implementation strategies (Tilley, 2010, p.190).  
The National Intelligence Model (NIM) (Ratcliffe, 2008, p.98), designed to 
support the Intelligence-Led Policing approach in the UK (Flood & Gaspar, 
2009, pp.52-53), is another influential model designed for knowledge 
management. NIM was designed as a business process model to introduce 
intelligence into the policing business plan (Carter and Carter, 2009, p.311). In 
this sense NIM can be considered a framework for operating the intelligence 
 
38 
 
strategy; it is an information-led deployment system that uses analytical 
products to coordinate resource allocation. NIM operates at different police 
organisational levels. Level One operates at the basic command unit or small 
force, Level Two at the force or region and Level Three at the national or 
international level (Bullock, 2013, pp.127-128). NIM has been described as a 
pyramid (James, 2003, p.48), which theoretically enables coordinated law 
enforcement activity along the continuum of criminality from Levels One to 
Three (Harfield, 2008a, p.67). Indeed, the formal ILP concept is to gather 
information and process it into intelligence through analysis to identify priority 
areas and use this knowledge to make decisions about allocating resources 
(Alach, 2012, p.82; Carter & Carter, 2009, p.317; Ratcliffe & Guidetti, 2008, 
p.112). Its decision-making structure is, thus, the ILP feature that makes it 
notable (Ratcliffe, 2005, p.440). In this sense the ILP reflects the view that 
priorities and decisions should be founded in facts and knowledge about the 
criminal environment (Rønn, 2013, p.55).  
Though ILP is novel in its surface layer of processes and procedures (Alach, 
2012, p.88), a lack of clarity exists not only about its mission, goals, and 
objectives but also about how it should be implemented and used strategically 
(McGarrell et al., 2007, p.143). Furthermore, there have been organisational 
dilemmas in the NIM between the local and national levels, leading to a 
negative impact on intelligence strategy implementation (Bell et al., 2010, p.345; 
Harfield, 2008a, p.71). Explanations given for this relate to the police culture, 
overdominance of performance indicators, and silo thinking that hinder the 
information flow between the levels (Maguire & John, 2006, pp.83-84). There 
are also arguments that implementation of the ILP in the UK met ideological 
resistance (James, 2013). Nevertheless, as intelligence and knowledge become 
interlinked, Nonaka and Takeuchi’s SECI model (1995, pp.62-69) can provide 
another viewpoint for law enforcement practices related to intelligence 
management. Thus, the known practice of intelligence management in law 
enforcement is discussed next, using their model, under the chapters 
Socialisation, Externalisation, Combination and Internalisation. 
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2.2.7.1 Socialisation - from tacit knowledge to tacit knowledge 
Two principal methods of sharing information exist in the criminal intelligence 
network. It is done either formally via an information network or informally via 
interpersonal social networks (Cotter, 2015, p.6). Intelligence officers prefers to 
share information informally to ensure reliability, timeliness, security and to 
avoid unwanted police action (Cotter, 2015, p.8). Especially tight professional 
groups, such as informant handlers in the police, have difficulties sharing their 
information outside their group (Gundhus, 2012, p.184). Informal social 
networks are, thus, often used to circumvent problems associated with 
information sharing via formal information networks (Cotter, 2015, p.5). The 
members of a social network must trust their counterparts in order to share 
information (Cotter, 2015, p.10; O'Neill & McCarthy, 2014, pp.150-151; Innes, 
2006, p. 236), which can be achieved by working directly with other intelligence 
officers (Cotter, 2015, p.10). Reputation is another key information driver in a 
social network (Cotter, 2015, p.2). Professional networks can be built through 
training courses, conferences and meetings in addition to working with each 
other. Maintaining these networks is challenging, for example, when a person 
changes the unit or leaves (Cotter, 2015, p.10). The police organisations often 
ignore these horizontal connections and informal relations despite the 
importance of these social networks (Sheptycki, 2017, p.4). 
These informal networks can be a real challenge for intelligence analysis tasks, 
as the information shared in these social networks is often not systematically 
recorded. This can undermine the intelligence process (Cope, 2004, p.199). 
The cultural underpinning is that police officers often consider as practical only 
information for incident-led and short-term police work. Thus, they are 
unconcerned with quality assurance or building causal understanding in long-
term processes. Furthermore, as the experience-based knowledge is not 
systematically managed and aligned with the theoretical perspective, it is less 
useful beyond case-by-case solving (Gundhus, 2012, p.186).  
2.2.7.2 Externalisation – from tacit knowledge to explicit knowledge 
The nature of intelligence is shaped by the process through which it is 
generated (Bullock, 2013, p.134). An essential part of the intelligence process is 
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collecting raw information that may be used in the analysis (Carter & Carter, 
2009, p.317). The information that law enforcement analysts work with is 
collected from a range of open and closed sources (Innes et al., 2005, p.43). 
Information from surveillance teams, covert human sources and wiretaps are 
examples of closed sources (Bullock, 2013, p.137; Corkill, 2009, p.63). Due to 
cultural bias in law enforcement, closed sources are traditionally considered 
more valuable (Innes et al, 2005, p.43), although these traditional intelligence 
methods have achieved only limited penetration in closed communities such as 
migrants (Innes, 2006, p.229). Therefore, police have also taken another 
approach and openly engage with various communities to establish contacts 
with people who can provide information (Bullock, 2013, p.134; Innes, 2006, 
pp.233-234). The challenge is to connect with the right people who have real 
knowledge of those with the potential to commit crimes (Innes, 2006, p.234). 
Crime incident reports and calls for police service (Bullock, 2013, p.137; Corkill, 
2009, p.63) can also be used to support the intelligence function (Bell et al, 
2010, p.348). Police officers are, thus, an important source of primary 
information for analysis (Cope, 2004, p.193), provided they record the 
information received accordingly (Cotter, 2015, p.12). In fact, Gottschalk 
(2009b, pp.152-154) identified at least 16 different information sources for 
analysis. Indeed, all types of information may contribute to the development of 
intelligence (Corkill, 2009, p.63). Some of this information will be acted on 
immediately. The rest will be assessed, ‘sanitised’ and potentially entered into 
the intelligence system to be used together with other data (Bullock, 2013, 
p.130).  
The need for intelligence to be entered into the system by the front-line officers 
has also resulted in an information overload, because the officers storing the 
information cannot assess its usefulness (Bullock, 2013, p.136; Innes et al., 
2005, p.43). Noise relates to the low value of processed information circulating 
in the intelligence system; together with the analysts’ secondary duties, noise 
can create an intelligence overload and paralyse the intelligence process 
(Sheptycki, 2004, pp.315-316). There is also underreporting of information 
caused by limited training and inexperienced front-line officers (Bullock, 2013, 
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p.136). Furthermore, police officers are often biased by their experienced-based 
practices, which they use to assess and filter the information ultimately shaping 
the nature of the information incorporated in intelligence systems (Bullock, 
2013, p.131). A real risk arguably exists in replicating these biases in the 
intelligence systems, as inputting intelligence reports into the digital system is 
considered time consuming and secondary to traditional intelligence activities, 
such as conducting surveillance or acquiring source information (Cotter, 2015, 
p.7). This often results in underreporting, or non-recording and non-reporting, as 
information is not processed into the system (Sheptycki, 2004, pp.317-318; 
Stanier, 2013). A lack of understanding of legislation also prevents information 
sharing by police officers (Stanier, 2013, p.126). 
Information collection should also be focused, as it is essential to identify 
variables that support crime analysis (Carter & Carter, 2009, p.317). 
Organisational priorities can also frame the nature of the information submitted 
to intelligence systems (Bullock, 2013, p.133). In this case the danger is that 
data collection for a prioritised area can result in a defensive data concentration 
on this given topic, which can become a self-fulfilling prophesy in making 
decisions about future priorities (Sheptycki, 2004, pp.321-322). Therefore, 
defining the data-collection efforts and the necessary routines allowing the 
organisation to continuously read the environment is not an easy task. The 
challenge is that organisations that do not benefit immediately are less inclined 
to invest in collecting quality data (Brown & Brudney, 2003, p.34).  
2.2.7.3 Combination – from explicit knowledge to explicit knowledge 
Tasking ensures that analysts know more precisely what is expected from the 
requested analytical product. This requires relationship management by the 
analyst (Nicholl, 2009, p.66-67). Analysts can then provide valuable support to 
operations (Harfield & Harfield, 2012, p.168) or look at the information from a 
broad perspective to identify trends and patterns in order to assist in developing 
preventative strategies (Ratcliffe & Sheptycki, 2009, p.252). Police databases 
are the primary sources of the data used to compile these analytical products 
(Cope, 2004, p.193). However, these databases often generate information in 
different formats, making it difficult for the analysts to use the data (Bullock, 
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2013, p.137). Analysts therefore still spend considerable time simply evaluating 
and processing data rather than conducting any analysis (Innes et al, 2005, 
pp.43-44). Furthermore, this can also be challenging to the quality of the 
analytical products, as the quality of analysis is integrally linked to the quality of 
the stored information. As a result the focus might be on what had happened to 
delivery of statistical summaries of crime data (Cope, 2004, p.193). The police 
systems may also have limited availability of information within those systems 
(Bullock, 2013, p.131; Stanier, 2013, p.80), resulting in linkage blindness when 
analysts fail to link crime series due to inadequate or insufficient data 
(Sheptycki, 2004, pp.314-315).  
Nevertheless, the increasing volume of information used in intelligence expands 
also the need for critical thinking (Quarmby & Young, 2010, pp.26-27) to avoid 
cognitive biases. More structured ways of thinking have a significant potential to 
enhance the effective management of uncertainty (Kebbel, Muller & Martin, 
2010, p.95). Indeed, Kahneman (2011, pp.20-21) has identified that people use 
two modes of thinking. The first is fast, automatic and more effortless 
experience-based thinking. The second is slow, rational and requires more 
effort. The second mode is preferred in the context of critical thinking, as the 
fast-thinking process is ‘gullible and biased’ (Kahneman, 2011, p.81) Quality 
analysis would then undeniably require a synthesis of a range of information 
sources with proper time to reflect on their relationship with one another (Cope, 
2004, p.197). This is a challenging task even from the physical viewpoint, as 
cognitive reasoning consumes a lot of energy (Kahneman, 2011, p.43). 
Nevertheless, analysts are repeatedly encouraged to become methodic thinkers 
free of biases (Herbert, 2006, pp.666-667). It is important to note that 
intelligence analysis cannot be objective in an absolute sense. Furthermore, 
biases can also be useful when inferring meaning from incomplete data (Marrin, 
2007a, p.409).  
These analysis results are then presented in different types of intelligence 
products (Corkill, 2009, p.66; Cope, 2004, p.191), which should trigger some 
type of law enforcement action to prevent or mitigate crime (Carter & Carter, 
2009, p.318). Indeed, these analytical products are being disseminated to 
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management who are operating in different levels so they can make resource 
allocation decisions (Bullock, 2013, p.127). Analysis is also often used to define 
intelligence gaps to articulate intelligence requirements (Carter & Carter, 2009, 
p.317), which then fuel the tasking process (Bullock, 2013, p.130). Intelligence 
analysis reports can include historical generalisation, pattern recognition, 
inferences, statistical analysis, educated guesses, and an indefinite number of 
other strategies (Herbert, 2006, p.669).  
Different intelligence products should serve the specific purpose of informing 
their users of how crime issues can be tackled (Chainey & Chapman, 2013, 
p.476). For example, intelligence products can try to understand social 
determinants of victimisation or offending factors that facilitate the development 
of crime (Bullock, 2013, p.138). Uncertainty is part of the intelligence production 
process, as the information collected rarely provides analysts with a complete 
picture of what is happening (Marrin, 2012, p.897). A tendency exists amongst 
operational officers to treat analysis products as full and objective accounts of 
the problem to be tackled despite this (Innes et al., 2005, p.52). Nevertheless, 
the analytic products are mostly used to describe the historical organisation of 
crime and the routines of the offenders so as to provide officers with the right 
information to disrupt the offending (Bullock, 2013, p.138; Cope, 2004, p.196).  
2.2.7.4 Internalisation – learning and using explicit knowledge 
Intelligence is considered a critical element in effective decision making (Corkill, 
2009, p.62), as it enables decision makers to optimise their responses (Corkill, 
2009, p.66; Dean & Gottschalk, 2007). The purpose of intelligence analysis is 
wise management of epistemic complexity, as decision makers are often 
flooded with information relating to an impending decision (Herbert, 2006, 
p.680). The extent to which a criminal intelligence analyst is able to deliver 
‘knowledge’ and ‘understanding’ to a decision maker provides a measure of the 
value of the intelligence function (Quarmby & Young, 2010, p.27; Herbert, 2006, 
p.680). The challenge is that the organisational emphasis is often on acquiring 
rather than using information (Collier, 2006, p.115). Indeed, the use of this 
‘academic type’ of explicit knowledge is challenging in a law enforcement 
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environment that values experience- and intuition-based knowledge more 
(Gundhus, 2012, pp.178-179).  
The impact of analytical products, then, varies as a result of the organisational 
context, the officers’ positions and roles in the organisation and their 
understanding and attitudes towards analysis (Bullock, 2013, p.139). Integrating 
the intelligence into decision making requires some aspect of proximity, such as 
organisational relationship, frequency of contact, and delivery mechanisms 
(Marrin, 2007a, p.411). Analytical products are also only one of many 
knowledge sources of the decision makers (Bullock, 2013, p.139; Marrin, 
2007a, p.410), giving managers the option to choose the information that might 
be closer to their preference (Marrin, 2007a, p.410). Managers might also want 
the analytical results to back up their initial ideas (Marrin, 2004, p.666). Thus, 
even if intelligence analysis is considered to be relevant to the decision maker, 
it is not guaranteed to be influential or useful (Marrin, 2012, p.909).  
This suggests that it is important for the intelligence analysis function to develop 
its products and services to match stakeholder expectations (Coyne & Bell, 
2011, p.23). It is also important to note in this sense that police officers are 
some of the key consumers of intelligence products (McGarrell et al., 2007, 
p.152). However if the intelligence product is coming from an analysis 
department, which is not inherently associated with the core police service, it 
may be easily ignored (Ratcliffe, 2005, p.447). Many police officers also lack an 
understanding of the analysis concept (James, 2013; Carter & Carter, 2009, 
p.311), which also affects their acceptance of these products. 
3.1 Summary of the literature review 
This chapter presented the available research literature on two levels. The first 
part under the heading ‘The science of knowledge management’ generally 
examined the concept of knowledge from different viewpoints. Firstly, it 
explored the philosophical foundation of knowledge and intelligence. Secondly, 
it then presented organisational knowledge assests and the SECI knowledge 
management model, followed by organisational culture and knowledge 
management as well as the concept of professionalism and its relation to 
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knowledge. Lastly, this first part also explained the supervision role in managing 
knowledge.  
The second part of the literature review, under the heading of ‘Knowledge in law 
enforcement’, addressed these same knowledge-related areas from the law 
enforcement perspective. Firstly, it discussed the evolution of policing models 
towards a knowledge-based model to provide the context for knowledge in law 
enforcement. This discussion was deepened from the operational perspective, 
followed by a discussion of the status quo of intelligence and analysis in 
policing. It also discussed the practical aspects related information and 
intelligence management in law enforcement. Secondly, it elaborated on the 
level of professionalism related to intelligence analysis in law enforcement and 
the police culture aspects of intelligence. Lastly, this part of the literature review 
compared the available policing-related literature to the SECI knowledge 
management model to identify what is known about the different aspects of 
knowledge management in policing. 
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3 Methodology 
3.1 Research setting 
The main lines of inquiry were established to comprehend the contemporary 
policing context from the viewpoint of intelligence analysis and how it 
contributes to law enforcement knowledge management. This research thus 
needs to take note of the different aspects of knowledge management not only 
to examine how the concept of intelligence and analysis are understood in law 
enforcement but also to understand the state of play of the knowledge 
management structures and systems. Professionalism and culture are integrally 
linked to organisational knowledge, so this thesis would be incomplete without 
also exploring these knowledge concepts. As professional doctorate research, 
this thesis has an inherent need to link theory and practice together by 
understanding the practical role and implications of intelligence analysis in the 
knowledge management apparatus. Indeed this practical focus coincides with 
the professional profile of the researcher, which consists of working at the 
patrolling field, as an investigator in variety of crime areas, and as a financial 
intelligence officer. Additionally the researcher has a wide variety of analysis 
related roles both national and international level - especially when working at 
Europol. At Europol the researcher also managed several analysis courses 
aimed for analysts, managers and investigators from different countries. 
Furthermore the researcher has received extensive range of education from 
basic police training to post graduate academic qualifications. Given this 
background, this research addresses the specific research questions: 
 What is the state of play of intelligence analysis in the contemporary 
policing context in terms of structures, systems and concepts? 
 What is the status of professionalism and organisational culture in 
relation to intelligence analysis? 
 How does intelligence analysis serve the law enforcement knowledge 
management apparatus in practice? 
After settling on these questions, the researcher felt a profound need to 
understand how best to conduct this study. As the professional observations of 
the researcher are that law enforcement intelligence analysis is confronting 
similar challenges in different countries it was considered important to reflect 
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this in this study; therefore, a decision was made to use two European countries 
for this study. Although the researcher’s acquired experience indicates similar 
challenges exist, using two countries might also reveal something new or at 
least provide a different perspective. Furthermore, two countries reinforce 
triangulation for the analysis and provide wider access to the data. At this point 
it is important to hihglight that the researcher has not been involved in creating 
any policies, before and during this study, in neither of the countries. Although 
the researcher has provided analysis training to officials coming from these 
countries, the content of these courses were build on general level focusing on 
basics of intelligence analysis, which is universally ablicable to all law 
enforcement around the globe. 
Access to data is vital with any research - especially in the context of law 
enforcement. The background of the researcher provided good propability to 
gain access to Finnish police, but also his professional experience had 
generated a good contact in Denmark. These two countries were, thus, obvious 
choices for this study. Additionally, these two countries have many similarities 
that faciliated conducting this research throughout the process. Indeed, these 
countries have around the same number of inhabitants (Eurostat, 2017a), 
around the same number of crimes recorded by the police (Eurostat, 2017b), 
and a similar number of police officers (Eurostat, 2017c) and police 
departments. Indeed, Denmark has 12 police departments, excluding the Faroe 
Islands and Greenland (Police Denmark, 2018), whereas Finland has 11 police 
departments (Police Finland, 2018).  
3.2 Research paradigm 
Scientific examination can be described as a set of philosophical and 
metatheoretical norms concerning ontology, epistemology, methodology and 
the research methods (Gelo, Braakmann, & Benetka, 2008, p.269). These 
terms are the ‘basic tools’ of research and assist, for example, in understanding 
the research assumptions and recognising others’ and our own research 
positions (Grix, 2002, p.176). Ontology is a starting point of all research and, 
after this is settled, the epistemological and methodological positions logically 
follow. Ontology is, then, about what we may know, and epistemology is about 
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how we come to know what we know (Grix, 2002, p.177). Ontology considers 
the nature of social phenomena: are they relatively inert and beyond our 
influence, or are they very much a product of social interaction (Bryman, 2012, 
p.6)? Epistemology concerns the question of what is or should be regarded as 
acceptable knowledge in a discipline (Bryman, 2012, p.27). Derived from the 
words episteme (knowledge) and logos (reason), epistemology focuses on the 
knowledge-gathering process (Grix, 2002, p.177). There are two contrasting 
epistemological positions: ‘positivism’ and ‘interpretivism’, the latter also known 
as constructionism. Positivism advocates the application of natural science 
methods (Grix, 2002, p.178), whilst interpretivism argues that social properties 
are constructed through interactions between people (Robson, 2011, p.24). 
Methodology, then, refers to the planning, structuring and executing of the 
research to meet the scientific criteria (Mouton & Marais, 1996, p.15). It is the 
logic of implementing scientific methods in the study of reality (Grix, 2002, 
p.179; Mouton & Marais, 1996, p.15), particularly when investigating the 
potentialities and limitations of particular techniques and procedures. As the 
term suggests, methodology is the science and study of methods (Grix, 2002, 
p.179). The debate on research methodology focuses on what the source and 
nature of knowledge about the social world are supposed to be. This has led to 
the development of research paradigms into two distinct, opposing 
epistemologies using terms such as positivism versus relativism, objectivism 
versus subjectivism, and quantitative versus qualitative (Wagner & Okeke, 
2009, pp.61-62). Grix (2002, p.180) argued that the methods themselves should 
be seen as free from ontological and epistemological assumptions and should 
be guided by the research questions, yet this is often not the case. Indeed, a 
researcher’s orientation in ontology, epistemology, and methodology often leads 
to a preference for a particular research method (Gelo, Braakmann, & Benetka, 
2008, p.269).  
So what is the status of these ontological, epistemological and methodological 
items in this research? The researcher’s ontological position leans more 
towards constructionism, which, according to Bryman (2012, p.33), asserts that 
the social actors modify social reality, which continuously changes. Knowledge 
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is, thus, indeterminate. Regarding the epistemological position, the researcher 
is a pragmatist, who, according to Robson (2011, p.28) prefers moderate and 
common-sense versions of philosophical dualism based on how well they work 
in solving problems. Thus, different, even conflicting, theories and perspectives 
can be a useful way to gain an understanding of the world. Here, the 
researcher’s law enforcement background is visible, as it gives the impetus to 
be closer to practice. The researcher firmly believes knowledge needs to be 
linked with reality. Therefore, the researcher has a flexible approach to the 
research paradigm and in the investigative techniques, viewing the research as 
a ‘holistic endeavour’ (Robson, 2011, p.171).  
How then have the biases of the researcher been mitigated? Firstly, the 
extensive range of academic disciplines, with previously unfamiliar knowledge, 
explored for this research acted as a balance against any preconceived notions. 
Secondly, the researcher used a technique called Key Assuptions Check to 
critically plan the research and the data collection questions. Thirdly, the 
selection of a specific research methodology that aimed for strenghtening 
triangulation acted as a mitigating factor for biases. Indeed, taking note of these 
and the research questions the mixed-method strategy, with its primary 
philosophy of pragmatism (Burke, Onwuegbuzie, & Turner, 2007, p.113), is the 
one most suitable for this research. As this is also an evaluation research study, 
with the purpose to study the effectiveness of using existing knowledge to 
inform and guide practical action (Clarke & Dawson, 1999, p.35), the use of the 
mixed-method approach is further justified (Miller & Fredericks, 2006, p.578). 
Furthermore, the mixed-method approach is increasingly recognised as the 
third major research paradigm along with the quantitative and qualitative 
methodologies (Burke et al., 2007, p.112). 
Indeed, both quantitative and qualitative paradigms have recognised strengths 
and weaknesses and, ideally, should be used in combination (Carr, 1994, 
p.720). The physical science approach related to the quantitative paradigm 
(Johnson & Onwuegbuzie, 2004, p.14) certainly aims to verify if observed 
phenomena and their systematic relationship confirm the prediction made by a 
theory (Gelo et al., 2008, pp.271-272). Thus, the researcher maintains a 
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detached and objective attitude towards the research subject in quantitative 
research in order to understand the facts (Carr, 1994, p.717). It is then possible 
for the researcher to surpass individual differences and identify patterns and 
processes in real life situations (Robson, 2011, p.83). The data collected is 
often considered precise, unambiguous, hard, numerical, and ordered (Sayer, 
2010, p.118; Carr, 1994, p.718) and, thus, is considered more reliable than 
qualitative research (Carr, 1994, p.719).  
Conversely, the qualitative purist rejects positivism and sees that research is 
time, context and value bound and that it is impossible to fully differentiate 
causes and effects (Johnson & Onwuegbuzie, 2004, p.14). Qualitative 
approaches, therefore, tend to comprehend the personal perspectives, 
experiences and understandings of the individual actors (Gelo et al., 2008, 
p.272). In this sense qualitative research can contribute to understanding the 
context in which crime occurs and criminal justice is administered by providing 
rich and detailed data to enrich the numerical, quantitative data (Noaks & 
Wincup, 2004, p.14). The strength of the qualitative approach is, thus, its ability 
to probe for underlying values, beliefs, and assumptions in a broad and open-
ended fashion (Yauch & Harold, 2003, p.472). 
The process of combining both qualitative and quantitative methodologies is 
also one aspect of using triangulation to increase the findings’ validity (Noaks & 
Wincup, 2004, pp.8-9). The mixed-methods research study thus attempts to 
consider multiple viewpoints, perspectives, positions, and standpoints (Burke et 
al., 2007, pp.112-113). Indeed, quantitative methodologies test theory 
deductively from existing knowledge, whilst qualitative researchers are guided 
by certain ideas and perspectives regarding the subject to be investigated and 
develop their theory inductively (Carr, 1994, p.716). Therefore, the aim of this 
mixed-method approach is to balance not only the use of structured data 
collection methods with less structured methods but also to balance the 
involvement of the researcher towards research subjects (Axinn & Pearce, 
2006, pp.25-26). Indeed, using the strengths of both approaches can help to 
minimise the weaknesses embedded in these classical paradigm approaches. 
The research world is increasingly interdisciplinary, complex and dynamic, so it 
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is especially seen as a necessity for researchers to complement one method 
with another (Johnson & Onwuegbuzie, 2004, pp.14-15). Furthermore, as an 
evaluation research study, the issues here need to be examined from several 
perspectives to find the causal linkages between activities and outcomes 
(Clarke & Dawson, 1999, p.5), another reason for advocating the use of the 
mixed-methods approach. 
3.3 Data collection methods 
Several options were available when starting this project for how to conduct the 
data collection. Indeed, observation methods are an important tool, as they can 
produce unique sources of insight and introspection. However, the intensive 
nature of this method generally prevents it from being used to study a large 
number of people due to time and resource constraints (Axinn & Pearce, 2006, 
p.8). Ethnographies also require a great deal of access to the field being studied 
and a great deal of researcher involvement in gathering, organising and 
analysing observations (Neyland, 2007, p.2). This research was conducted in 
two different countries, while the researcher lived and worked in a third country, 
so significant time and proximity challenges existed relative to using this 
method. Furthermore, language issues would have prevented using this method 
in Denmark; thus, this method was unsuitable for this research from a practical 
viewpoint. The focus groups, in which respondents interact with one another 
when formulating responses, similar to semistructured interview questions 
(Axinn & Pearce, 2006, p.7), would have been similarly challenging to organise 
due to the distance, time and costs. Hence, the researcher did not select this 
method.  
The historical and archival methods were also strong options for this study, 
along with document analysis to evaluate and interpret documents (Bowen, 
2009, p.27), in order to have a more rigid data triangulation. The intention was 
to evaluate the official policies and documentation made by the organisations to 
better understand their operational context and to verify findings or corroborate 
evidence from other sources (Bowen, 2009, pp.29-30). However, this also 
would have not worked, given the available resources and, yet again, the 
language barrier in Denmark. The topic of intelligence is also often under tight 
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information security, which would have further hindered the practical application 
of this method. Also, as the researcher knows, trust is important for law 
enforcement thus face-to-face interviews works better in acquiring knowledge. 
Therefore, given the identified challenges in these methods, the chosen 
qualitative method for this research was semistructured interviews, which can 
be conducted on an individual basis and, thus, provide a good balance of 
flexibility and validity in relation to data collection. Indeed, Axinn and Pearce 
(2006, p.6) have stated that this method allows respondents to change the 
course of the conversation and bring up new issues that the researcher had not 
preconceived. Semistructured interviews are also a familiar method for the 
researcher who as an investigator has interrogated several people in crime 
investigation related professional setting. The challenge of the semi-structured 
interview technique is that it might drift away from the subject if the interviewee 
is not guided properly, but also if there is too much guidance this might 
introduce interviewer biases. 
One of the mitigating factors for these interview related challenges was to use 
survey questionnaires to collect data. Also, as semistructured interviews are 
quite intensive and demanding to carry out with large numbers of respondents 
(Axinn & Pearce, 2006, p.6), the researcher could obtain multiple responses on 
the topic and to save time by using survey questionnaires (Vogt, Gardner, & 
Haeffele, 2012, p.29). The advantage of this type of numerical data is that it 
also facilitates comparisons between groups and allows a determination of the 
extent of agreement or disagreement between respondents (Axinn & Pearce, 
2006, p. 4; Yauch & Harold, 2003, p.473). Another advantage is that this 
method provides anonymity, which is important for law enforcement setting. The 
challenge of this method is to make it understandable for the respondent. The 
five point Likert scale was used in the survey questionnaire, as this study 
wanted to measure respondents’ views on the impact, beliefs, policies, and/or 
practices around this topic to explore possible differences across the groups 
(Vogt et al., 2012, p.30). The Likert scale made it possible to measure the 
participants’ attitudes around this topic (Vogt et al., 2012, p.63; Bryman, 2012, 
p.166; Robson, 2011, p.94) and, thus, to build a more complete picture 
(Robson, 2011, p.303). Indeed, the survey responses complemented the 
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detailed context gathered through the interviews (Noaks & Wincup, 2004, p.14). 
Furthermore, as the interview questions and the survey statements reflected the 
same issues, these two methods counterbalanced each other’s weaknesses 
(Axinn & Pearce, 2006, pp.25-26). Moreover, this combination of two methods, 
known also as triangulation, then increased the validity and enhanced the rigour 
of this research (Vogt et al., 2012, p.111; Robson, 2011, p.158).  
3.4 Collecting the data 
Empirical data were collected using purposive or judgement sampling to select 
persons with special expertise or roles (Bowling, 2009, p.208; Marshall, 1996, 
p.523). The researcher’s contact points in both countries provided a list of 
possible participants whom the researcher approached to recruit to this study. 
The researcher aimed for having a balanced list of participants covering the 
three key roles of analyst, investigator and manager. Also the aim was to have 
balanced geographical/police department coverage in both of the countries. As 
there were quite a number who refused to participate, the snowballing sampling 
method was also used to identify participants proposed by the interviewees 
(Bryman, 2012, p.424). This ensured the right contacts and profile but also 
provided a larger geographical coverage that included staff from different police 
departments. Thus, this also supported the aim to interview different staff roles 
in different police departments to increase the validity of this research. The 
recruitment was done via email, which contained the invitation letter, information 
package and consent form. The participants were invited to read the 
documentation and return the filled-in and signed consent form to the 
researcher via email as a scanned copy. The semistructured interviews were 
targeted to match the aims and objectives of this research and were 
thematically organised into 
 intelligence, analysis and knowledge in law enforcement 
 information management 
 knowledge conversion 
 on knowledge workers 
 prganisational issues 
Appendix II shows the full interview schedule. In order to mitigate any insider 
role effect or power distance related distorsion when responding to the interview 
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questions the researcher did not highlight his professional role and status to the 
majority of the participants, who did not know the researcher in advance. To 
mitigate these effects among the participants, who knew the researcher in 
advance, the information on voluntary participation were emphasised. 
Additionally the atmoshphere during the interview was kept casual and any 
guidance to the minimum. 
As a result of this process, 13 interviews comprising five different police 
departments, national police, national police board and the police college were 
conducted in Finland. In Denmark, 11 interviews were conducted among four 
different police departments and in the national police. The conducted 
interviewees covered the key roles of patrolling officer, investigator, analyst and 
manager (see Table 3.1). The majority of the interviews were conducted over 
the phone, Skype of Facetime due to the geographic distance. Few face-to-face 
interviews were also conducted. All of the interviews were recorded. English 
was used as the language among the Danish participants. Finnish language 
was used among the Finnish participants. Appendix IV presents these 
questions. These recorded interviews were then transcribed. The Danish 
interviewee responses were directly transcribed into English, and the Finnish 
responses were first transcribed into Finnish and then translated into English. 
The researcher did his utmost to ensure that the meaning and the concepts 
were not lost in the Finnish to English translations.  
Semi-structured interviewees 
Role Finland Denmark 
Manager 5 3 
Analyst 5 6 
Investigator 2 1 
Patrolling officer 1 1 
Total 13 11 
Table 3.1. The number of semistructured interviewees and their roles per country 
The surveys (see Appendix III) were also thematically organised into  
 intelligence, analysis and knowledge in law enforcement 
 information management 
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 knowledge conversion 
 knowledge workers 
 organisational issues 
The survey collection in Denmark was mostly conducted in the analysis 
conference organised by the Danish police in October 2016. The researcher 
participated in this conference and invited the Danish participants to complete a 
paper copy of the survey to be returned to the researcher, resulting in 57 
responses altogether. The researcher also requested the Danish contact point 
to collect additional surveys via email to boost up the response rate, resulting in 
an additional 10 responses. Thus, 67 responses were received from Denmark. 
Out of these, two responses were rejected due to not fitting or an unclear 
professional role. Therefore, 65 responses were used in this research, of which 
38 came from analysts, 19 from managers and 8 from investigators. The 
responses from senior management and management were combined together 
in this calculation (see Table 3.2). In the paper-based collection, 17 empty 
values appeared in 7 surveys, which were marked as ‘Neutral’ in the used set. 
One survey had a Neutral/Disagree response marked on one of the statements, 
which was also translated into ‘Neutral’. Appendices VII-VIII present these 
results in detail. 
The survey questionnaire collection in Finland was conducted via the online 
survey tool provided by Google Docs. The researcher also translated the survey 
questions into Finnish (see Appendix IV). The Finnish National Police Board 
(NPB) tested the link to the online survey to ensure it functioned properly and 
that there were no data protection-related issues before the online survey was 
disseminated. The link to this survey was disseminated via email through the 
registries of the police departments and National Bureau of Investigation after 
the NPB’s approval was received. The aim was to target certain dedicated 
groups of investigators, management and intelligence staff. After a reminder 
was sent to extend the deadline, 123 responses were received from Finland. 
One response was rejected from the final set, as it was the only response 
received from a patrolling officer. The responses from senior management and 
management were also combined together in Finland. Therefore, out of 122 
responses, 21 came from analysts, 19 from management and 82 from 
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investigators (see Table 2). The fields in the online survey were marked as 
‘Mandatory’; thus, no empty or unclear values appeared in the responses. 
Appendices V-VI present the results of these survey responses. 
  
Finnish survey 
respondents 
Danish survey 
respondents 
Analysts 21 38 
Managers 19 19 
Investigators 82 8 
Total 122 65 
Table 3.2. The number of survey respondents per country 
3.5 Analysis 
The qualitative and quantitative methods were used separately, independently, 
and in parallel, as previously indicated (Robson, 2011, p.165). The interview 
questions and the survey statements were synchronised to reflect the same 
issues and counterbalance the weaknesses of the concerned methods (Axinn & 
Pearce, 2006, pp.25-26). The aim was to ensure the quality of the in-depth 
answers and obtain multiple responses around the topic through a self-
administered survey questionnaire to save time (Vogt et al., 2012, p.29). The 
analysis of the interview data broadly followed Robson’s (2011, p.476) thematic 
coding analysis phases of data familiarisation, code generation, theme 
identification, constructing thematic networks, and integration and interpreting 
data. The transcribed interviewee responses were firstly coded manually, by 
using the text-highlighting feature in MS Word, when going throught the text in 
several iterations. The aim was to identify similar themes between the different 
interviewee responses by allowing the codes and emerging themes to steer this 
formulation. The researcher considered using NVivo to assist in this task, but as 
the transcribed texts were in two different languages the decision was not to 
use this software in order to avoid false findings and mistakes. Nevertheless 
this slow manual work assisted in identifying themes, which were then firstly 
clustered together and then reallocated into three different chapters for further 
synthesis. The synthesis and meta-analysis of the text in these chapters 
resulted the need to adjust and reorganise the text also between the chapters 
as the analysis progressed. Thus the analysis of one chapter had to be done in 
conjunction with the other thematic chapters. Therefore, the text analysis of the 
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three findings chapters was actually moving forward in parallel. The 
interpretation of the interview responses was the most time-consuming part of 
this analysis phase (Yauch & Harold, 2003, p.472). 
The results of the interviews were then synthesised and compared with the 
survey results to assess how well they are in conjunction. The survey 
statements were placed under relevant themes. Descriptive statistics (see the 
Appendices) were used, and the average was calculated from the answers of 
the different groups in the two countries for comparison purposes (Robson, 
2011, p.126). The survey contained the five point Likert scale on which the 
average calculation was based. The researcher used descriptive statistics to 
summarise the data for quick, accurate and honest communication (Hanneman, 
Kposowa, & Riddle, 2012, p.5). The descriptive statistics were complemented 
with the interview results, as the relative weakness of these statistics is that 
they cannot capture the subtleties and complexities of individual human 
behaviour (Robson, 2011, p.83); thus, they are considered quite primitive tools 
for explanation (Sayer, 2010, p.133). Critics have also argued that it is highly 
dubious to translate statistical association into causality. The reliability of 
quantitative research also suffers if the data have been stripped from the natural 
context (Carr, 1994, p.719). Thus, context-dependent actions might be 
unsuitable for quantification; however, if this is done, the interpretation of the 
results should be done extremely cautiously (Sayer, 2010, p.119). Therefore, 
the comparison of the survey results was conducted against the interviewee 
responses. The multistrategy design thus followed a sequential exploratory 
design in which emphasis would be given to the qualitative data collection, and 
the findings would be integrated during the interpretation phase (Robson, 2011, 
p.165).  
3.6 Ethical considerations 
As the author of a professional doctorate study, the researcher is drawn to the 
statement of the first page on the ‘The concordat to support research integrity’ 
by Universities UK (2016) stating: ‘All those engaged with research have a duty 
to consider how the work they undertake, host or support impacts on the 
research community and on wider society”. This is particularly true in this 
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research. Conducting a study in an area in which the researcher is 
professionally engaged has a specific meaning in terms of credibility. Indeed, 
this indicates the researcher needs to maintain the highest integrity 
professionally as well as in this study, otherwise this research is pointless and 
useless. 
There were certainly several ethical considerations to take into account. The 
first relates to potentially compromising situations in which the participants may 
reveal something about their organisation that could have consequences for 
their future work in the organisation. Their responses were made anonymous to 
avoid any harm to them and to respect this concern raised by many of the 
interviewees. Specific attention was given to statements that could have 
revealed the identity of the interviewee, such as specialists or managers who 
are low in numbers among the staff, to mitigate this. The police departments 
where the interviewees worked are not identified to further protect their 
anonymity and to avoid possible identification due to the low number of any 
given role in the department. Then comments that could have compromised the 
identity of the interviewees were presented in a way to protect their anonymity. 
In relation to the surveys, the amount of data collected by using the survey 
mitigated the risk of identification through the nominal variables, as the 
individual answers are part of the mass information. This was also one of the 
reasons to exclude some of the survey responses, as the demographics related 
to their specific role of these respondents would have made it possible to 
discover their identity.  
This study also has a possible reputational risk towards the countries and 
organisations under study. As this is an evaluative research study, there will, 
most likely, be findings that can be seen as undesirable and that might reflect 
negatively on the researched institutions and/or countries. This particular 
concern was also raised by the Ethics Committee; the researcher was thus 
asked to take specific attention and inform the countries of this risk in writing. 
This was carried out as expected. In Denmark the researcher provided 
information on this to the organisation; in Finland this was part of the 
standardised written procedure when applying for permission to perform this 
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study in the Finnish police. It also needs to be highlighted that studies in other 
countries support the overall ethos of this study; thus, these countries under 
study are not alone with these findings. Furthermore, as both countries are 
engaged in improving the intelligence analysis processes, this study can also 
assist these organisations to improve their processes accordingly. 
Participation in this study was purely voluntary and, from the ethical viewpoint, 
this was a success, as several potential interviewees refused to participate. Due 
to different sampling techniques, as previously explained, the contact points in 
each of the countries were unaware of the persons participating in this study. 
Furthermore, as previously mentioned, a written informed consent was acquired 
from each interviewee. As most of the interviewing was conducted via phone, 
Skype or Facetime, the participants were requested to scan the signed version 
of the consent form and send it via email to the researcher. Additionally, all 
possible information from the ethical viewpoint was provided to the possible 
participants of the survey questionnaire. The information sheet was either 
provided separately for the participants, as in the case of paper-based 
responses, or it was integrated into the online survey. The data collection in this 
regard was also completely voluntary. The collected data is kept in the 
personal, password-protected computer drive of the researcher and not stored 
in any outside server. The hard copies were also kept safe in a locked filing 
cabinet. The transcripts will be similarly kept safe.  
Another ethical consideration is related to the insider role. This role confusion is 
also amplified by the fact that the researcher has been providing intelligence 
analysis courses to the law enforcement staff in these countries. The researcher 
was during the research in a senior role at Europol and before this study he had 
been part of the Finnish police. In order to mitigate the role conflict the 
researcher did not highlight these professional facts to the possible participants. 
Instead the researcher’s role was highlighted when contacting the organisations 
under study to mitigate any role conflict issues. Written documentation and 
written consent forms were also collected from the interviewees. This approach 
was a success from the ethical viewpoint, which could be seen when recruiting 
the interviewees. Challenges certainly existed in finding and convincing staff to 
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participate in this study; thus, it can be concluded that this ethical consideration 
was mitigated very successfully.  
Lastly, given that this research is conducted in an area that is relatively 
confidential by its nature, a risk exists of revealing tactical and technical 
knowledge about the functioning of the law enforcement. The obviously 
sensitive information was not included in this thesis to mitigate this risk, and 
when this was relevant for the findings, it was discussed on a very general level 
to avoid any unwanted disclosure of police tactics. Other than this, there is no 
foreseen knowledge of risks or burdens in this study when it comes to ethics. 
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4 Findings I: Exploring the context   
This chapter addresses the first research question: ‘What is the state of play of 
intelligence analysis in the contemporary policing context in terms of structures, 
systems and concepts?’  The chapter thus provides an understanding of the 
context in which intelligence analysis operates by exploring the policing model 
of these two countries, followed by exploring how crime management strategies 
are implemented. Then, it discusses the information management systems and, 
lastly, the concepts of knowledge, intelligence and analysis. By doing so this 
chapter contributes to the overall aim of this study to comprehend the policing 
context from the viewpoint of intelligence analysis. The implementation of the 
crime management strategies also provides insight into how the organisation 
applies knowledge. Furthermore, this chapter contributes to the overall aim by, 
firstly, examining the systems related to knowledge management, followed, 
secondly, by elaborating how the concepts of knowledge, intelligence and 
analysis are understood.  
4.1 Policing approaches and the organisational structures for 
intelligence 
The respondents were generally clear that the Finnish the police operate a 
standard model of reacting to events. There have been considerations and an 
attempt to manage crime differently and change the thinking towards 
Intelligence-Led Policing (ILP). Several interviewees (FI05-FI06,FI08-FI10) 
stated that Community-Oriented Policing (COP) was also on the agenda; 
however, it has practically evaporated from there and is mostly conducted in 
social media. The National Intelligence Model (NIM) has also been on the 
agenda in Finland and, similar to the original model, every police department in 
Finland established their own Intelligence and Analysis Unit (IAU) a few years 
ago to focus on collecting, validating, processing, organising and disseminating 
information. Additionally, an intelligence cooperation structure exists at the 
national level in Finland, a sort of national fusion centre, where the intelligence 
generated by the police, customs and border guard (PCB) can be managed 
nationally. Several interviewees (FI03,FI07,FI12) in Finland also stated that the 
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operational centres, which provide support to the patrolling officers, can act as 
the link between the intelligence units and the patrolling officers.  
Nevertheless, the results in adopting the intelligence concept have been modest 
so far. Several reasons were put forward for this:  
The ILP concept is considered too fancy and difficult for the police 
who require practicality [and] the support for Intelligence-Led 
Policing is missing in every level (FI04, Analyst). 
Unfortunately substantial part of the leadership do not have 
adequate understanding of the Intelligence-Led Policing (Survey 
respondent, Analyst, Finland). 
There is a severe lack of resources, which prevents the 
development of new crime prevention measures (Survey 
respondent, Investigator, Finland). 
Additionally, one interviewee (FI05) identified that the lack of general agreement 
on the policing model by the leadership has led to the lack of agreed definitions 
and terminology for analysis, ultimately diminishing its role in policing. The lack 
of a clear legal framework on intelligence was also seen to hinder the adoption 
of the intelligence concept. But also: 
The leadership have no understanding what we really want to do 
with all of this information (FI09, Manager). 
This might be a bold statement; however, this claim is supported by other 
findings that indicate a variance in working standards between police 
departments on ILP-related standards.   
The Danish police have similarly been mainly operating through the classic 
reactive policing model of ‘dealing [with] the matters that are in front of us 
(DK02)’. Nevertheless, several Danish interviewees (DK01,DK03,DK10) 
identified that there are developments to adopt a more ILP approach (Rønn, 
2013, p.55) to save resources and be successful in the complex policing 
environment, along with having a Danish National Intelligence Model. As a sign 
of this in Denmark, all of the police departments also established their own IAU 
a few years ago to collect, validate, process, organise and disseminate 
information. Another IAU exists in the Danish National Police that manages the 
information and intelligence on a national level. Nevertheless, these changes 
have had a limited impact on adopting the intelligence concept in Denmark:  
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[Intelligence} is absolutely necessary and logic way to work […]. 
We have some difficulties because the Danish police has been 
working on its own way for so many years and like a big tank ship 
we have to turn and it takes so much time (DK06, Analyst). 
[Intelligence] is highly needed for Danish police […]. But it causes 
some challenges, because we have been working like we have 
been doing for several years – without using analysis that much in 
police work (DK08, Analyst). 
Thus, it takes time to adopt new routines (Gundhus, 2012, p.183). There were 
also some reasons provided by the Danish interviewees for the modest ILP 
results:  
The challenge is that as intelligence is much more abstract 
concepts it is not satisfying way to work for many people. This is 
due to the fact that the whole organisation builds on very pragmatic 
and practical work (DK05, Analyst). 
The problem is to get [ILP] implemented due to lack of resources 
and management understanding (DK01, Manager). 
Indeed, as several interviewees (DK01,DK04-DK06,DK09) stated, there are 
difficulties in comprehending and adopting new intelligence- and knowledge-
based policing approaches in the police departments. As a result many of the 
police departments in Denmark have false perceptions about working 
Intelligence-Led when instead they are working in quite the old-fashioned way. 
We have a lot of talks about Intelligence-Led Policing and Problem-
Oriented Policing etc. The problem right now is to get it 
implemented. Also [there is] a gap [in senior management level] 
between what they think is the level of implementation [and] what is 
the actual level of implementation (DK01, Manager). 
This also indicates the overall challenge in changing routines and working 
cultures within the Danish police organisations. Indeed, the practical 
implementation is the challenge: 
In practice […] you discuss [strategy] with our police district top 
management and they are more receptive for strategic products 
and working on knowledge base [however what] tend to happen [is] 
that […] they send the strategy down and then half of what you 
want to happen happens (DK04, Analyst). 
Thus, working routines and cultures are challenging for leadership. 
Nevertheless, there is a major Intelligence-Led Policing project on-going in 
Denmark to implement a knowledge-based approach in the Danish police. 
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4.2 Crime management strategies 
The National Police Board in Finland develops the national strategies that are 
then approved by the Ministry of Interior; the different crime management 
strategies are essentially very much the end product of this political guidance. 
The crime management strategy includes theme-based focus areas for the 
organisation. However, there is a limited use of intelligence analysis when 
defining the crime management strategies, as the strategic analysis was 
identified (FI03,FI05,FI11) as being inadequately understood, developed and 
coordinated among the Finnish police. As one interviewee (FI05) further 
identified, the strategic crime management practice in Finland does not use 
scenario building, which would help to guide the police work. The whole crime 
management strategy is leaning more towards the patrolling field, anyway. 
[Crime management strategies] are more useful among the 
patrolling area where it is more functional. It is easy for the chiefs of 
police departments to search the crime records database and the 
emergency response database to find out where the events have 
occurred and what time in order to guide resources to these places 
in the future (FI10, Analyst). 
Moreover, the visibility of crime management strategies in the investigative 
section seems to be quite non-existent as one interviewee identified, saying ‘I 
cannot say that [crime management strategies] are visible in any way (FI11)’. 
Moreover, an analyst confirmed the understanding of statistics as strategic 
analysis in the Finnish police: 
We have this strategic analysis function here where crime statistics, 
for example, on burglaries are queried in order to understand when 
and where these have taken place (FI12, Analyst). 
Nevertheless, these strategies are guiding the work of the intelligence and 
analysis units at both local and national levels. These units are tasked to 
coordinate the implementation of the defined strategies and follow the decided 
focus areas. The challenge, as stated earlier (FI05), is that the national 
strategies do not take note of the differences between the police departments, 
causing challenges in implementing the crime prevention strategies at the local 
level. Another challenge identified is the lack of visibility of the crime 
management strategies in the investigative work. In relation to this, the 
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management would need to improve communication on the aims and objectives 
of the different strategies to improve the staff’s knowledge of these. There are 
some strategic areas, such as traffic, that remain mostly the same over time. 
But the national crime prevention strategies are not necessarily so clear to the 
police staff – sometimes not even to the police managers. These qualitative 
findings match the survey results on the statement, ‘We have clear, agreeable 
and manageable organisational crime reduction strategies, objectives and 
priorities’. The Finnish respondents definitely disagreed with this statement with 
the average of 3.22. Out of the three professional groups, the management was 
the most positive and agreeable with the average of 2.95, although almost half 
(47.37%) of them remained neutral towards this statement. Conversely, the 
investigators were the most negative with the average of 3.33 and with 23.17% 
in agreement with this statement. The analyst’s average was 3.05 with 33.34% 
in agreement.  
The police in Denmark have recently adopted a new structure for national 
strategic analysis, one that informs strategic focus areas in relation to identified 
crime tendencies for police to tackle instead of monitoring specific crime cases. 
More importantly, strategic analysis is produced for the first time in some police 
districts to define priorities at the district level. Denmark also uses scenario 
building to develop crime management strategies. The survey respondents’ 
views of the statement, ‘We have clear, agreeable and manageable 
organisational crime reduction strategies, objectives and priorities’, was slightly 
positive with the average answer of 2.87. The management were the most 
positive professional group with the average of 2.74. The investigators were 
close to this with the average of 2.75. The analysts were most negative with the 
average of 3.14. Still, among the Danish management, 26.32% were in 
disagreement and 26.32% neutral with this statement. The comments from the 
interviewees match these figures. The investigators have expectations of using 
the intelligence to better prioritise the selection of criminal cases (DK07) to 
avoid wasting resources on unsolvable cases. However, from the analysts’ 
viewpoint (DK01, DK03-DK04), this was seen as challenging due to inadequate 
management attention, persistent organisational culture and routines, lack of 
authority of the analyst, lack of resources, and lack of understanding of the 
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intelligence concept. Therefore, ultimately many of the police departments are 
not working intelligence-led and as a result, for example, the investigators were 
seen to have the authority to decide what they want to investigate (DK04). 
4.3 Information management systems 
Databases used by the Finnish police are separated from each other, making 
the information dispersed and fragmented. The majority of the Finnish 
interviewees (FI02-FI06,FI08-FI09,FI12) felt that this fragmentation of 
information was unhelpful. The systems cannot find commonalities between the 
different databases, making the cross checking of data between the different 
systems a challenge (Sheptycki, 2004). The information will also not reach 
easily to the right persons; thus, the information management is a problematic 
area. Ideally, there would be only one system where all the police information is 
managed. 
Additionally, no standardised processes exist around information management 
in the Finnish police. Some departments have developed their own systems to 
share information more efficiently, but these models are different throughout the 
police. A relatively new observation system has been introduced that, for 
example, allows patrolling officers to collect observations and information and 
store it in a separate database for the Intelligence and Analysis Units (IAUs) to 
validate and facilitate. This can be done without reporting a specific crime. 
Emails are also still used to report these observations, and electronic platforms 
are also used where information and intelligence is collected and shared around 
certain themes. These platforms are also used to share intelligence products. 
All of the staff, in principle, have the same access rights to the databases; thus, 
anyone can search and collect data from different databases and sources. This 
was also visible in the survey responses, as the average response to the 
statement, ‘I have sufficient access to the information I need for my work’, was 
very positive with the score of 1.77. Nevertheless, from the legislative 
perspective, individual police officers can only access data that is relevant for 
their work, and access limitations exist on some of the databases that are under 
very strict legal auditing. The staff that usually work at the IAUs or are otherwise 
performing intelligence- and analysis-related tasks can access these databases. 
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Additionally, the users who should have access to the intelligence systems have 
been carefully assessed due to the recent public scandals, which as also 
significantly suppressed the number of users of these systems. In relation to the 
observation database, every police department can store its observations into 
this database however all police departments have view access to the available 
data nationally. 
The legal aspects of information sharing were not seen as an issue, as the 
average answer to the statement, ‘I am fully aware of the legal aspects of 
information sharing”, was 2.2. Thus, the respondents seem to be quite well 
aware of the legal aspects of information sharing, yet these interviewees (FI03-
FI05,FI09,FI12) identified issues in relation to legislation that inhibits proper 
data management. Furthermore, in Finland there were comments indicating that 
the legal requirements to process data in the systems are too high 
(FI07,FI10,FI12). The differences in the data lifecycle between different systems 
were also seen as problematic (FI12). However, these interviewees (FI03,FI07) 
also stated that the legal threshold to store data in the observation database is 
quite low and, as the legal concept of observation is relatively new in the 
Finnish police, there might be a gap in legal knowledge among the police 
personnel who are using this new system. Nevertheless, the local IAUs should 
validate data stored by the police officers, so there should be no major legal 
difficulties for the police officers to store the data. There is also an initiative to 
adjust the legal framework concerning police information management and 
storing personal data to better meet the contemporary needs of the police, 
taking into account the latest data protection standards. These interviewees 
(FI12,FI13) also stated that the legislation around information management 
mostly concerns police management, who should have proper knowledge of the 
rules and regulations, since they are ultimately responsible for ensuring that 
legal requirements are met.  
The Danish police also have a quite significant number of different kinds of 
databases that are separate from each other, making the information dispersed 
and fragmented. These Denmark interviewees (DK01-DK02,DK04-DK06,DK08-
DK09) identified the need to have one system where all the information could 
be stored and managed. Compared to Finland, the average answer to the 
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survey statement, ‘I have sufficient access to the information I need for my 
work’, was more negative in Denmark with the score of 2.86. That could be 
because the system in Denmark was built so that the national police have 
access to all information provided by the local police departments, whilst the 
local intelligence and analysis centres can only see their own local information. 
This was considered a major issue, as the operational analysis is mostly done 
at the local/regional level, and without proper access, the different police 
departments are targeting the same person without knowing this. Nevertheless, 
this situation is likely to improve in the future with the implementation of a new 
analytical platform with more extended access to this system. The aim is to 
integrate several databases together with the ability of analytical tools to work 
with the data. However, as one Danish interviewee (DK03) identified, the 
integration of the databases is not going to be easy and might take years.  
Moreover, there is also a system in use in Denmark that enables the patrolling 
officers to store observations and information at the IAUs for validation and 
further facilitation. This can be done without reporting a specific crime and has 
been in use for a few years. Despite this possibility, emails were also in wide 
use when reporting observations within the organisation. The legal issues 
around information sharing were not an issue in Denmark, as the average 
answer was 2.1 to the statement ‘I am fully aware of the legal aspects of 
information sharing was. These Danish interviewees (DK07,DK10-DK11) also 
identified the patrolling officers and investigators as not having any legal 
challenges in relation to information management, yet legislation inhibits proper 
data management to some degree. For example, the different rules related to 
the data lifecycle between different systems were seen as problematic by many 
interviewees (DK07-DK08,DK11). As further stated: 
‘This causes many legal issues within the new systems, which aims 
to integrate different kind of datasets and sources. Many of these 
datasets have their own legal framework to comply with (DK03, 
Analyst). 
This is undoubtedly a challenge for any organisation integrating databases 
together. Neverthelss, initiatives exist to adjust the legal framework to better 
meet the contemporaty needs.  
 
69 
 
4.4 Knowledge domains 
According to these Finnish interviewees (FI01,FI04), the Finnish police prefer 
experience-based, tacit knowledge. 
Theoretical and academic knowledge is not much appreciated by a 
regular police officer […] thus sometimes there is a sort of disdain 
towards theoretical knowledge (FI01, Manager). 
Nevertheless, these interviewees (FI06,FI13) stated that there is also a need 
for, and the possibility to use, explicit, written types of knowledge. This was also 
supported by the answers to the survey questionnaire statement, ‘Theoretical, 
academic type of knowledge is mostly not needed in practical police work’. 
Respondents generally disagreed with this statement with the average answer 
of 3.47. However, several interviewees (FI01,FI04,FI06,FI13) identified that the 
understanding of research and knowledge should be better integrated within the 
police. 
The academic analytical knowledge and expertise should be 
improved and connected with police profession (FI01, Manager) 
Indeed, considerations were given to hiring staff with academic backgrounds to 
work with analysts having a police officer background. 
There have been discussions to combine a civilian background staff 
with analysts having a police officer background. The advantage of 
having the police officer background is the understanding on the 
police culture however this might limit the thinking as well. The 
practical work at the police is very much based on the sharing of 
the tacit knowledge and experience (FI04, Analyst). 
These Danish interviewees (DK05,DK07,DK09) also stated that their police 
have a clear preference for experience-based, tacit knowledge (Gundhus, 
2012). 
Information needs to be enriched with information, however this is a 
challenging […] as it is quite abstract and the whole police 
organisation builds on very pragmatic and practical work (DK05, 
Analyst). 
Police work is mostly still based on biased gut feeling (DK09, 
Analyst). 
There is also a need for, and a possibility to use, explicit knowledge, despite 
this (DK06). This was also supported by the answers to the survey 
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questionnaire statement, ‘Theoretical, academic type of knowledge is mostly 
not needed in practical police work’. On average the Danish respondents 
disagreed with this statement with the score of 3.69. This is in line with the 
interviewee who stated that, ‘Danish police is not so experience based any 
more’ (DK03). This is also in line with these interviewees (DK04-DK05,DK09), 
who stated the need to better integrate the academic type of knowledge into the 
practical police experience, as both types of knowledge are essential to police 
work. 
Indeed, as identified, the key is to work closely together to gain the benefits of 
these different skills, knowledge and experience. The combination of a 
systematic, academic type-knowledge, together with the practical experience of 
the police officers, is an enormous benefit for the organisation. These 
interviewees (DK04,DK05) stated that the academics can identify knowledge 
gaps in the organisation and make the analytical findings and process more 
valid. 
The police officers have experience but the academics have a 
systematic way of approaching to this knowledge and ‘that’s where 
it really connects’ (DK05, Analyst). 
The key is then to work close together to get the benefits of these 
different skills, knowledge and experience (DK09, Analyst). 
Apparently, this connection knowledge connection is taken seriously by the 
Danish police, as several interviewees (DK02-DK03,DK05,DK09) indicated that 
the organisation have been hiring analysts with an academic background to 
bring in the new perspectives and ideas from academia to the police.  
4.5 The perception of intelligence 
The majority of the Finnish interviewees (FI01- FI05,FI09-FI10) stated that the 
definition of intelligence is poorly recognised and understood (Alach, 2012, 
p.76). This has had a negative impact on the implementation of intelligence in 
the Finnish police. 
Lack of common understanding of the terminology has had 
negative impact to the whole development of the intelligence 
function (FI02, Manager). 
 
71 
 
There is some definitions related to intelligence and analysis but 
these have not been implemented properly in the daily work (FI04, 
Analyst). 
The fact that we do not have agreed definition on the intelligence 
hinders the criminal intelligence work (FI03, Analyst). 
As […there is no common terminology] it absorbs part of the 
efficiency that could be gained (FI02, Manager). 
The general idea of intelligence was also linked ‘to the idea of collecting it from 
different sources (FI03)’ and of it being secretive work (FI04,FI08). Several 
interviewees (FI01,FI03,FI08) also identified intelligence as something that 
guides and acts as the foundation for the investigations. These interviewees 
(FI02,FI04-FI05,FI10) stated that the definitions are important to improving 
standards and definitions in intelligence and to working the same way. 
Furthermore, several Finnish interviewees (FI03,FI05,FI09-FI10) raised the 
issue of inadequate and dysfunctional legislation in relation to intelligence. One 
of the major problems identified is the lack of definition in the legislation. 
Nevertheless, the attitude towards intelligence seems to be quite positive, 
according to the survey responses to the statement, ‘The concept of intelligence 
in law enforcement is practical and needed’. The average answer to this 
statement was 2.26.  
Several Danish interviewees (DK01-DK04,DK09) similarly identified the 
difficulties in understanding what intelligence is in the police (Corkill, 2009, 
p.66). 
Many police officers don’t know what intelligence is. They don’t 
know how to define intelligence versus investigation (DK01, 
Manager). 
The intelligence term has so many different interpretations and only 
the people really working with the intelligence can actually define 
intelligence. […] There is a big need to make clear the whole 
intelligence term in the Danish police (DK02, Analyst). 
The whole concept and understanding of intelligence in Denmark is 
very vague. Actually nobody talks about intelligence instead people 
are talking about investigation and front line officers. […] And there 
are so many definitions on intelligence (DK03, Analyst). 
Nevertheless, work is currently undereway to establish the intelligence doctrine 
of the Danish Police by describing the concepts of intelligence, intelligence 
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cycle and intelligence sources. The journey of change takes time as indicated 
by one of the interviewee who stated that ‘In the last 10 years so many things 
have changed. [Intelligence] is going forward (DK03)’. This more positive 
attitude of the Danish interviewees was also visible in the Danish responses to 
the statement, ‘The concept of intelligence in law enforcement is practical and 
needed’, with the very positive average answer of 1.17. Several Danish 
interviewees (DK02,DK05-DK08,DK10) also clearly stated that intelligence is 
very much needed, and most of the staff is generally ready to acknowledge 
intelligence as the way for the future.  
4.6 The status of analysis 
The majority of the interviewees (FI02-FI05,FI07,FI09,FI12-FI13) stated that 
there are no clear and common definitions and understanding of analysis in the 
Finnish police. Some furthermore stated (FI04-FI05) that the aims, function and 
role of analysis are not clear for everyone. 
The fact that we do not have agreed definitions on analysis hinders 
the criminal intelligence work. (FI03, Analyst). 
We are missing certain definitions. These definitions would be 
needed though there is thinking in using common sense, but this 
creates the variation in how the analysis is performed (FI02, 
Manager). 
Analysis - beautiful idea. Perhaps somewhere in the future it will 
come true (Survey respondent, Investigator). 
Despite these comments, the average answers to the statement, ‘The aims, 
objectives and function of analysis in law enforcement is clear’, indicate that the 
survey respondents appear to accept this survey statement. The average 
Finnish answer was 2.67. A closer look at the answers reveals that 40.24% of 
the investigators and 52.63% of the management agreed with this statement. 
Indeed, as these interviewees (FI01,FI05) stated, analysis is seen as a support 
mechanism for the investigations, and the Finnish police are good at making 
case analyses of specific investigations or phenomena. 
Currently the reputation of analysis is that it is only linked to the 
detection of crime series and serious crime (Survey respondent, 
Manager). 
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These notions tightly link analysis in Finland with the investigation process. This 
is logical, as there seemed to be a lack of vision among the leadership on what 
to do with all the available information, as one interviewee (FI09) identified. 
Given that, a perception exists (FI03) that some of the management considered 
analysis a complete waste of time.  
Nevertheless, the need for analysis is not questioned openly, and the collection 
and processing of information to make conclusions out of this (Chaney, 2009, 
p.57) is seen to be more important than ever. Therefore, it is interesting to note 
that the average answer to the statement, ‘Our analytical products and services 
are well-defined and standardised’, was slightly negative. The average answer 
in Finland was 3.25. Only 33.33% of the analysts agreed with this statement 
and even fewer, 21.05%, agreed among the management. The investigators 
were the most negative with only 13.41% agreeing. These figures correspond 
well with the views of these interviewees (FI02-FI03,FI05,FI10,FI12-FI13), as 
many of them stated that in Finland there are no established standards for 
intelligence reports. Many interviewees (FI01-FI02,FI09,FI12-FI13) indicated 
that, despite this, there are similar products produced in different IAUs, such as 
periodic strategic reports. Indeed, there were strategic products products 
covering different areas of crime prevention. Ad hoc reports are additionally 
produced in relation to specific crime phenomena. The joint PCB intelligence 
centre also produces different national strategic reports and different ad hoc 
reports. Nevertheless, one interviewee (F102) stated that ‘there should be 
standard structure on the products for the manager to understand what is what’. 
The reports’ standards obviously vary between the different IAUs, and a clear 
need exists to improve this. 
Several Danish interviewees (DK01-DK02,DK04-DK05,DK10) also stated that 
no clear and commonly understood definitions and awareness exist for analysis.  
The analysis concept is not well established and understood in the 
Danish police (DK02, Analyst). 
There is not yet established analysis at Danish police (DK04, 
Analyst). 
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Nevertheless, the survey respondents were more positive about this, as the 
average answers to the statement, ‘The aims, objectives and function of 
analysis in law enforcement is clear’, were slightly positive with the score of 
2.69. However, only 37.5% of Danish investigators and 57.89% of Danish 
management agreed with this statement. Thus, there are still variations in 
understanding of the aims, objectives, function and role of analysis in Denmark, 
and the police were generally seen to be unprepared for analysis.  
The police have also the tendency to react to certain crime areas 
very quickly, which cuts out the analysis phase (DK04, Analyst). 
The investigators are placed in pedestal and the investigators don’t 
have big fate in analysis (DK03, Analyst). 
Nevertheless, the necessity for analysis has increased in the increasingly 
complex world within the law enforcement domain. These interviewees 
(DK01,DK03-DK04,DK08) stated that analysis is becoming more crucial within 
the police. 
The awareness [of analysis] is growing and police officers know 
that they cannot ignore analysis when the crimes are getting more 
complex (DK03, Analyst). 
Most of the people are ready to acknowledge intelligence and 
analysis type of work (DK08, Analyst). 
The level of knowledge on strategic analysis slowly increasing in 
the organisation (DK04, Analyst). 
It is interesting to note, therefore, that the average answer to the statement, 
‘Our analytical products and services are well-defined and standardised’, was 
slightly negative in Denmark with the average answer of 3.09. Only 26.32% of 
the analysts agreed with the statement, while 26.32% of the management 
agreed. The investigators were the most positive with 37.5% of them agreeing. 
These figures also do not correspond with the statement made by these 
interviewees (DK01-DK03,DK06,DK09) that there are standards for reports 
established in 2014, so the police can produce them the same way in all police 
departments. These results do match with the argument of one interviewee 
(DK02), who stated that ‘not using these standards has no consequences and 
as a result there are 12 police districts producing these reports their own way’. 
Nevertheless, these interviewees identified similar reports, such as periodic 
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reports, for various topics. Additionally, a lot of ad hoc analyses are also 
conducted. This standardisation work was continuing during this research, and 
new templates were being developed for investigative reports, analysis reports, 
patrol briefings and judicial reports. Furthermore, new strategic analysis reports 
are coming out at the local and national level to establish priority areas on which 
to focus.  
4.7 Summary of Findings I 
These findings indicated that the standard model of policing still dominates the 
ethos of the law enforcement work in both countries. Both countries have made 
serious attempts to implement an ILP-like approach; nevertheless, these 
findings indicated that the ILP is considered too abstact, which makes its 
implementation a challenge in a pragmatic and practical police culture. 
Furthermore, this culture, along with its deep-rooted routines has been an 
obstacle to implementing ILP. Proper terminolgy has also been missing in 
relation to ILP. The challenges in adopting knowledge-based concepts were 
also visible in both countries’ fraqmented information systems. Indeed, these 
systems do not properly support analysis work, further indicating the immature 
level of ILP implementation. 
These findings further illustrated how crime management strategies in Finland 
are not based on analysis. The further implementation of strategies is also a 
challenge, as even the managers are unaware of the organisational strategy in 
some cases. Thus, the nature of the work is to react to events. Although 
Denmark is a bit more advanced in using analysis to formulate strategies, the 
findings also indicated some challenges in implementing them. Indeed, as the 
findings indicated, experience-based knowledge is the dominating doctrine in 
these organisations, providing partial clarity about why it is difficult to implement 
crime management strategies. The general agreement that more academic type 
of knowledge is needed is not visible in these organisations. Indeed, there is no 
common agreement on the intelligence concept. The more explicit type of 
knowledge work that should be conducted through analysis is also inadequately 
established in these organistions. The analysis doctrine is largely 
underdeveloped. 
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5 Findings II: Professionalism and the impact of police culture 
This chapter addresses the research question: What is the status of 
professionalism and organisational culture in relation to intelligence analysis? 
By doing so this chapter explores two vital, yet abstract, organisational 
knowledge concepts of professionalism and culture, thus providing the central 
contribution to the overall aim of this research. It does this by, firstly, identifying 
the level of professionalism on intelligence and analysis at the organisational 
level. Secondly, it examines the level of the intelligence and analysis 
professionalism of the analysts, management and police officers, each in its 
own, specific section. Thirdly, it discusses intelligence analysis training. Lastly, it 
examines the findings related to organisational culture.  
5.1 Organisational information and intelligence management 
Several Finnish interviewees (FI02-FI03,FI10,FI12) stated that the local 
Intelligence Analysis Units (IAUs) perform extensive information management at 
the police departments. These units should not only know what is going on in 
their respective police departments but should also facilitate the information 
from the local level to the national level and follow the defined strategic focus 
areas. The Police, Customs and Boarder Guard (PCB) Intelligence and Analysis 
Centre further coordinates the strategy implementation. They particularly 
coordinate the daily national briefings when all the local intelligence and 
analysis units participate to discuss topical national issues. Compared to the 
local level, the focus of the PCB at the national level is more strategic, and the 
PCB Centre maintains the national situational awareness, aiming to produce 
intelligence on crime, criminality, trends, phenomena, threats, and crime series. 
The national level also produces target selection in relation to serious crime.  
These interviewees (FI02-FI05,FI12) identified that the local IAUs’ structure, 
function and tasks vary from one police department to another. The 
departments essentially are not respecting the given policies and guidelines. 
The information management model, such as collecting and processing crime 
and criminal-related information, also varies between the local departments. 
One interviewee (FI04) stated that there is a general lack of understanding of 
the benefits of a standardised information management model. Several 
 
77 
 
interviewees (FI04-FI05,FI09) also identified variances not only in the resources 
but also in the differences in the management set-up between the IAUs. Few 
units have full-time managers, and most managers are busy managing other 
functions as well.  
Several interviewees (FI03-FI04,FI06,FI08-FI09,FI13) additionally identified that 
the level of professionalism for intelligence and analysis is higher at the national 
level than at the local level. The intelligence and analysis work is also often 
seen as a sort of secretive and classified undercover work kept separate from 
the basic police work. Thus, two interviewees (FI03,FI09) identified that the 
IAUs’ tasks are unclear, causing confusion on how to use this function. These 
findings correspond well with the responses to the statement, ‘The division of 
tasks between investigators and analysts are clear in our organisation’. The 
average answer was 2.85. Despite this slightly positive average, only 47.62% of 
the analysts, 35.37% of the investigators and 47.36% of the management 
agreed with this statement. Furthermore, others (FI03,FI09) stated that the 
functioning of these units often depend on individual staff members’ personal 
interpretations and how they understand their unit’s role. Thus, the lack of 
standards and definitions for intelligence and analysis reduces these units’ 
effectiveness (McGarrell et al., 2007, p.153), which also impacts how others 
perceive a particular IAU. Then, depending on the IAU’s reputation, this will 
have either a positive or negative impact on, for example, finding staff for these 
units. There seems to be a willingness to improve this situation despite this 
rather grim picture. For example, an interviewee (FI13) stated that one 
department in Finland has the vision to build an intelligence unit that would 
centralise the knowledge, skills and expertise on information collection and 
management from different information sources.  
Several Danish interviewees (DK02,DK04,DK10) similarly stated that the IAUs 
should perform the more extensive information management at the local police 
departments and facilitate this information towards the national level (Bullock, 
2013, pp.127-128). The IAUs should also follow the defined strategic focus 
areas. The aim of the Danish National Police at the national level is to 
concentrate only on strategic analysis and coordinate the knowledge sharing, 
not to conduct investigative support. It would also educate and develop 
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collection methods. Several Danish interviewees (DK02-DK03,DK10) identified 
that the level of knowledge and understanding of intelligence and analysis and 
the overall professionalism is higher at the national level than at the local level, 
anyway.  
Other Danish interviewees (DK02,DK04-DK05,DK09) also stated that the local 
IAUs’ structure, function and tasks vary from one police department to another. 
Furthermore, the information management model, such as collecting and 
processing crime and criminal-related information, varies between the local 
departments, along with producing and using analytical results (Bell et al., 2010, 
p.345). Others (DK01-DK02,DK09)  similarly stated that a division exists 
between the different professional police groups who are unaware of what the 
other professional groups are doing. Indeed, the Danish police were considered 
by one interviewee (DK02) to be professionally quite divided, creating 
challenges for having an efficient organisational knowledge management setup. 
For example, the patrolling officers’ lack of knowledge demotivates them from 
registering the information needed for analysis. Indeed, in Denmark the average 
answer to the statement, ‘The division of tasks between investigators and 
analysts are clear in our organisation’, was 3.2. Only 28.95% of the analysts, 
25% of the investigators, and 26.32% of the management agreed with this 
statement, indicating an unclear task division. Nonetheless, extensive work is 
being carried out in Denmark to enhance the understanding of the intelligence 
analysis work by the other professional groups through workshops and 
seminars. The challenge is to implement this in their daily work due to persistent 
working routines.  
5.2 The professionalism of the analysts 
Several Finnish interviewees (FI02-FI05,FI08,FI12) stated that the role and 
function of the analysts working in the different IAUs varies, and they are 
performing a wide variety of tasks. Most analysts are tasked to manage 
situational awareness and, thus, are tasked to daily filter the local events and 
reported crimes in the strategic focus areas that are then reported in the 
national daily briefing. Analysts are also working to detect crime series, 
although one interviewee (FI11) argued strongly that this should be done by the 
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investigative teams where they are mostly detected. Then, depending on the 
police department, the analysts perform quality control for the stored data, 
receive and record crime reports, use crime reports to identify trends and 
phenomena, and balance the workload between investigative teams. The 
analysts are also receiving regular requests to provide statistics. They often 
have their own area of responsibility to monitor and coordinate. 
On top of these tasks, the analysts are also used to support on-going 
investigations through different actions, analytical methods and products. These 
include, for example, the analysis of itemised billings, providing geographical 
information and/or monitoring open sources such as social media. They can be 
retasked to support another case when their support is no longer needed, as 
they have no responsibility over cases. Thus, several interviewees (FI03,FI05-
FI07,FI10,FI12) identified that the analysts have a supporting role towards 
investigators and patrolling officers. These analysts’ skills were contested, 
however, by some interviewees (FI01,FI10) who claimed that the organised 
crime units, which produce their own analysis, are producing at better quality 
analysis than the IAUs’ analysts. Indeed, criminal intelligence in Finland has 
historically been conducted by the drugs units, as previously stated, and some 
departments have case analysts working within the investigative teams to make 
conclusions and reports out of the criminal investigations. Yet, as someone else 
(FI08) further indicated, some departments have no one conducting any case 
analysis despite it being seen as beneficial also from the IAU viewpoint; that is, 
to have someone providing support to the investigation from beginning to end.  
The analyts’ job descriptions and tasks are undefined and un-unified in the 
Finnish police and, as previously stated, a wide variety of tasks and differences 
exists between the IAUs’ analysts when conducting these tasks. For example, 
some departments occasionally deploy analysts with a police background to 
conduct traditional police tasks (FI03-FI04). When observing the survey 
respondents, the researcher noted that they were slightly positive to the 
statement, ’I know what I can expect from an analyst in our organisation’ with 
the average score of 2.84. This wide variety of tasks performed by the analysts 
also corresponds to the answers to the statement, ‘The analysts are essential to 
our organisation’. In Finland the average answer to this statement was 1.97. 
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Despite these positive figures, several interviewees (FI03-FI04) and survey 
respondents stated that currently the ‘real’ intelligence analysis work at the 
Finnish police is conducted by only a few persons and a few functions.  
This claim was actuallycorroborated by statements (FI02-FI03,FI10) that no 
requirements exist for educational background and experience for the staff 
working in the analytical field. Analyst recruitment standards certainly vary, as 
the desired experience, education and personality of an analyst were seen to be 
dependent on the task. Nevertheless, most of the operational analysts in 
Finland have traditionally been police officers who have operational 
backgrounds, such as investigations, which has then been supplemented with 
specialised analysis training and learning on the job. Some interviewees (FI01-
FI02,FI05-FI06,FI12) suggested some ideal analyst characteristics. An ideal 
operational analyst would need to have motivation and a passion for evaluating, 
searching and clarifying things. This person should also have wide experience 
in investigations with an investigator’s intuition and imagination and not be 
routinised. The person would also need to understand how to manage 
information, conduct analysis and draw conclusions by using standard methods.  
Several interviewees (FI02,FI05,FI13,) stated that there have been discussions 
in Finland to have civilian background analysts in order to combine their skills 
with analysts who have a police officer background (Evans & Kebbell, 2012). 
Currently, only a few analysts with a civilian background are working at the 
police. Although one interviewee (FI04) reasoned that a police background can 
limit analytical thinking, this interviewee also estimated with other interviewees 
(FI02,FI13) that the advantage of having a police officer background is the 
understanding it provides of the police culture. Furthermore, the analysts’ police 
experience gives them the justification to speak with the voice of a police officer. 
Nevertheless, a civilian analyst was seen by one interviewee (FI04) to bring in 
different and more strategic views, knowledge and experience from academia, 
overcoming a police officer’s biases. Another interviewee (FI01) also stated that 
analytical expertise cannot be gained through the police profession, and it is a 
challenge to find a person who has both a statistical analysis and a police 
background. Nonetheless, one of the interviewees stated,  
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It could be cheaper to train an experienced police officer […] 
instead of hiring outside from the university […]. The reason being 
that the university people would need to undergo police education, 
at least in short version, in order for them to learn the police 
working culture (FI05, Manager). 
There were also views that the analyst tasks and role should determine the 
expected experience and educational background. 
Maybe an operational analyst should have better understanding on 
police tasks, but in strategic analysis this might not be needed 
(FI13, Manager). 
Indeed, other interviewees in Finland (FI02,FI05) had a similar view that the 
strategic analyst would not require a police or investigator background. These 
interviewees stated that a strategic analyst would especially need to have an 
ability to understand the influencing factors in society and criminality in order to 
interpret the situation, and this person would need to have advanced 
knowledge, ability and skills to analyse information, formulate conclusions and 
produce logical recommendations. Some units in Finland also considered it 
important that the analyst would have university-level studies in statistics in 
order to draw conclusions out of numbers. Nevertheless, the strategic analyses 
were seen to be in poor condition in Finland, as there are hardly any qualified 
strategic analysts in the police departments. There is often someone in the IAU 
who produces statistics for the police chief, which is called strategic analysis, 
although it was not considered strategic analysis by these interviewees 
(FI03,FI05,FI11). Another element in this debate also relates to the acceptance 
by the organisational hierarchy of analytical findings produced at the constable 
level. Indeed, some interviewees (FI05,FI06,FI10) indicated that management 
have difficulties accepting analytical findings written at the lower organisational 
levels. Thus, it would be pertinent to have a more senior analyst role who would 
understand the leaderships’ needs and be able to convey the findings at the 
equivalent hierarchical level. 
Nevertheless, the overall challenge in this debate is that hardly any standards 
exist in the analysis discipline; thus, the reality is that often the analysts only 
receive a little advice for performing some sort of analysis, and the rest they 
need to learn by themselves. Certainly no clear analyst profession exists in the 
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Finnish police, or the professionalism is in a very early stage. There have been 
some discussions about having a defined analyst career path, but this has not 
advanced any further. Currently, the only possibility for analysts to advance in 
their careers is to move from the local to the national police. Yet the average 
answer to the statement, ‘I think the analysts have good career opportunities in 
our organisation’, was slightly in agreement with the score of 2.76. Interestingly, 
57.14% of the analysts agreed with this statement but only 23.17% of the 
investigators agreed with it. These figures indicate that an analyst’s career 
prospects are not that clear to the staff at the Finnish police. 
The Danish IAUs also employ most of the analysts, who work on building a 
bigger picture of different areas by using the collected data. Similar to Finland, 
Danish analysts have a wide variety of tasks. They produce a tactical analysis 
that is used to open up an investigation. Then they receive requests to provide 
statistics for the senior management, as well as to respond to different 
questionnaires and enquiries by other institutions on specific areas. Analysts 
also support ongoing investigations through different actions, analytical 
methods and products, such as analysing itemised billings, providing 
geographical information and monitoring open sources. A Danish interviewee 
(DK03) stated that the aim in Denmark is for analysis to be really close to the 
investigation so the analysts can provide something useful for the investigator. 
Thus, analysis is seen to be firmly placed in the investigative process. The 
dilemma in this, as these interviewees (DK01,DK03,DK08) stated, is that 
analysts are easily misused for tasks other than analysis. Indeed, other 
interviewees (DK01,DK08,DK11) stated that the analysts with a police 
background are also occasionally deployed to conduct traditional police tasks, 
though others (DK07,DK10) stated that the analysts can be more efficient in 
working with information and providing charts to the investigations. The average 
answers to the survey statement, ’I know what I can expect from an analyst in 
our organisation’, were positive in Denmark with 2.72, thus, overall slightly 
agreeing. Furthermore, this wide variety of tasks performed by the analysts also 
corresponds to the answers to the statement, ‘The analysts are essential to our 
organisation’. The average answer to this statement was 1.86. Analysts are 
clearly needed. 
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Similarly, there is no clear analyst profession in the police in Denmark, or the 
professionalism is in its early stage. There have been some discussions to have 
a defined career path for the analysts, but so far this has not succeeded 
(Stanier, 2013, p.132). There is the possible career step for an analyst to move 
from the local to the national police. Despite the slightly positive score of 2.7 by 
the survey respondents to the statement, ‘I think the analysts have a good 
career opportunities in our organisation’, only 36.84% of the analysts and 25% 
of the investigators agreed. Furthermore, there are no clear requirements for 
educational background and experience for the staff working in the analytical 
field. The desired experience, education and personality of an analyst were 
seen to be task dependent. Nevertheless, one interviewee (DK09) identified 
some important characteristics, stating that an analyst should have an open 
mind, eagerness to go further and to think differently, a willingness to develop 
information, and analytical perception. The rest can be learned. Another 
interviewee (DK05) also saw that personality traits are important, and not all 
academics are good at taking note of the special context in which they operate 
in the police. Furthermore, networking and social skills were seen as important 
by another interviewee because,  
If [the analyst] don’t know anything about people, [s/he is] going to 
fail because there is so much trust between, there are so many 
social relations in getting information out of the head of people 
(DK02, Analyst) 
Communication skills are also needed to communicate with the investigators in 
a practical way without using difficult academic language. Thus, analysts need 
also to be humble towards the investigators when delivering intelligence.  
Similar to Finland, most Danish operational analysts have traditionally been 
police officers with an operational background, such as investigations. This has 
then been supplemented with specialised analysis training and learning on the 
job. One Danish interviewee (DK01) stated that the educational level of police 
officers in Denmark is higher nowadays, and many young police officers have 
an academic degree. Having both police and academic education were seen as 
a very good combination, as these bring in different skills and perspectives. 
Such police officers have the potential to be hired as analysts quite early in their 
careers. Nevertheless, several interviewees (DK01,DK06) stated that recruiting 
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operational analysts in the Danish police has been a challenge, as the police 
culture demotes an operational analyst’s work.  
As a result, the Danish police recently started to hire outsiders, civilians with no 
police background, as analysts. The aim is to find the right profile for the unit’s 
actual needs, such as having open source expertise. Another interviewee 
(DK03) also stated that it was important for analysts to be able to move 
between investigation and analysis. The challenge there is that the analysts 
recruited from outside lack knowledge of the police organisation. The outsiders’ 
advantage is that they can bring in new perspectives and ideas and can help 
identify these knowledge gaps in the organisation. Using a civilian background 
is not new in Denmark. Indeed, most of the strategic analysts have an academic 
background, which is also an expectation for this post. But the actual academic 
discipline varies: It can be political science, sociology, anthropology, etc. Most 
strategic analysts are, in fact, hired outside from academia, so the analysts 
have different backgrounds.  
5.3 The professionalism of management 
Many Finnish interviewees (FI01,FI04-FI06,FI12-FI13) stated that the 
management have an important role in intelligence analysis success. Indeed, 
the management should guide, respect, trust and support the intelligence unit’s 
work. 
The role of the direct line management is to keep the intelligence 
function ongoing and act as the mediator between the senior 
management and the analysts. [Also] to make sure that the 
analysts stay within certain framework (FI06, Analyst). 
Furthermore, these interviewees (FI02,FI08,FI12-FI13) stated that the 
management should ensure that the policies and standards for information 
management processes, such as collection and storage of data, are used to the 
fullest. The management must also ensure that the staff feel motivated, 
satisfied, supported and trusted. Moreover, due to the scarce resources, the 
management also must be able to prioritise work. However, the average 
answers to the statement, ‘Our management is actively and systematically 
involved in directing the intelligence analysis process - for example through 
tasking and planning’, showed that the respondents slightly disagreed with this 
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statement. The average answer to this statement in Finland was 3.22. Only 
28.57% of the analysts agreed with this. This figure was even smaller with the 
investigators, as only 17.07% of them agreed with this, and only 47.37% of the 
Finnish management agreed with this statement. 
Indeed, one interviewee (FI05) identified that only three local IAUs have a full-
time manager devoted solely to the unit, despite experience that shows these 
are the best-functioning IAUs. Another interviewee (FI06) stated that this 
confirms the importance of a dedicated manager who should act as an enabler 
and a mediator between the senior management and the analysts. A dedicated 
manager who understands about leadership is in a much better position to 
convince senior management and the rest of the organisation of the necessity 
of analysis. This is vital, as the lack of understanding, appreciation and support 
of intelligence analysis and the analysts was identified as visible at every level 
of the police organisation. The challenge these interviewees (FI02-FI05,FI09-
FI10) identified is that the police managers’ involvement in and understanding of 
intelligence and analysis varies greatly. Indeed, when the management have an 
inadequate understanding of the intelligence analysis concept as a decision-
making tool, they often do not considered it as something useful (Stanier, 2013, 
p.132). Then, they prefer to keep working as they have always done when they 
do not know what to ask or how to task the analysts. Still, there is strong 
support from the management to have analysts in the organisation, as indicated 
by their responses to the statement, ‘The analysts are essential to our 
organisation’. Among the management, 68.42% agreed with this statement. The 
management similarly claimed to know what to expect from the analyst, as 
68.42% agreed with the statement, ‘I know what I can expect from an analyst in 
our organisation’. Although these are quite strong figures, some interviewees 
(FI02-FI03,FI06,FI10,FI13) stated that the management’s involvement in and 
understanding of intelligence and analysis varies greatly.  
Furthermore, these interviewees (FI04-FI06,FI09) felt that the management of 
the Finnish police do not properly direct analysis. This can also be seen from 
the reactions of the management to the survey statement, ‘I think the analysts 
have a good career opportunities in our organisation’. Only 47.37% of the 
management agreed with this. Similarly, only 47.37% of the management 
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agreed with the statement, ‘The division of tasks between investigators and 
analysts are clear in our organisation’. Nevertheless, improvements are 
foreseen in Finland, as many managers have now received awareness of ILP 
and are eager to try to utilise intelligence in practice.  
The Danish interviewees (DK01-DK02,DK04,DK06) also identified 
management’s key role in the success of intelligence and analysis. A significant 
number of interviewees certainly identified that management’s role is extremely 
important in guiding, respecting, trusting and supporting the intelligence unit’s 
work. They also provide resources to the intelligence analysis function. The 
management must be able to communicate clearly and clarify any rumours. 
Furthermore, legal compliance monitoring is an important task for management 
to ensure the analysts stay within the legal framework. They also act as a link 
between the analytical assignments, strategic context and stakeholders’ 
expectations. For example, managers should also encourage other managers 
to use the intelligence services, monitor several issues and communicate the 
work to the senior management (von Krogh et al., 2012, pp.270-271). The core 
or essence of the matter is that the management should certainly be able to 
make decisions based on intelligence and analysis.  
Yet when looking at the average answers to the statement, ‘Our management is 
actively and systematically involved in directing the intelligence analysis 
process - for example through tasking and planning’, the respondents slightly 
disagreed with the average score of 3.05. A closer look at these responses 
shows that only 23.68% of the analysts, 37.5% of the investigators and 36.84% 
of the management agreed with this. Furthermore, as indicated by the 
responses to the statement, ‘The division of tasks between investigators and 
analysts are clear in our organisation’, the task division between analysts and 
investigators is not clear to the management, as only 26.32% of the 
management agreed with this statement. Over half of the management similarly 
do not know what to expect from the analysts, as 47.37% of the management 
agreed with the survey statement, ‘I know what I can expect from an analyst in 
our organisation’.  
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These figures also correspond with these interviewees’ statements (DK01-
DK04,DK09) that there is a lack of understanding, appreciation and support for 
intelligence analysis and analysts in the organisation. Furthermore, there are 
often high expectations and false perceptions, especially among the senior 
management, towards the actual level of implementation of intelligence and 
analysis within the organisation. One interviewee (DK04) stated that only one 
third of the Danish police department heads are actually engaged in this type of 
policing approach. This was supported by another interviewee’s statement 
(DK05) that only around five of the 12 police departments use the IAUs as 
originally intended. The rest of the departments are conservative and back old-
fashioned police work. Indeed, being in charge of an intelligence and analysis 
unit is not a desired position among management; instead, they want to be in 
charge of an investigative team. The preceding figures also correspond with 
these interviewees’ statements (DK01-DK02,DK04,DK06, DK08-DK09) that 
there is great variation in the police managers’ involvement in and 
understanding of intelligence and analysis. This also depends on the unit where 
they work, as the operational units tend not to understand the intelligence 
concept. The management at the local level have even less understanding. 
Similar to Finland, these Danish interviewees (DK01-DK03,DK09) specified that 
the management in Denmark have an insufficient understanding of the 
intelligence analysis concept as a decision-making tool.  
There is still quite strong support from the management, despite these 
challenges, to have analysts in the organisation, as indicated by the responses 
to the statement, ‘The analysts are essential to our organisation’: 94.74% of the 
Danish management agreed with this statement. Furthermore, 52.63% of the 
Danish management agreed with the statement, ‘I think the analysts have a 
good career opportunities in our organisation’. Indeed, these interviewees 
(DK04-DK05,DK07-DK08) stated that the situation has slowly improved among 
the management, who have become more accepting towards analysis. The new 
generation of managers, especially, have a better understanding of what 
analysts can contribute. Older managers are more conservative and have 
difficulties understanding the benefits of analysis. The management must be 
motivated and educated about intelligence and analysis to support it.  
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5.4 The professionalism of the police officers 
The majority of Finnish interviewees (FI01,FI04,FI06-FI08,FI11-FI12) identified 
that police officers, both investigators and patrolling officers, are the providers of 
the information for analysis. This collection is either done under certain themes 
or the police officers are asked on an ad-hoc basis to observe and collect 
information. Additionally, intelligence is collected through the patrolling officers’ 
assignments, for example, to domestic crime situations and public behaviour 
disturbances. Information is also increasingly collected via the Internet or 
through police liaison officers who can collect information on different crime 
areas and events. On average the responses to the survey statement, ‘In the 
context of intelligence analysis process our patrolling officers and informant 
handlers can be seen as the collectors of information’, slightly agreed with the 
score of 2.85. The analysts were most positive about this statement with 
57.14% agreeing. Only 36.84% of the investigators and 36.84% of the 
management agreed with this.  
These interviewees (FI01,FI04,FI06,FI09,FI12) stated that the patrolling officers 
and investigators have an important role in ensuring that the quality, accuracy, 
relevancy of the information and data are as high as possible. However, this 
was considered a challenge, as there is not enough understanding of the 
importance of the quality of the classifications among the police officers. The 
quality of the information they process into the systems varies, thus creating 
challenges for the analysts. Nevertheless the responses to the survey 
statement, ‘The information processing standards (i.e. how to store data into our 
systems) and rules (such as data protection) are clear to me’, correspond with 
the interviewee statements. Only 43.90% of the Finnish investigators agreed 
with this. At the same time, 52.44% of the investigators disagreed with the 
statement, ’It is easy to use our organisation’s information systems’. These 
interviewees (FI08-FI09,FI11-FI12) stated that ordinary police officers have 
insufficient understanding of the intelligence and analysis discipline and why 
information must be collected. Indeed, the responses to the survey statement, 
‘The aims, objectives and function of analysis in law enforcement is clear’, 
corroborated this, as 59.76% of the Finnish investigators disagreed with this. 
Thus, the police officers’ awareness must be improved in order for them to 
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understand the importance of information gathering for analysis. Another 
interviewee (FI13) also indicated that nowadays the investigators should know 
the basics of intelligence and analysis to be more efficient. Some of the 
investigators are already conducting basic analysis and using the systems 
accordingly. Indeed, in some departments the investigators are educated in 
basic analysis and information management. Nevertheless, several Finnish 
interviewees (FI05,FI08,FI12) indicated a wish for the investigative teams to 
have more dedicated analysts to save investigative resources.  
The role of the patrolling officers in relation to the intelligence process seemed 
to be more established in Denmark. One patrolling officer stated it clearly, 
‘Patrolling officers are supposed to gather information and bring it further into 
the systems’ (DK11, Patrolling officer). Indeed, other interviewees 
(DK04,DK06,DK10) also identified that police officers, both investigators and 
patrolling officers, are the ones who should provide the information to the 
analysts. Similar to Finland, this information collection in Denmark can be based 
on the police officers’ own observations and initiative when performing their own 
routine tasks. This collection can also be conducted under certain themes, or 
the police officers can be asked by the analysts to collect information on specific 
targets. The Danish survey respondents were also more positive than the 
Finnish respondents about the survey statement, ‘In the context of intelligence 
analysis process our patrolling officers and informant handlers can be seen as 
the collectors of information’. The average answer of the Danish respondents 
was 1.72, and 94.74% of the Danish analyst agreed with this statement. 
Moreover, 75% of the Danish investigators and 84.21% of the Danish 
management agreed with this. 
The patrolling officers and investigators in Denmark are seen to have an 
important role in ensuring that the quality, accuracy, relevancy of the stored 
data are as high as possible. This is also challenging, as there is lack of 
understanding of the importance of the data quality among police officers. The 
quality varies in relation to the information police officers process into the 
systems, creating challenges for the analytical work. Lack of routine was 
identified as the reason: ‘there is a willingness to do this however this needs 
constant reminding’ (DK08, Analyst). The survey questionnaire responses to the 
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statement, ‘The information processing standards (i.e. how to store data into our 
systems) and rules (such as data protection) are clear to me’, showed that 
87.5% of the investigators agreed with this statement, indicating that processing 
standards are mostly clear. However, 50% of the Danish investigators 
disagreed with the statement, ’It is easy to use our organisation’s information 
systems’. Thus, the processing standards are not an issue, but the systems 
should be easier to use.  
These Danish interviewees (DK01,DK02,DK05,DK10-DK11) indicated that the 
ordinary police officer has insufficient understanding of the intelligence and 
analysis discipline and why information must be collected. These Danish 
interviewees (DK08,DK10) also identified that a lack of understanding among 
police officers is why valid information is necessary. As a result police, officers 
tend to act on information and intelligence that is not assessed, verified and 
validated. The responses to the survey confirm these views. Of the Danish 
investigators, 62.5% disagreed with the statement, ‘The aims, objectives and 
function of analysis in law enforcement is clear’. Several interviewees 
(DK06,DK09-DK11) indicated the need for awareness raising on analysis 
among the police officers. However, it was further stated that the existing 
working routines of the police officers are difficult to change, even when this 
awareness is provided. The willingness to use intelligence is also missing 
among police officers. Nonetheless, the understanding of intelligence concepts 
is slowly improving, and the younger generation, especially, is more open to 
using the intelligence concept. One explanation given for this was that the level 
of education of police officers is higher nowadays, so their mind-set is readier 
for this.  
5.5 Training on intelligence and analysis 
According to one interviewee (FI05), the capacity building in Finland on 
intelligence and analysis was somewhat random and mostly absent up until 
2016. Since then an introduction to crime intelligence has been included as part 
of the basic police education for all ranks. A general introduction to the ILP and 
intelligence functions and some definitions are included at the basic bachelor’s 
level of police education. A similar training package is also delivered in the petty 
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officers’ training for future team leaders to know how to utilise intelligence. 
There is also an optional course at the master’s level. Still, no standardised 
training model exists for intelligence analysts in Finland, though there is a 
demand to develop more systematic intelligence and analysis education. 
In order to improve criminal intelligence we should firstly pay 
attention to training. We don’t have standardised model on 
intelligence training. We might must have a specific educational 
path to analysts (FI04, Analyst). 
The responses to the survey statement, ‘I have had plenty of training 
opportunities on the intelligence analysis process, the analytical methods and 
software’s used in our organisation’, support these claims. The average answer 
to this statement was 3.67. Only 42.86% of the Finnish analysts agreed with this 
statement. The situation is even more challenging among the other professional 
roles, as only 9.76% of the investigators and 10.53% of the management 
agreed with this statement. Thus, it is quite clear that there is a lack of training 
opportunities on intelligence and analysis in Finland (Stanier, 2013, p.137). 
These interviewees (FI02-FI04,FI10,FI12-FI13) explained that there have been 
some training opportunities for analysts in the past. Still, the training 
opportunities have been inadequate for several years, even for the analysts; 
therefore, some of the analysts have not received any training on analysis. Most 
of the analysts, in fact, are self-taught. These interviewees (FI02-FI05,FI09-
FI10,FI12-FI13) also stated that the analysis training is inconsistent and lacks 
standardisation and harmonisation.There is a similar absence of management 
training on intelligence and analysis, which is an issue, as the management 
need this type of training in order to understand it and improve its usage in the 
decision-making process. Moreover, the management need training on the ILP 
principles in order to proceed with the intelligence-led approach.  
Some attempts have been made to include intelligence- and analysis-related 
concepts into the training for the new analysis system. The notion is that the 
police officers would receive training modules on analysis along with the 
software training by including these concepts in the training. However, this is a 
challenge, as even the general training on IT systems and analysis tool is 
viewed as inadequate. Everyone receives basic training on the police systems, 
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despite that, yet the advanced features of the systems are not properly used 
without further training. Furthermore, 
The IT systems are forgotten within the district and there is no one 
who is responsible in these as in some other areas such as use of 
force. It gives the impression that within the police there is no 
needed to provide this type of IT training (FI07, Patrolling officer). 
Mostly it is like we provide an IT tool for the staff and inform that 
there are instructions within the system on how to use it without 
providing any training (FI09, Manager). 
The result is that the users try to learn these themselves with the help of some 
tips from their colleagues. Indeed, these interviewee findings correspond with 
the responses to the survey questionnaire statement, ‘I have had plenty of 
training opportunities on information management (i.e. how to collect, store and 
share information through the systems) in our organisation’. The average 
answer in Finland was 3.14, and 52.38% of the analysts, 26.83% of the 
investigators and 36.84% of the management agreed with this statement.  
Similarly, the responses to this same survey questionnaire statement were 
more negative in Denmark with the average answer of 3.21. Indeed, only 
34.21% of the Danish analysts, 25% of the investigators and 15.79% of the 
management agreed on adequate information management training 
opportunities. Instead, these interviewees (DK05-DK06) stated that training on 
IT systems and analysis tools has been mostly inadequate, and the users have 
had to try to learn the systems by themselves with the help of some tips from 
their colleagues. The situation is similar in relation to the training on intelligence 
and analysis. The answers to the survey statement, ‘I have had plenty of 
training opportunities on the intelligence analysis process, the analytical 
methods and software’s used in our organisation’, indicate quite clearly the lack 
of training opportunities on intelligence and analysis. The average answer to 
this statement was 3.36 with only 28.95% of the analysts, 12.5% of the 
investigators and 10.53% of the management agreeing with this statement. 
These interviewees (DK01,DK05-DK06,DK09) identified some training 
opportunities for the analysts in the past that were either provided by the police 
organisation itself or by a third party, such as an international law enforcement 
organisation or a private company. As a result, the analyst trainings are not 
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adequately aligned, harmonised and standardised (Quarmby & Young, 2010, 
p.38). The different courses and training providers also make it a bit obscure. 
Nevertheless, the most pressing issue is that training opportunities for the 
analysts have been inadequate for several years; therefore, some of the 
analysts have not received any training on analysis.  
In relation to management, these interviewees (DK01,DK03) expressed the 
importance and the need for the management to have training on intelligence 
and analysis in order to understand it and use it in the decision-making process. 
Such training is not provided, despite its importance. Currently, it is mostly a 
self-learning process. Just as there is no proper career path for the analysts, 
there is also no proper possibility for a manager to have worked as an analyst. 
Nevertheless, the Danish Police have been investing quite significantly lately in 
management awareness. In 2017 they were ‘running crash courses (DK03)’ on 
ILP for all the managers in the analysis units. There is also an initiative to train 
the managers ‘so that they would know what an analyst can actually do [and] 
what a difference they can make in an investigation (DK03)’. Moreover, there 
has been an improved focus on capacity building for analysis since 2016 after 
the Danish Police decided to be more intelligence-led. The Danish Police 
College has been working on a proper model for analyst education. Additionally, 
there have been several seminars, conferences and workshops on intelligence 
and analysis organised for the Danish police officers and analysts. The adoption 
of a new analysis system has also meant that all the police officers are 
receiving training modules on analysis along with the software training. 
5.6 Organisational working culture 
The majority of these interviewees (FI02,FI04-FI10,FI11,FI13) considered that 
the Finnish police organisation is very conservative, static and functioning with 
the underlying notion that the police organisation should continue to work the 
way it has always done (Waddington, 1999, p.297). 
Routines are very strong at police […]. And when you try to talk 
about Intelligence-Led approach there is immediate resistance 
towards this concept (FI04, Analyst). 
The older generation of management were also considered more conservative 
and reluctant to accept and understand the benefits of analysis. 
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There is an older generation, the old school guys, who want to work 
the way they have always done. Thinking that they never needed 
analysis in the past (FI03, Analyst). 
The police organisation was also considered quite hierarchical (Coleman, 2008, 
p.311) by several of the interviewees (FI01,FI04-FI05,FI09-FI10), which was 
also confirmed by the the survey respondents’ disagreement with the statement, 
‘I consider my organisation to be non-hierarchical, dynamic and future oriented’. 
The average score was 3.67. One interviewee (FI03) further stated that the 
organisational dynamics between the local police and the national police are 
incompatible. Local police departments are also often very hierarchical, 
conservative, static and strict in their structure, as this statement further 
indicated, 
Some of the senior management considers police to be an 
‘obedience organisation’ – you don’t question, you just act 
accordingly (FI06, Analyst). 
The national police are seen as much more open, flexible, agile, non-
hierarchical, non-authoritarian and adaptable to change. These interviewees 
(FI02-FI03,FI05,FI10,FI13) also indicated that the new generation of managers 
is bringing in new ways of working. But also:  
There is a constant resource cuts therefore the organisation cannot 
cope anymore with static leadership style, thus there is a pressure 
to be more dynamic and flexible in the future (FI05, Manager). 
Therefore, the culture has been changing to encourage new ideas and new 
ways of working (O'Neill & McCarthy, 2014). The survey respondents also 
confirmed this, as the average answer in Finland to the statement, ‘I can easily 
present new ideas and experiment new solutions to identified problems in our 
organisation’, was 2.65. Nevertheless, as these interviewees (FI03-FI04,FI07-
FI10) indicated, having new ideas accepted in the organisation is not easy. 
They must be supported by the right people to move the idea forward, as 
management support is especially essential. The ideas also must be justified 
and presented well. Nevertheless, implementing new ideas also depends on the 
department and the unit due to the different working cultures both between and 
within the police departments. These interviewees (FI04,FI11,FI13) also stated 
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that it is easier to present new ideas and make changes at the higher levels of 
the police organisation.  
Coupled with the acceptance of new ideas is the tolerance for mistakes. 
Regarding this, these interviewees (FI01,FI06-FI08,FI13) identified that the 
organisational atmosphere is relatively open to small mistakes, which can be 
tolerated and are seen as part of a learning process. As long as the legal 
requirements are respected, this is even desirable so that the fear of making 
mistakes would not paralyse the organisation (Paoline et al., 2000, p.578). 
Nevertheless, the tolerance for mistakes still depends on the line manager. The 
tolerance for mistakes is still not an easy topic in the Finnish police, despite 
those interviewee statements. This is evident when noting the survey responses 
to the statement, ‘Our organisation tolerate honest mistakes and see them as 
improvement opportunities’. The average answer was 3.2. Around 35% of the 
respondents had a neutral opinion and around 35% of them disagreed with it; 
the rest were positive.    
Communication is another controversial issue in the Finnish police. The survey 
responses to the statement, ‘Communication on different issues - even 
conflicting and difficult ones - is easy in my organisation’, were slightly negative 
with the average score of 3.27. However, there was a clear difference between 
the professional roles. The analysts were the most positive about this 
statement, with the average of 2.86. The investigators were the most negative 
with the average of 3.4. This topic’s difficulty is also illustrated by the average 
number of neutral answers at 37%. These interviewees’ (FI04,FI06,FI11) 
statements around communication indicated that basic communication works 
quite well. There is no problem communicating between the different 
hierarchical levels in theory, but in practice there is a certain threshold between 
the hierarchies, depending on the management. The communication between 
the senior management and the police officers especially does not function 
properly (Westmarland & Rowe, 2016, p.12). The challenge is that different 
information needs exist at different organisational levels. Senior management 
prefers more strategic communication, whilst the investigators or patrolling 
officers prefer operational communication. These interviewees (FI05,FI11,FI12) 
also identified that there are communication and cooperation gaps between 
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different units and departments. Nevertheless, the interviewees also stated that 
communication between colleagues they know is easy, which is also applicable 
towards the management.  
Furthermore, another interviewee (FI02) stated that communication relates to 
trust, which is generally at a good level at the police. The survey respondents 
confirmed this who provided the average answer of 2.04 to the statement, ‘I 
have full trust to my colleagues in our organisation’. Nevertheless, personal 
relationships play a significant role in trust; thus, the analysts have tried to reach 
out to the other parts of the organisation. Trust builds up slowly by working 
together, as was further stated. Trust is especially essential in the area of 
serious crime, as  source handlers and serious crime investigators generally 
have difficulty trusting people, so some police officers have a tendency to keep 
information and not share it openly. 
Nevertheless, information sharing also relates not only to the personality and 
willingness of the investigators but also to their understanding of the value of 
actively sharing this information. One interviewee (FI02) stated that the 
culturally inherited model in Finland has meant that their information and 
sources have been viewed as the personal property of the individual police 
officers. This has traditionally allowed them to accomplish a certain status they 
want then to uphold. Organisational competition also plays a role, but the group 
cohesion around an investigation also rejects the outside world and any 
outsiders. Nevertheless, this type of ‘knowledge is power’ culture is slowly 
becoming extinct with management’s intervention. As previously indicated, the 
situation seems to be improving through the establishment of the IAUs and the 
PCB Intelligence Centre, which enable everyone to work more closely together, 
even at the national level. The merging of the police departments has also 
increased cooperation, and management has also simultaneously made sure to 
promote a new type of cooperative thinking within the departments to build trust. 
Some interviewees (DK04,DK06,DK11) similarly considered the Danish police 
organisation to be very conservative and static; that is, it was functioning with 
the underlying notion that the police should continue to work the way they have 
always done. The survey respondents also confirmed this with the average 
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score of 3.48 for the statement, ‘I consider my organisation to be non-
hierarchical, dynamic and future oriented’. These interviewees (DK04-
DK06,DK10-DK11) explained that the Danish organisational working culture 
among the police officers encourages upholding routines and resisting change 
(Kelling & Moore, 1989). For example, Danish human source handlers, who 
mainly work in the area of drugs and organised crime, have difficulty collecting 
other crime area-related information. The lack of new routines also hinders the 
police officers from storing and sharing information with the analysis unit. This 
type of conservatism was also associated with the older generation of police 
management who are often reluctant to understand the benefits of analysis. 
These interviewees (DK04,DK07) see the young generation being more 
accepting of the intelligence-led policing approach. New ways of working can 
also be adopted through the new generation of managers.  
The police organisation was also seen as quite hierarchical, which was 
considered problematic in implementing intelligence-based policing strategies. 
Nevertheless, differences were reported on the organisational dynamics 
between the local police departments and the national police. The local police 
were seen to be very hierarchical, conservative, static and strict in their 
structure, whereas the national police are seen as more open, flexible, agile, 
non-hierarchical, non-authoritarian and adaptable to change. Implementing new 
ideas depends also on the department and/or the unit, but this is generally not 
easy, and the right people’s support is needed, especially from the 
management. An idea also must be well justified and presented. Nevertheless, 
the survey respondents were quite positive about presenting new ideas, as the 
average answer to the statement, ‘I can easily present new ideas and 
experiment new solutions to identified problems in our organisation’, was 2.59. 
However, the survey respondents were not as positive about tolerance of 
mistakes. The average answer to the statement, ‘Our organisation tolerate 
honest mistakes and see them as improvement opportunities’, was 3.09. 
Several interviewees (DK03,DK05-DK07,DK11) identified having a working 
atmosphere where small mistakes can be tolerated and seen as a learning 
process, despite this slightly negative figure. 
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Furthermore, these interviewees (DK05,DK08,DK11) identified that official 
communication is conducted through the hierarchy. There is generally no 
problem in communicating between different hierarchical levels; however, 
management often does not share the relevant information further with their 
staff or their own line management. Therefore, intelligence shared in different 
meetings does not always reach the right stakeholders. Communication and 
cooperation gaps were also identified not only between the different local police 
departments but also between the national police and the local police 
departments. Indeed, it was stated that the local police departments are largely 
ignoring the national level, because too much information is coming from the 
national level. The local departments also slightly mistrust the national police. 
Therefore, there is generally a lack of feedback in the organisation. The survey 
respondents to the statement, ‘Communication on different issues -even 
conflicting and difficult ones - is easy in my organisation’, also confirmed the 
communication challenge. The average answer to this statement was slightly 
negative with the score of 3.15. This topic’s difficulty is also illustrated with an 
average number of 28% neutral answers.  
Nevertheless, there is general trust within the organisation, as illustrated by the 
average answer of 2.16 to the statement, ‘I have full trust to my colleagues in 
our organisation’. The investigators were the most positive professional group 
with the score of 1.88, according to the survey results, and the least positive 
were the analysts with the score of 2.41. These figures correspond with the 
majority of the interviewees’ views (DK01,DK03-DK04,DK06,DK08-DK10), who 
stated that trust exists in the organisation. They also correspond to these 
interviewees’ (DK02-DK03,DK07,DK11) views that a high level of trust exists 
between police officers. However, these interviewees (DK02-DK03,DK07) 
further indicated there is mistrust towards the ‘outsiders’, or the analysts with 
civilian and/or academic backgrounds (Westmarland & Rowe, 2016, p.2). 
Indeed, it was noted that hiring outsiders raises conflicts among the different 
professional backgrounds in the Danish police. Misunderstandings and biases 
often exist among the police officers towards other professionals with an 
academic background, but it is also the other way around. This clash of cultures 
and mindsets was indicated as a real barrier in intelligence work in Denmark, as 
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the new professional staff is seen to overtake some of the tasks of the police 
officers and as a threat to the police officers’ existence.  
Having personal contacts to receive and share information among the 
organisational layers, silos and groups was seen as important among the 
interviewees (DK05-DK06,DK08,DK10-DK11), as the communication is difficult 
on a large scale and trust challenges exist among the different professional 
groups. One interviewee (DK04) stated that ‘the analyst would must be able to 
cut across the hierarchy […] then it might work.’ This way the intelligence can 
be shared, and the all-important feedback can be provided. 
Indeed, communicating among colleagues you know is easy. Thus, one 
interviewee (DK01) stated that sharing information with analysts is not a 
problem for the investigators but must be done through personal contacts. 
Therefore, the analysts must reach out to the police officers on a personal level 
to gather their information, as police officers tend only to trust other 
professionals to whom they can relate.  
We spent some time telling the police officers at the patrol level on 
how we saw it. And sometimes we got some quite good 
discussions with them […]. And then we can use their input to 
qualify our project (DK08, Analyst). 
Personal relations play a significant role in trust, and one interviewee (DK07) 
stated that when the analyst is respected, then the analysis results are taken 
seriously and respected. Therefore, another interviewee (DK02) indicated that 
the analyst must be part of the same pack and use the same language to gain 
trust. Thus, it is important to avoid too complicated academic language when 
communicating with the investigators, as this creates communication barriers. 
The theoretical language must be translated into operational police work. 
However, as stated, it takes time for the investigators to trust and appreciate the 
analysts. The cooperation between investigators and analysts depends on their 
mutual working experience and interaction. Common experiences and 
interactions build trust. It is, thus, common to use trusted contacts with whom 
the police officers only share information. These interviewees (DK02-DK03) 
stated that the source handlers, especially, have difficulty trusting people, with 
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the result that they have a tendency to keep information to themselves. Culture 
is an important aspect of information sharing, as, 
There is also a misconception among management to think that by 
having a technical solution the organisation is intelligence-led and 
ignore the whole cultural part being intelligence-led. Because in the 
end the data must be stored into the system by a police officer, 
analyst or source handler. (DK02, Analyst). 
Indeed, management have a pivotal role in information sharing. This 
interviewee (DK04) further stated that management are intervening in this type 
of ‘knowledge is power’ culture, which is slowly becoming extinct. 
5.7 Summary of Findings II 
The IAU’s set-ups are different among the different police departments in both 
countries. Indeed, differences exist not only in how they are managed but also 
in staff roles and responsibilities. Furthermore, the information management 
models differ among the police departments. The analysts also have a variety of 
different tasks in both countries that also vary among the police departments. 
There are no clear career paths for analysts. Standards related to their 
expected education or experience are also missing in both countries, although 
both countries have held discussions on the career path for analysts and what 
could be their expected background. Denmark is a bit more advanced in this, as 
they started hiring analysts with a civilian background to the analyst positions. 
The level of professionalism of management in the intelligence and analysis 
disciplines is low in both countries; thus, they are not engaged properly in the 
intelligence process. The professionalim of police officers was also low in this 
regard, although more clarity exists about their role in the intelligence process in 
Denmark. Still, both countries have a significant shortage in intelligence 
analysis-related training in all of these professional groups.  
Regarding organisational culture, the police organisations in both countries 
were identified as being conservative, static, routinised and hierarchical, 
although differences exist between the national and local levels. Generation 
also has an impact on this: New ideas and tolerance for mistakes are 
controversial topics and depend on the person’s organisational position and line 
management. Communication is also controversial and impacted by hierarchy 
 
101 
 
and trust. The Danish police officers, especially, show mistrust towards the 
analysts with no police background.  
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6 Findings III: Practical application of knowledge 
This last findings chapter seeks an answer to the research question: How does 
intelligence analysis serve the law enforcement knowledge management 
apparatus in practice? The researcher pursued the answer to this question by 
using the Socialisation, Externalisation, Combination, Internalisation (SECI) 
knowledge conversion model and presenting the intelligence practices of these 
countries under the sections Socialisation, Externalisation, Combination and 
Internalisation. By doing so this chapter contributes to the overall aim of this 
research by exploring the practical role of intelligence analysis and its 
implications for law enforcement knowledge management in practice. It also 
contributes to the understanding of the practical implications law enforcement 
practice has for intelligence analysis. 
6.1 Socialisation – fixing organisational pathologies 
Several Finnish interviewees (FI04,FI06-FI07,FI10) identified that different 
professional groups (Skolnick, 2008), such as patrolling officers, hold a lot of 
information and knowledge, which fragments the information. Moreover, some 
interviewees (FI07,FI10) stated that pertinent information tends not to move 
easily among the professional groups, since the management is often the only 
link among them. Therefore, information and knowledge often stay within the 
respective team, unit or department. As a result, personal relations and social 
networks are very important factors in information and intelligence sharing:  
They enable it to be exchanged more flexibly and quickly. 
Information is fragmented into so many places […]. So often the 
information sharing is based on personal relations of the staff to 
know the right persons (FI13, Manager). 
In practice the old truism is true. Exchanging knowledge, 
information and intelligence is not between organisations, but 
between persons (FI08, Investigator).  
Another interviewee (FI03) stated that it is about trusting and respecting the 
other person enough to share information and accept the intelligence they 
provide (Cotter, 2015, p.10). Therefore, people will not easily share information 
even with a person officially appointed and tasked to work with this information. 
The officers still must know this person before they share any information. 
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There will be no information sharing or at least a delay without this personal 
contact. Thus, a need exists to establish social networks in order to facilitate 
information exchange, especially as no systematic management attention is 
given to social relations and networking by the police organisation. 
The police organisation has been waking up to understand the 
importance of networking and socialisation too late, which has 
prevented to identify valuable contacts, experience and information 
(FI02, Manager). 
Actually establishing contacts and building networks is often a quite sporadic 
and individually driven exercise. Training courses, seminars and conferences 
were, thus, seen as important networking platforms. Yet, 
However as there are only one or two places [annually] available 
for each of the department, therefore the networking is not so 
extensive. So there is no systematic approach to this (FI10, 
Analyst). 
Additionally, these seminars are usually held only for a specific professional 
group; thus, networking beyond this professional group is limited. Nevertheless, 
the survey results show that willingness exists to share professional knowledge 
and experience. Indeed, the average answer to the statement, ‘I make sure to 
share my professional knowledge and experience with my colleagues via social 
events, meetings, presentations and/or trainings’, was very positive with the 
score of 2.15.  
These interviewees (FI03,FI12) identified that the Intelligence and Analysis 
Units (IAUs) aim to develop social networks and establish a wide range of 
contacts to gather knowledge. The IAUs are naturally involved in different 
matters and in contact with a wide range of stakeholders, so they act as a sort 
of information funnel for the police departments. This also facilitates the 
departments’ ability to find the right contacts, which was difficult before the 
IAUs. Meetings are also a way to collaborate and exchange information among 
different teams and groups. Tasking of information collection on certain topics is 
also easier for the analysts through these meetings. Furthermore, all the IAUs 
participate in the daily national intelligence briefing led by the National Police 
Board (NBI). The aim of that meeting is to keep all departments updated on the 
national situation. 
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These interviewees (FI01,FI06,FI11) also identified that an enormous amount of 
tacit knowledge exists with people, and the practical work at the police is very 
much based on sharing this silent, tacit knowledge and experience. 
Police is a craftsman profession, you can have the basic knowledge 
at school, but ultimately you can only learn it through work (FI05, 
Manager). 
However, there seems to be no standardised model for sharing tacit knowledge, 
although, 
This type of knowledge makes it also difficult to have a systematic 
process to manage it and with more systematic process as we 
might lose something. Tacit knowledge must be transferred silently 
(FI01, Manager). 
Indeed, the model used to transfer tacit knowledge, identified by the 
interviewees (FI01,FI05), has mostly been used by detective partners or in 
patrolling teams, such as a more experienced detective and a novice working 
together. Tacit knowledge is also exchanged through different events, such as 
courses and seminars, as previously indicated; this knowledge conversion is 
also more self-initiated and done voluntarily. 
Some Danish interviewees (DK01-DK02,DK09) identified the existence of 
different professional groups (Hendriks & van Hulst, 2016, p.173) dividing the 
Danish police. 
Danish police is really divided. […] Often people have no idea what 
other different professional part of the organisation […] is doing 
(DK02, Analyst). 
Indeed, when information and knowledge is held in these different social 
communities, it becomes fragmented. Furthermore, interviewee (DK10) stated 
that the pertinent information is often changed among the teams by their 
management, but then this is not further shared with their staff. Therefore, 
intelligence shared in the different meetings is often not reaching the right 
people. Another interviewee (DK05) identified that the information- and 
knowledge-sharing process among the police departments is similar, making it 
challenging to share large-scale information among police departments. 
Therefore, it is essential to know the right persons from another police 
department with whom to exchange information and intelligence. Personal 
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relations and social networks are very important in information and intelligence 
sharing within law enforcement; they enable it to be exchanged more flexibly 
and quickly. 
A lot of the important information that could lead to valid intelligence 
is mostly something that is going on from individual from individual 
(DK02, Analyst). 
It is ultimately about trusting and respecting the other person enough to 
exchange information. It is easier to reach the right people working on a specific 
area to resolve problems, share and receive intelligence or gain more contacts 
when you have personal contacts. One interviewee (DK10) stated that the 
network size affects the amount of available information; e.g., large networks 
have more information available. Furthermore, 
It is part of how long you have been [working] there and who do you 
know (DK11, Patrolling officer) 
Thus, the analysts must establish social networks and relationships throughout 
the organisation to gain the needed information. These networks also assist in 
reporting the analytical work through personal interactions, and the analysts can 
provide the all-important feedback to the police officers, as the formal process is 
often inadequate. Many interviewees (DK02,DK06,DK08) considered this a 
good model, as it also builds up relations, resulting in good discussions for 
further information sharing and enhancing the police officers’ understanding and 
motivation to collect and register information, as this interviewee indicated:  
If we need information about something, then we ask the people. It 
is easy for us to go them and ask (DK11, Patrolling officer). 
Nevertheless, this kind of feedback is quite time consuming and there is often 
no time for this, as police work is performed in a high-paced environment.  
A generic understanding exists about creating a network of personal contacts to 
exhange information despite this obstacle, although establishing contacts and 
building networks is a quite sporadic and individually driven exercise developed 
slowly over time through working relations. The longer the working period, the 
larger the network and the fewer the role conflicts among different professional 
groups. Indeed, there is no systematic management attention given to social 
relations and networking. Nevertheless, one interviewee (DK03) claimed that 
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the Danish police are generally improving at socialisation and networking, as 
several seminars, conferences and training events are available about 
intelligence. 
Indeed, training courses, seminars and conferences were seen an important 
networking platform; however, networking itself is not planned and is a rather 
underestimated side effect of these events. Nonetheless, the survey results 
indicate that a generally positive attitude exists for sharing professional 
knowledge and experience at different types of social events. The average 
answer to the statement, ‘I make sure to share my professional knowledge and 
experience with my colleagues via social events, meetings, presentations 
and/or trainings’, was very positive with the average score of 2.17. These 
interviewees (DK05,DK09) reported the lack of a standardised model to 
exchange this, although an enormous amount of tacit knowledge is available in 
the organisation. Denmark has no national morning briefing but established 
information exchange groups exist in a specific area with the aim of using these 
types of social networks more systematically and formally.  
Furthermore, as these analysts without police experience stated (DK03,DK05), 
they could learn more from the police context if they were close to the 
investigators. The challenge is that traditionally the Danish police are not used 
to working on cross-collaborative teams in which different professionals with 
different skill sets are working on the same task. That would be beneficial for 
the organisation, nevertheless. More interaction between analysts and 
investigators is occurring nowadays, and the analysts are receiving tacit 
knowledge, which is often done through stories (van Hulst, 2013) as this 
interviewee indicated: 
There are a lot of those anecdotes from the senior officers who 
have been in the game for some time and they tell successful case 
stories and what worked in that particular case to be used for the 
current case (DK05, Analyst). 
These interviewees (DK02,DK03,DK05,DK10) further reported that the police 
officers’ and analysts’ personality traits and how social, open and 
communicative they are affect how information and knowledge is shared with 
someone. Furthermore, the analysts must be humble towards the investigators. 
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Indeed, one interviewee (DK02) indicated that an analyst’s social skills are very 
important. Thus, personality traits impact social network development. It can 
take some time and perseverance for an analyst to establish contacts and build 
relationships. Actively reaching out and working with the police officers in 
operational matters are good ways to do this. The analysts must prove 
themselves to the investigators and relate to them in a way they understand, 
using the same language.  
6.2 Externalisation – the challenge of collecting and storing data  
6.2.1 Tasking and requesting information collection 
The survey responses in Finland to the statement, ‘Our management is actively 
and systematically involved in directing the intelligence analysis process - for 
example through tasking and planning’, slightly disagreed with the average 
score of 3.22. The management responses to this statement were slightly more 
positive with the average of 2.95. Nevertheless, only 47.37% of the 
management agreed. Indeed, these interviewees (FI04,FI13) stated that there 
are no systematic national information collection plans and models. Thus, the 
police departments often have their own way to collect data, yet police officers 
still regularly receive requests to observe and collect information in relation to 
some themes, trends and phenomena. The information collected at the local 
level mostly relates either to a public event or to a criminal investigation. Some 
Finnish local police departments have even developed their own special 
information request template to identify information holders in the organisation. 
Incoming information, collected through the police officers’ routine tasks, 
dictates the IAUs’ work. Other sources, such as police informants, surveillance 
teams, liaison officers and other authorities, also provide information. The 
Internet is also increasingly used as an information source. Intelligence gaps 
still exist despite all these options. 
The average responses in Denmark to the survey statement, ‘Our management 
is actively and systematically involved in directing the intelligence analysis 
process - for example through tasking and planning’, were largely neutral with 
slight disagreement in the average score of 3.05. The management itself 
agreed more with the average answer of 2.84,  although only 36.84% agreed 
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with this statement. Thus, the majority of the management is not involved in the 
tasking and planning process, according to these figures. Denmark is similar to 
Finland with no systematic national information collection plans and models, 
either. The police departments have their own way of establishing data 
collection, and few local police departments in Denmark have started to 
formulate data collection plans. This has not been without challenges: 
The analysts have tried for the past 6 to 8 months to make 
collection plans for the patrolling officers, human source handlers 
and the investigators without success. The analyst are not getting 
anything back (DK06, Analyst). 
Danish police officers are regularly requested to observe and collect information 
in relation to some themes. This request can come via the hierarchy or via IAU 
emails. Furthermore, these interviewees (DK06,DK08) identified that in 
Denmark the analysts have specific annual objectives and targets that their data 
collection efforts must focus on. Danish analysts can also task the source 
handlers to collect certain types of information. It is generally challenging for the 
investigators to accept this, as they are not accustomed to being told what they 
should be focusing on. Indeed, as an investigator stated, ‘police officers are 
wondering why an academic, straight out of school, is telling them how to do 
their job (DK07)’. 
Indeed, the analysts’ ability to task the source handlers is new, and the police 
officers have difficulty accepting this; thus, the actual ability to task was not fully 
implemented. There are also police officers who are in contact with the general 
public and who can provide good intelligence on certain topical themes and/or 
people who are threats to others. The use and collection of this open source 
information varies between police departments, as there are no common 
standards.  
6.2.2 Collecting and storing 
According to these Finnish interviewees (FI03-FI04,FI06-FI07,FI09,FI11-FI12), 
the IAUs should, in principle, electronically receive the information from the 
police officers into an observation database. However, this is often not 
considered a priority and, thus, is not done immediately. Therefore, these are 
often not done after the mandatory registrations of the crime, due to the general 
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rush related to the police officers’ lack of time and resources. The result is that 
the patrolling officers often do not store their observations systematically in the 
system. The average answer of 2.85 to the survey statement, ‘I systematically 
share and store any crime related information (such as tip-offs) in my 
possession into our organisations information systems for further use’, supports 
this claim. Only 45.12% of the investigators agreed with this statement, despite 
this slightly positive average score. There seems to be no major issue related to 
the legal aspects of storing data, as indicated by the average answer of 2.2 to 
the statement, ‘I am fully aware of the legal aspects of information sharing’. 
Indeed, 70.73% of the investigators agreed with this. Still, these interviewees 
(FI03-FI05) identified that information is kept in the pockets, emails and heads 
of the individual police officers. Finland’s practice to mitigate this issue is that 
the information can also be sent via email to the IAU. The rationale is that at 
least the IAU has the possibility to utilise this information, even though the 
information is not so well shared this way.  
Moreover, a working culture also exists for sending information directly to the 
investigators: 
There is no systematic processing of data into the systems - when 
we know that the information is needed somewhere then we share 
this information with the different stakeholders (FI08, Investigator) 
This is not a very efficient way of working. Indeed, this interviewee (FI01) 
identified that the police officers have difficulty estimating the usefulness of the 
collected information (Bullock, 2013, p.136). The information fits well into the 
case in some instances, but the information is often indeterminate. The police 
officers were also considered to have too much power to decide what 
information is processed into the systems and how (FI09). Furthermore, the 
patrolling officers (FI12) were identified as lacking an understanding of the 
importance of the quality and availability of information. Other interviewees 
(FI09,FI12) identified that the issue was the database quality, in which the 
patrolling officers and investigators have a major role. However, an 
understanding of information quality, accuracy and relevancy is often missing 
among the police officers, and the classifications of the collected data are not 
sufficiently performed. Thus, as mentioned earlier, the quality and validity of the 
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data varies. The amount of information is quite massive, so the classifications 
should be done accurately in order to be able to conduct analysis. Poor quality 
information causes considerable challenges for the analysts, because they 
cannot trust the data’s quality (Bullock, 2013, p.137). 
These Finnish interviewees (FI09-FI10) furthermore stated that the standards 
for information sharing and processing vary at both the organisational and 
individual levels. The processing is a challenge for police officers, as they must 
take so many different things into account, but unclear definitions also create 
challenges for storing information in the system. Additionally, the systems are 
not supportive in this sense, as there are only a few mandatory fields in the 
systems that must be filled in when processing data. Otherwise, this system 
works randomly. The information categories to choose from should also be 
clarified and made more understandable for the people recording the data in the 
systems. Additionally, there are insufficient quality checks performed on the 
processed information. Nevertheless, the average answer of 2.54 to the survey 
statement, ‘The information processing standards (i.e. how to store data into our 
systems) and rules (such as data protection) are clear to me’, gives quite a 
positive indication of the users’ knowledge of information processing standards. 
As stated: 
In relation to the IT systems I think they are fine – there are no big 
issues […]. The issue is more on the current legislation and how to 
use these different acts in collecting information and intelligence 
(FI11, Investigator). 
Moreover, several factors were identified that have an impact on the sharing 
and storing of information and knowledge, factors related to the personality, 
understanding and willingness of the police officers to be active and share 
information. Police officers who lack knowledge of information management and 
intelligence will find their motivation hindered regarding collecting and storing 
information in the systems. Culture, routines, time and energy also influence 
how much an officer is willing to store data. Lack of control was identified as an 
issue, as ‘there are no consequences for not sharing information’ [thus] it is 
easier not to process anything’ (FI10). Strict interpretation of legislation and 
cumbersome information management policies were also seen to hinder the 
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storing of the information in Finland. These related to the recent public scandals 
within the Finnish police that have hindered police officers’ initiative for 
searching and sharing information, as they fear they are doing something illegal 
and, thus, mistrust the information systems.  
This interviewee (FI05) also identified feedback as important. People will not 
store data in the systems in the future if it takes them a lot of time to store data 
in the systems without receiving anything in return. Thus, feedback increases 
the police officers’ motivation to store data and be more focused in their 
information collection activities. However, people experience difficulties in 
providing and receiving feedback. Consequently, when comparing these views 
of the interviewees with the investigators’ responses to the statement, ‘I know 
how information stored in our systems will be used by the organisation’, it can 
be noted that quite a number of investigators do not have a full understanding of 
this, as only 53.66% agreed with this statement. 
All information in Denmark should be received electronically from the police 
officers, who should report the information by storing their observations in the 
database. However, after the mandatory and prioritised registrations of 
information, coupled with the general rush of the police officers, these are often 
not done (Sheptycki, 2004).  
[Information storage] depends on how long you have been working 
and if it is part of your routine and do you feel that you have the 
time and energy (DK11, Patrolling officer). 
Furthermore, the average answers to the statement, ‘I systematically share and 
store any crime related information (such as tip-offs) in my possession into our 
organisations information systems for further use’, were positive in Denmark 
with the score of 2.02. In Denmark 75% of the investigators agreed with this 
statement. The legal aspects related to information sharing are also not a 
significant issue, as the average answer to the statement, ‘I am fully aware of 
the legal aspects of information sharing’, was 2.1, with 75% of the Danish 
investigators agreeing with this. The Danish interviewees still also identified that 
information is kept by the police officers for themselves without sharing. Thus, 
the staff working in the Danish IAUs also try to collect the information through 
personal contacts.  
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The IAUs, as identified earlier, have a central role in collecting, validating and 
processing new data in the systems and distributing it further to the different 
stakeholders. One Danish analyst (DK08) identified, in relation to this, that the 
validation process is a challenge for the analysts and that, therefore, the same 
person who originally obtained this information should actually do this. The 
whole validation concept also seems to be vague for the police officers. 
Validation is still a challenge at the local level due to the lack of 
understanding of how important it is to validate intelligence to get 
multiple sources in regards you have to use it for specific purposes 
(DK04, Analyst). 
Furthermore, these Danish interviewees (DK04,DK06) also identified a strong 
routine and working culture in which information is traditionally sent directly to 
the investigators, thus bypassing the IAUs and the whole validation process. 
However, the patrolling officers were seen to lack an understanding of the 
importance of quality and information availability but also had too much power 
to decide what information is processed in the systems and how. This has a 
negative impact on the quality and validity of the data, and it is difficult to 
conduct analysis when the classifications are not done properly. 
I would like to improve awareness and importance of the 
intelligence gathering. […] Every police officer in Denmark should 
have an understanding why valid information and why intelligence 
is necessary. And why quality is necessary (DK09, Analyst). 
The police officers’ lack of knowledge of information management and 
intelligence hinders their motivation to collect and store information in the 
systems. The police officers' culture, routines, time and energy influence how 
much they are willing to store data. The lack of management control and the 
importance of feedback were also similarly identified in Denmark. The police 
officers must see the benefits of storing the data immediately; otherwise, they 
will stop storing it. Many interviewees (DK02-DK03,DK06,DK10-DK11) stated 
that feedback increases the police officers’ motivation to collect and store data. 
Nevertheless, there are difficulties providing and receiving feedback in the 
Danish police. Certainly when comparing these interviewees’ views with the 
investigators’ responses to the statement, ‘I know how information stored in our 
systems will be used by the organisation’, it can be noted that quite a number of 
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investigators still do not have a full understanding, given that 62.5% agreed with 
this statement (Stanier, 2013, p.129).  
These Danish interviewees (DK08-DK10) certainly identified that database 
quality is an issue. The challenge is that whilst the patrolling officers and 
investigators have a major role in relation to the quality, accuracy and relevancy 
of the data, they are often missing the necessary understanding. Thus, for 
example, the classifications of the collected data are often not sufficiently 
performed; therefore, the analysts cannot trust the data’s quality. Nevertheless, 
in accordance with the survey responses to the statement, ‘The information 
processing standards (i.e. how to store data into our systems) and rules (such 
as data protection) are clear to me’, there seems to be no issue with the 
standards, as the average answer was 2.42. Indeed, these interviewees 
(DK02,DK07,DK11) stated that the police officers are quite used to using the 
systems they need in their work. The younger generation is more able to use 
these. 
6.3 Combination – producing intelligence 
6.3.1 Intelligence tasking 
As mentioned earlier, the average answers in Finland to the statement, ‘Our 
management is actively and systematically involved in directing the intelligence 
analysis process - for example through tasking and planning’, were slightly 
negative. Only 28.57% of the Finnish analysts agreed with this. Many 
interviewees (FI01,FI03,FI05,FI08,FI10,FI13) also stated that tasking by the 
management is unstructured, unclear or non-existent. Many managers have no 
knowledge of or interest in analysis; thus, they are keen to maintain the old 
routines. Nevertheless, the situation looks a bit different when noting the 
answers by the possible users of intelligence, such as investigators and 
management, to the statement, ‘Police should not waste its resources on 
generating statistics, charts, reports and theories’. On average the answers in 
Finland were negative at 3.58; 57.32% of the investigators and 73.68% of the 
management disagreed with this. These figures correspond well with these 
interviewees (FI03-FI05,FI09), who indicated that a need exists to educate the 
management on tasking and asking for analytical products. There is also a clear 
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need to educate the investigators as well who, as some interviewees 
(FI10,FI12) stated, are accustomed to ask for different services from the IAUs 
on an ad-hoc basis and to dictate the daily work of these units. 
The average answers in Denmark to the statement, ‘Our management is 
actively and systematically involved in directing the intelligence analysis 
process - for example through tasking and planning’, were also slightly 
negative, and only 23.68% of the Danish analysts agreed with this. The Danish 
management approach to tasking and planning is quite unstructured, overly 
defined or non-existent, similar to Finland. Their understanding and interest in 
analysis is low, so they are keen to maintain the old routines. These 
interviewees (DK02-DK03) stated that there are managers who request 
analytical support, but they are often the same ones. This interviewee (DK06) 
stated that, in terms of tasking, the analysts are still receiving too many 
requests to provide statistics, figures and numbers when no analysis is 
required. Nonetheless, analysis is mostly seen as important, as indicated by the 
negative average answer of 3.81 to the statement, ‘Police should not waste its 
resources on generating statistics, charts, reports and theories’. Particularly 
interesting is the finding that 75% of the investigators and 78.95% of the 
management disagreed with this. Overall, these survey figures related to 
tasking and reports correspond well with some interviewees’ claims (DK01-
DK03,DK08) that the management must be educated to understand the 
intelligence process and what analytical products to request. The investigators 
must also refine their understanding and expectations of analysis, especially in 
those situations, identified by one interviewee (DK02), in which the analysts are 
only tasked to make charts for the investigators (Cope, 2004, p.194). 
6.3.2 Using systems to find and combine- 
Some interviewees (FI10,FI12-FI13) reported that analysis in Finland is mostly 
based on the information in the regular police systems, such as the crime 
records. Every police officer can then search and collect data from these 
different basic databases, although restrictions exist for some of the national 
systems. 
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As a team leader I go through daily the information on the available 
databases and the daily reports in order to build a situational 
picture […] if it seems that we cannot manage to collect the needed 
information then we are in contact with the intelligence analysis unit 
(FI08, Investigator). 
Some challenges occur when using the systems, as indicated by the average 
answer of 3.25 to the statement, ‘It is easy to use our organisation’s information 
systems’. The clear discrepancy between the analysts and investigators is 
shown in their average answers: 2.76 for the analysts and 3.39 for the 
investigators. The management’s score also showed a slight disagreement with 
the score of 3.21. Some interviewees (FI03,FI05,FI08-FI09) indicated that a 
vast amount of data is available in the different systems; however, it is difficult 
to manage, analyse and use it when it is scattered among many systems. This 
makes the cross checking of entities a challenge, and the inadequately 
classified information also makes it difficult to use when searching and querying 
the databases to perform an analysis. 
The results gained through the statistical systems varies raising 
questions on the reliability of the information and how much it can 
be used when making decisions (FI01, Manager). 
This also affects how much of the data can be used in decision making.  
Nevertheless, the analysts are still conducting analyses, as indicated by their 
average answers of 2.14 to the statement, ‘I often use different analytical 
techniques to the data and information stored in our systems to create a new 
awareness on a given topic’. However, this interviewee (FI02) identified that the 
lack of defined standards for the analysis discipline creates variations in how 
this analysis is conducted. Interestingly, 21.95% of the investigators and 
21.05% of the Finnish managers were also positive towards this statement, 
indicating a wider use of analytical techniques. Indeed, some interviewees’ 
statements (FI04,FI09-FI10) confirmed that some investigators are using 
analytical techniques in their investigations.  
The analysts mostly perform analysis on crime series and support on-going 
investigations by providing different visualisations or by analysing itemised 
billings, according to several interviewees (FI05-FI07,FI12-FI13). The IAUs also 
spend a lot of time and resources to search and filter information for the national 
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morning briefing. One interviewee (FI11) who criticized the usability of the 
intelligence the IAUs provided also expected it to contain more relevant action 
recommendations and not just some semi-accurate tips. Several interviewees 
(FI10,FI12) identified that the issue is often solved before an analysis would be 
ready to provide such recommendations, due to the high tempo at the local 
police to handle the investigations, meaning there is no time to produce these 
types of products. Two interviewees (FI02,FI10) also identified that the 
emphasis is often on the analysts organising the information into specified 
summaries. Indeed, two more interviewees (FI03,FI11) stated that a significant 
amount of working time is spent on making statistics for the senior management 
without including any form of analysis, conclusions or findings.  
These statistics are often produced to understand the number of open cases 
within the investigative teams to help balance their workload. One interviewee 
(FI03) also stated that statistics can help to understand the current situation, but 
they are far and away from being a strategic analysis. Furthermore, another 
interviewee (FI01) stated that crime is such a multidimensional topic that the IT 
systems alone cannot provide the answers. Thus, analysis is needed to find the 
answers. The challenge is that, 
Strategic analysis is less coordinated and not necessarily well 
understood. The long term focused and aimed activity is missing 
(FI05, Manager). 
Thus, strategic analysis is underdeveloped in Finland. Part of the problem is 
also that the police mostly use it for their own information collection; thus, the 
more extensive social knowledge is missing in the analysis.  
Access to this information in Denmark depends on where the personnel are 
organisationally located. Access restrictions to the data exist, so the IAUs can 
only access their own information, but the national police can access all the 
available information. Vital information is often missing due to this, and the 
different police departments may target the same person or group as a result. 
Additionally, the databases of the Danish police have an inadequate amount of 
information available for conducting analysis, such as target profiling, which 
creates significant intelligence gaps for analysis. Indeed, using the information 
systems is not that simple, according to the survey respondents. The average 
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answers in Denmark were 3.21 to the statement, ‘It is easy to use our 
organisation’s information systems’. The analysts agreed slightly more with the 
average score of 2.81. The investigators were the most critical with the average 
score of 3.5, but the management also slightly disagreed with the average score 
of 3.32.  
Indeed, many Danish interviewees (DK01,DK04-DK06,DK10) also identified 
that an enormous amount of data is available but is difficult to manage, analyse 
and use, as the information is scattered around many systems. Thus, the data 
needs to be searched and collected from different databases, and with the 
information often inadequately classified, this is even more challenging. 
Moreover, the analysts often must manage a cumbersome process whereby the 
relevant data must be firstly exported from one system and then imported again 
to another system before they can start conducting any analysis (Bullock, 2013, 
p.137). Furthermore, the structure and format of the data varies between the 
systems, so the data cannot be used for analysis directly. Thus, the analysts 
must spend a lot of time modifying the collected data into the same format so 
they can used it for analysis, which considerably reduces the time for the actual 
analysis. The new system is expected to improve this situation for the analysts. 
Still, the analysts were most positive towards the statement, ‘I often use 
different analytical techniques to the data and information stored in our systems 
to create a new awareness on a given topic’ with an average answer of 2.3. 
Furthermore, 37.5% of the investigators and 31.58% of the management 
agreed with this, indicating the usage of analytical techniques in their work. 
Nevertheless, these Danish interviewees (DK07,DK10) identified that the 
analysts are considered to be more efficient when working with different kinds of 
data and providing charts for the investigators. The analysts can also find 
important, previously unknown phone numbers or other new paths in the 
investigation. Furthermore, two Danish interviewees (DK03-DK04) identified 
that the work of the analysts is to try to collect the information from different 
sources to make the analysis and produce intelligence for the police officers 
and to instruct them, for example, to work on certain identified targets. The 
challenge is the lack of available information in the systems. The analysis 
process is also time consuming: Just building target profiles can take several 
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months by a group of analysts. However, with the police being such a high-
paced environment, the management wants quick results and 
recommendations; therefore, the time for analysis is inadequate. The tendency 
is often to react to crime issues very quickly, which cuts out the analysis phase. 
Furthermore, the analysts are also performing some case-specific analysis, 
while simultaneously remembering that their main goals from other areas are to 
build a bigger picture using the collected data. One Danish interviewee (DK06) 
also identified that a significant amount of working time is spent on making 
statistics for the senior management, which are often compiled without any form 
of analysis to formulate conclusions or findings.  
6.3.3 Analytical reporting 
The majority of the Finnish survey respondents reported that analytical outputs 
are accepted in the organisation. Indeed, the average answer was 3.58 to the 
statement, ‘Police should not waste its resources on generating statistics, 
charts, reports and theories’. The management were even more accepting of 
this statement with the average score of 3.89. The investigators also seem to 
accept the idea of having someone producing statistics, charts and reports with 
the average answer of 3.45. Furthermore, all three professional groups seemed 
to be familiar with producing different types of reports and documents. The 
average answer was 2.28 to the statement, ‘I am used to produce different 
types of reports, documents and/or material to capture crime related information 
for our organisation’. 
Indeed, as mentioned earlier, the IAUs in Finland produce local situational 
reports on different projects, maintain lists of wanted persons, and provide 
summaries of the on-going investigations. Additionally, the IAUs receive 
constant requests from senior management to produce different kind of memos 
and other strategic products. The PCB Intelligence Centre at the national level 
produces the situational report after the morning briefing to keep everyone 
updated. The PCB Intelligence Centre also produces and facilitates other 
intelligence reports for the senior management for strategic decision making. 
These reports are also distributed to the local intelligence units that use the 
relevant parts in their weekly reports. These Finnish interviewees (FI01-
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FI02,FI04,) identified that the production of crime statistics for the management 
is also an important task of the intelligence units at both the local and national 
levels.  
The analysis in these reports was contested by some interviewees (FI05,FI10-
FI11). One person (FI05) further stated that typically the analysis is understood 
to have the same data in a new, understandable format with limited analysis. 
The issue here is that the lack of a common understanding and standardisation 
of intelligence and analysis causes variations in analysis. Both the Finnish 
interviewees (FI06,FI12-FI13) and survey respondents expressed the critical 
view that there is quite often a tendency in the organisation to make reports for 
the sake of reports. 
Reports are important if there is some kind of analysis conducted 
with conclusions and recommendations. However […] there is an 
attitude to produce reports without having any idea, aim and 
usability of these reports (Finnish Survey Respondent, Analyst). 
The local intelligence and analysis units were thus seen as superficial actors 
who produce all kinds of reports that have limited impact on the operational 
work. Furthermore, two Finnish interviewees (FI03,FI05) were critical of the 
strategic analysis, which was said to be in very poor condition due not only to 
the lack of qualified strategic analysts in the police departments but also to an 
underdeveloped strategic analysis concept. Thus, the statistics are often seen 
as strategic analysis, although two interviewees (FI03,FI05) stated that these 
are far and away from being a strategic analysis.  
A general acceptance exists in Denmark for the output of the analysis. The 
average answer to the statement, ‘Police should not waste its resources on 
generating statistics, charts, reports and theories’, was a positive 3.81. Of the 
professional groups, management firmly disagreed with the average response 
of 3.95. The investigators also generally accept the idea of having someone 
producing statistics, charts and reports with their average answer of 3.5. All 
three Danish professional groups are familiar with producing different types of 
reports and documents, as shown by the average answer of 2.39 to the 
statement, ‘I am used to produce different types of reports, documents and/or 
material to capture crime related information for our organisation.’ Nevertheless, 
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there are different ways to use the collected data and several products that can 
be provided to the management or to the police officers. The product type in 
Denmark varies from individual charts to reports containing these charts. The 
most commonly used products include link charts and event charts. Telephone 
analysis is also a typical product. Then there are periodic reports, which 
highlight the current situation in the crime area. Analytical products are also 
connected to a specific investigation, and target profiles of criminal groups are 
produced to help decide on and select the next operational target for the police 
to focus on. Statistics are also produced. Nevertheless, a Danish interviewee 
(DK02) identified that often the analysis is left out from analysis reports, so they 
only contain descriptive figures and numbers. However, there are actual 
strategic analysis products produced in Denmark that analyse the crime 
development from different perspectives in order to produce a national strategic 
plan with recommended focus areas. These strategic products should then be 
connected to the investigations. Many of the products are geared toward 
decision making on the management level, although the aim is to have the 
products serve both management and investigators. Nevertheless, there is no 
strict framework for producing analytical products, and though standard 
templates and guidance are available, there are no consequences if these are 
not used. Thus, all 12 police districts produce reports in their own way in 
practice. 
6.4 Internalisation – the usage of intelligence 
6.4.1 General usage of intelligence products 
The Finnish police officers are eager for new knowledge as indicated by the 
average score of 1.72 to the statement, ‘I am eager to discover and experience 
new things in order to use this new knowledge in my working practice’. No 
major differences occured among the professional groups in the responses. 
Nevertheless, two interviewees (FI05-FI06) stated that challenges occur in 
utilising the intelligence. The primary one is that the working culture, where 
analysis results have not typically been used, is a challenge. The decision-
making framework or process on how to use intelligence was also considered 
inadequate. Indeed, the lack of knowledge of intelligence products and what to 
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expect from them hinders their usage for making decisions. Nevertheless, some 
interviewees (FI02-FI03,FI05) identified that the need for the written type of 
analytical products and knowledge is acknowledged, and analytical products 
are increasingly used to make decisions to steer police activities (Corkill, 2009, 
p.66). For example, two interviewees (FI01,FI03) explained that the situational 
report produced after the national morning briefing is used by management to 
make decisions for tackling the new emerging threats. The morning briefing has 
also improved the availability of intelligence, thus improving its usage. This has 
also allowed a quick reaction on issues affecting multiple departments, although 
one person (FI04) criticized that the tasking of the different units on the issues 
identified in the analytical reports is missing, because no one is taking the 
responsibility. Indeed, the interviewees (FI02,FI03,FI06,FI13) identified that 
some reports, such as strategic reports, are not really used at the working level, 
as they are often considered to be too wide and lacking focus. Furthermore, 
utilising operational analytical findings and recommendations is also challenging 
due to the lack of resources. This is part of the long-running question on how to 
transfer well-done analysis into action in Finland. 
The average answer in Denmark to the statement, ‘I am eager to discover and 
experience new things in order to use this new knowledge in my working 
practice’, was even more positive with the score of 1.44. No major differences 
occured among the professional groups in Denmark. Nevertheless, as in 
Finland, the interviewees (DK04,DK06,DK08) identified that challenges occur in 
utilising intelligence due to the working culture and routines, where analysis 
results have not been typically used. Two Danish interviewees (DK02,DK07) 
stated that often the police officers must see proof that intelligence can work 
before they will take it seriously (Gundhus, 2012, pp.176-177). The lack of 
knowledge about intelligence products and what to expect from them hinders 
their usage in this sense. Nevertheless, the need for the written type of 
analytical products and knowledge is also acknowledged in Denmark, and 
analytical products are increasingly used to make decisions and steer police 
activities.  
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6.4.2 Intelligence products in decision-making 
The average answers in Finland to the statement, ‘Our analytical products are 
important for the organisational decision making process’, were slightly positive 
with the average score of 2.8. The management were the most positive 
professional group and, interestingly, the analysts were the most negative 
professional group towards this statement. Some interviewees (FI02-FI03,FI05,) 
stated that the explanation for this difference can relate to the conceptual 
understanding among the management that analysis is a decision-making tool 
for leadership. Nevertheless, some interviewees (FI02-FI03,FI10) further 
explained that there are many managers who are unaccustomed to working 
with the analysts and have difficulty understanding how they can use analytical 
products in practice. The managers will keep working in the old-fashioned way if 
they are not engaged in or convinced about analysis. Thus, the usage and 
understanding of the value of the analytical reports varies among the managers 
up to the senior management level. One person (FI02) stated that every police 
department chief has a different understanding about these products, especially 
at the local level.  
Moreover, the management often consider that these analytical products’ 
findings and recommendations are either very general or absent. Some 
interviewees (FI05-FI06,FI10) also stated that often the old fashioned thinking is 
that a low-ranking police officer conducting analytical work cannot write 
recommendations to the police department chief. Nevertheless, attempts have 
been made to change this culture so analysts can provide recommendations, 
but if the leadership is going to use the analysis results, these must be delivered 
to them by a management-level analyst. Therefore, it might be challenging to 
implement intelligence into a decision-making framework and make the cultural 
changes in the organisation also at the management level. However, 
interviewee (FI05) stated that improvement is also expected in the 
understanding of the intelligence and analysis concept as the management 
changes over time. The younger management generation is both more open to 
the intelligence concept and willing to use it, but it takes a long time to 
implement change like this. 
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The average answers in Denmark to the statement, ‘Our analytical products are 
important for the organisational decision making process’, was more positive 
with the average score of 2.11. However, two interviewees (DK02,DK08) 
indicated that, in reality, many managers are unaccustomed to working with 
analysts and have difficulty understanding how they can use the analytical 
products in practice. Some interviewees (DK07-DK08) stated that most leaders 
are ready to acknowledge the analysts’ work and that, nowadays, intelligence is 
even considered to be the foundation for police work among Danish 
management. The public pressure that demands documented and valid 
knowledge from the police has also made the management more willing to 
accept the strategic analysis products. The managers will keep working the old-
fashioned way, despite these developments, if they are not engaged or 
convinced about analysis. Thus, the use and understanding of the analytical 
reports’ value varies between managers up to the senior management level 
(Bullock, 2013, p.139). For example, in Denmark one interviewee (DK04) 
estimated that only one third of the 12 police departments heads are motivated 
and engaged in knowledge-based policing approaches. There is no real 
motivation for the police departments to use analysts. 
We have people collecting on intelligence and trying to put together 
the different sources of information and try to make analysis […} 
but the management have difficulties to implement these (DK04, 
Analyst). 
One interviewee (DK02) observed that this is also very individually based in 
Denmark and depends on the ability of a single analyst to establish good 
relationships with the management. Two interviewees (DK02,DK08) also stated 
that analytical findings were often used by the management only if the findings 
corresponded with their personal views on the issue (Marrin, 2007a, p.410). 
Furthermore, there is also often a reluctance to relinquish control to the analyst. 
Thus, management often do not appreciate recommendations and, in some 
cases, even discourage the analyst from making any recommendations, as not 
following those recommendations might harm the managers if their decision is 
wrong. Therefore, the analysts are often tasked to produce an analytical report 
that would fit into management’s view and their predefined decision.  
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The main problem we have in the police it’s the leaders, because 
some of the seem to be scared about using our products because 
sometimes people will tell them what to do or recommend to do and 
I believe some of them are afraid of leaving the decisions up to us 
(DK08, Analyst). 
Additionally, the analysts are generally not positioned close to the managers, so 
they lack the necessary influence with these decision makers. Therefore, it is a 
challenge to implement intelligence into a decision-making framework and make 
the cultural changes in the organisation also at the management level. 
However, the interviewees have also the observed positive changes, and the 
understanding of the intelligence concept is improving, along with the impact of 
analysis, with changes in the management. The younger management 
generation is more open to the intelligence and analysis concept. 
6.4.3 Intelligence products for operational staff 
The analytical products were not as important for the Finnish investigators, as 
only 34.15% agreed with the statement, ‘Our analytical products are important 
for the organisational decision making process’. Nevertheless, one interviewee 
(FI04) indicated that the usage of the products varies greatly on the operational 
level. Moreover, these interviewees (FI02,FI11,FI12) and one survey 
respondent stated that the utilisation of operational products is at such a low 
level that it raises questions as to whether or not these are needed in 
operational work. The challenge for the Finnish investigators, due to their 
workload, is their lack of time and resources to read and react to these different 
analytical products. Those in the volume investigation domain especially stated 
that, for their work, there is very limited added value to the intelligence and 
analysis work. The problem relates also to the type of analysis provided to the 
operational staff: 
I would personally like to provide real analysis to them and not only 
statistics. But in practice we don’t provide this type of analysis 
(FI12, Analyst). 
A team lead of a volume crime investigation also confirmed this: 
The feeling is that if someone is tasked to provide analysis this is 
more statistics than analysis. […] But the interpretation and 
conclusions of these figures are very limited (FI11, Investigator). 
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This was echoed by a patrolling officer: 
We have this electronic platform where there are analytical reports 
available. There are statistics available on who are committing 
crimes and mug shots. But these are not useful for the patrolling 
officers (FI07, Patrolling officer)  
Indeed, these Finnish interviewees (FI08,FI10,FI11) indicated that a need exists 
for  proper analyses so the investigators can build their investigations. The 
analysts are often expected to provide clear recommendations for the 
investigations and how to best proceed in arresting the targets. The 
investigators need analytical products on itemised billings and crime series, as 
they lack the skills and resources to perform that themselves. Moreover, the 
volume crime investigation team lead (FI11) wanted the intelligence analysis to 
be more connected to the investigators’ work to avoid the current practice in 
which uncertain intelligence and tips are sent to the investigative teams with 
instructions to validate them. Another investigative team lead (FI08) from the 
serious crime area wanted the IAUs to independently follow the operational 
environment more closely, which would release investigative resources for 
something else. Indeed, the needs of the volume crime investigations and the 
serious crime investigations are different. Another stakeholder domain for the 
IAUs is the patrolling officers, who sometimes need target-specific intelligence 
when planning special actions or events. Certainly, there are many expectations 
of the IAUs, which hold a lot of information. The issue at the local IAUs is that 
the work tempo is so fast at the operational level that there is limited time to 
conduct analysis; thus, the analytical results remain quite modest, as there is no 
possibility for the analysts to go as far analytically as they would like to. 
In Denmark 62.5% of the investigators agreed with the statement, ‘Our 
analytical products are important for the organisational decision making 
process’. One Danish interviewee (DK05) similarly stated that the products’ 
usage varies on the operational level. Furthermore, the analytical products 
produced by those analysts with only an academic background were considered 
theoretically useable, but their translation into the operational police work is 
often challenging (DK02). The preference is for experience-based knowledge; 
thus, the arguments made by an analyst with a purely academic background 
are not considered as valuable. Indeed, police officers are very biased toward 
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everything that comes from another professional with an academic background. 
One interviewee’s experience exemplifies this: 
There are a lot of people who will never see what good an analyst 
brings. One officer said that when has an analyst last solved a 
crime? And I think that is still there and it will be there for many 
years (DK04, Analyst) 
Sometimes the analysts generate different results than the police officers 
expect, which is further challenging to their acceptance of analytical results. 
Additionally, the investigators are educated to be independent, and they also 
have a lot of autonomy in practice to decide whether or not to acknowledge the 
analytical findings. Yet, the police officers often tend to act on intelligence that is 
either not verified, validated or is vague, so in this sense there are strong 
routines among the investigators that are difficult to change. Therefore, the 
investigators often have difficulty accepting an analyst’s knowledge-based view. 
They have the power, in practice, to change the strategy by deciding to focus on 
different targets than the analysis identified. As one of the analysts stated,  
The Danish Police is very good at knowing what they know thus the 
on-going investigations will dominate the awareness of the staff and 
they will have their own initiative towards the group being 
investigated. (DK05, Analyst). 
Therefore, (DK04) stated, the department heads would need to be deeply 
involved in implementing strategies to put more pressure on the police officers 
to implement the strategy and intelligence findings. This can be challenging, as 
one investigator stated that it would 
Eliminate the initiative and make the investigators ‘dumb police 
officer’ who just waits for orders coming from above (DK07, 
Investigator). 
Indeed, new target profiling reports are being produced in which the analysts 
give instructions to the investigators with recommendations to pursue 
designated targets. This is quite hard for the investigators, as they are not used 
to being told what they should work on. Thus, personal relations can be 
important in this regard, as intelligence is taken seriously if the analyst is 
respected. The analysts need to build trust and relate to the investigators and 
prove themselves to the investigators before the investigators will take the 
analysts seriously. Only then can the investigators accept the theoretical 
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analyses and hypotheses the analysts provide. The translation of analytical 
products produced by analysts with only an academic background into 
operational police work is quite challenging for those analysts without both 
police and academic backgrounds. Sometimes the academic language is too 
complicated, which creates a communication barrier, as police officers only 
want something practical they can react to. Nevertheless, some analytical 
products, such as link charts and event charts, are commonly used and 
acknowledged by the investigators, for example, when conducting a telephone 
analysis. Background information is also collected from the open sources for a 
specific person. Thus, analysis is definitely used as an investigative tool, but it 
also depends on the investigators. Additionally, as with the managers, the 
investigators’ understanding of the intelligence concept is improving, as the 
younger generation is more open to this concept. 
6.5 Summary of Findings III  
The findings illustrated how the information and knowledge is fraqmented into 
different social and professional groups in both countries. It is difficult to 
exhange information between these groups or provide feedback without the 
help of personal contacts, which highlights the importance of networking. Trust 
is imperative in these interactions, yet no systematic approach exists for 
establishing these exchanges, which are frequenlty the unintended side product 
of seminars and trainings. Nevertheless, established methods do exist for 
exchanging tacit knowledge in the police, such as partnering a more senior 
police officer with a junior police officer. This could be further extended to more 
cross-collaborative work accross professional groups. 
Management is not systematically engaged in intelligence tasking in either 
country. Collection plans are either missing, like in Finland, or it is challenging to 
make them function. The Danish analysts also have challenges in tasking police 
officers. Intelligence is not stored systematically by the police officers in these 
countries due to their working cultures, persistent routines, and time constraints. 
The police officers’ lack of knowledge about information management and 
intelligence also negatively impacts the storage of information and data quality. 
Lack of management control was seen as facilitating this issue in both 
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countries. Lack of feedback was also having a negative impact. Validation was 
also identified as a challenge in Denmark, whilst the legality related to how to 
collect data was an issue in Finland. It was also observed in Finland that the 
police officers often have difficulty estimating the information’s usefulness. 
Management is also not involved in the tasking of analysts in both countries. 
Old routines hinder this, together with the management’s lack of knowledge. 
The fraqmented information systems are challenging to use for analysis from 
the usage viewpoint, and the data quality is also an issue for analysis. 
Furthermore, the high working tempo often cuts into the analysis time; 
therefore, analysts often organise information into summaries. Statistics seem 
to dominate strategic analysis in Finland, raising the argument that it is not 
functioning properly. Interestingly, investigators are using analytical techniques 
in both countries and, furthermore, analytical outputs were seen as positive. 
This could be linked to the familiarity of all professional groups with producing 
reports. Still, the actual analysis in the produced reports is contested in both 
countries. 
The general attitude towards learning and discovering was good in both 
countries, but difficulties still exist when using the reports. No culture and 
routine exist for report use in these countries. Management in both countries 
were positive about analysis reports but are unaccustomed to using them. The 
lack of knowledge of analysis by the users impacts this. Sometimes the 
management are also reluctant to acknowledge analysis due to their own 
routines and fear of losing control. Police officers In Finland did not consider 
analytical reports that important, as they are mostly statistics, which do not 
match the needs of the operational work that has different needs in different 
areas. The analytical products were seen as more important by the Danish 
investigators. The issue of using them also depends on who has produced 
them, as the analysts’ backgrounds also play also a role in this, with academics 
considered as less credible. The investigators, who are quite independent, can 
decide whether to accept and implement the findings or not. Personal relations 
also matter in this. 
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7 Discussion 
This chapter discusses the previously mentioned findings under three sections. 
The first section examines the findings identified in the ‘Exploring the context’ 
chapter. The second section then continues to explore the ‘Professionalism and 
the impact of police culture’ chapter, whereas the third section reviews the 
findings from the chapter ‘Practical application of knowledge’. 
7.1 Scene 1: Exploring the context 
The findings in the Exploring the context chapter certainly illustrate that the 
standard, reactive policing model still dominates how the police operate in these 
countries, despite efforts to introduce different policing approaches such as the 
Community-Oriented Policing (COP), Problem Oriented Policing (POP) and 
Intelligence-Led Policing (ILP). These findings indicate that one of the main 
reasons for this is that ILP is perceived as too abstract a concept for the police 
organisations to operate with. Indeed, the lack of definitions and terminology 
related to intelligence and analysis demonstrate the gap between theory and 
practice in ILP implementation. These findings coincide with other intelligence-
related research (Alach, 2012; Corkill, 2009; Sheptycki, 2008). This research, 
by combining the policing and philosophical discussions of knowledge, further 
clarifies the research literature on policing and why it is inherently difficult to 
implement a knowledge-based policing approach in law enforcement. Indeed, 
the experience-based knowledge, found deeply embedded in the standard 
policing model, must be taken onboard when designing more explicit, 
knowledge-based policing practices. Therefore, it is unsurprising that these 
countries lacked the proper management vision, understanding, and aspiration 
towards knowledge-based policing. Indeed, as James (2011) also identified, a 
lack of support for and understanding of ILP in these countries seemed to exist 
at every management level. Given these findings, it also understandable why a 
lack of agreement on the policing approach exists within the Finnish police 
management and also why routines and old ways of working still dominate how 
the Danish police work.  
Nevertheless, both countries have had serious efforts to integrate intelligence 
into their policing practices; thus, these countries cannot be blamed for not 
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making an effort. Indeed, a National Intelligence Model (NIM) has been on both 
countries’ agendas, with the result that every police department now has an 
Intelligence and Analysis Unit (IAU) to collect, process, validate and 
disseminate information. Finland has even established a national fusion centre 
that aims to combine the intelligence from the police, customs and boarder 
guard. These certainly follow the same development pattern as the UK 
identified in the literature (see James, 2013; Stanier, 2013; Reising, 2010; 
Harfield, 2008; Maguire & John, 2006; Fielding, 1995). Nevertheless, from the 
organisational design viewpoint, these findings also illustrated why it is 
important to have a common understanding of the concepts related to 
information, knowledge, intelligence and analysis. Indeed, a lack of 
understanding of these concepts can negatively impact the role and functioning 
of the information management units. In this regards both countries lacked 
proper information management structures and processes, which further 
suggests that these organisations are not fully aware of the nature of 
information, knowledge and intelligence and analysis. This is another addition 
that this research can provide to the ILP- and NIM-related literature. 
Coleman (2008, p.317) stated that new policing approaches will ultimately fail if 
not implemented as an organisational strategy. It was interesting to note in this 
sense that the national crime prevention strategies and use of strategic analysis 
varied between these countries. The usage of analysis in the Finnish national 
crime management strategies is limited and mostly based on statistics on 
reported crimes. The local differences are also not reflected in these strategies, 
and no scenarios used to assist the anticipation of future trends and 
developments. The rationale for this seems to relate to the inadequately 
understood and developed strategic analysis concept that lacks coordination. 
The Finnish findings coincide with Williams and Godson’s (2002, p.314) 
argument about the reluctance to combine the areas of social science research, 
intelligence and law enforcement. Therefore, strategic analysis seems to be 
more developed in Denmark, according to these findings. Indeed, a new 
structure for strategic analysis was recently adopted there to define priorities. 
They are also using scenarios to anticipate the future and some of the local 
police departments are also conducting strategic analysis. 
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Nevertheless, the implementation of these crime reduction strategies seems to 
be quite challenging in both countries. There is inadequate understanding of 
these strategies among the staff In Finland due to lack of communication and 
visibility. More importantly, the vast number of the management who do not 
have adequate clarity and understanding about these strategies are a major 
hindrance to implementing strategies in the organisation. It is difficult for 
managers to communicate the strategy when they do not understand this in the 
first place. Denmark’s situation was similar, as more than half of the 
management do not fully understand the organisational crime management 
strategies. Indeed these findings in both countries correspond with Yang et al.’s 
(2010, p.231) argument, which stated that many managers cannot articulate 
how the organisational strategy is linked with their resources. Arguably, the 
police departments are not working intelligence-led if the management are not 
committed to the strategy. Thus, in light of these findings, the level of strategic 
analysis and the processes related to implementing strategies can provide quite 
a reliable understanding of the level of ILP implementation in an organisation. 
This is an interesting finding that contributes to the strategy related to research 
that provides a different perspective on the role of strategic analysis in 
measuring how knowledge-based an organistion is. The overdominence of 
experience-based knowledge can obviously be connected to the difficulties in 
creating and implementing a strategy in the police context. It is as if forward 
thinking and preparedness is not important to the police. In this sense, this 
research has opened up a new perspective on the strategy implementation in 
law enforcement connected to the area of strategic leadership and business 
design. 
Moreover, these findings indicate that the information management systems in 
these countries were also failing to support the intelligence function properly. 
The information in these countries is definitely fragmented into several 
databases, matching Sheptycki’s (2004) and Stanier’ (2013) findings. Neither 
country seems to have defined and standardised information management 
models or processes, which arguably is a major hindrance for efficient 
knowledge management in these organisations. This also confirms Alavi and 
Leidner’s (2001) argument. Both countries still had a system in place in which 
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all the police officers can store their observations to facilitate intelligence 
collection. This highlights the issues, as both organisations want to collect 
information and intelligence, but the further utilisation of this information is not 
considered properly. 
The access to information was not seen as an issue in Finland, but in Denmark 
there were access restrictions observed that cause duplication of work and 
waste of resources. Indeed, as Brown and Brudney (2003, p.31) indicated, real-
time access to the organisational databases stimulates knowledge 
accumulation. It is encouraging to see that there are on-going projects in both 
countries to improve their information management, as new analysis systems 
are being introduced into these organisations. The risk in this, as Cotter (2015, 
p.4) has argued, is that often the improvement of intelligence capabilities 
primarily focuses on the further development of digital information networks and 
ignores the needed development in other areas. With these observations, these 
findings enrich the discussion of information management systems within the 
policing domain. It is, arguably, possible to observe the level of the knowledge-
based approach in a policing institution by studying its information management 
system. 
Furthermore, Nonaka et al. (2006, p.1193) have argued that the nature of 
knowledge transforms organisations. These findings demonstrate that these 
police organisations under study are operating two types of knowledge domains 
similarly, as Gundhus (2012, p.184) and Luen and Al-Hawamdeh (2001, 
pp.313-314) also identified in their studies. Nevertheless, out of these two 
knowledge domains, the more dominant one, and the one the police officers 
desire, is the experience-based knowledge domain. Conversely, the analysts 
are more accustomed to the explicit knowledge domain when producing new 
knowledge by using diverse raw facts. The findings have furthermore indicated 
that explicit knowledge should be better integrated into the practical, 
experience-based police work. Thus, the combination of both knowledge 
domains is the key to success, although, as Dean et al. (2008, p.341) also 
identified, explicit knowledge work is not a new concept in law enforcement, as 
the investigators have had to capture the knowledge provided by forensics, 
victims, witnesses and suspects for their cases. The difference when compared 
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to intelligence analysis, as Williams and Godson (2002, p.314) stated, is that 
this case-related, explicit knowledge is insufficient for providing knowledge for 
the whole policing domain, as its focus is often on individual cases rather than 
the overall phenomena. Indeed, there is more knowledge to be developed in a 
police organisation than just crime investigations, and intelligence analysts can 
play a significant role in this. This study was able to further assist the 
understanding of the difficulties associated with changing the policing model 
from experience-knowledge based to explicit-knowledge based by exploring the 
theoretical foundation of knowledge and researching this in the context of law 
enforcement. Drilling down on the fundamentals of knowledge whether seen as 
explicit (episteme) or implicit (techne), also provides increased understanding of 
some of the cultural issues discussed later. This conflict between the knowledge 
domains and the impact of an overdominance of experience-based knowledge 
provides a contribution to knowledge in at least the fields of philosophy, police 
culture and policing. 
Nevertheless, these findings have furthermore indicated that intelligence is not 
a well-established concept in the law enforcement domain. Intelligence is 
insufficiently recognised and understood in these countries, which definitely has 
a negative impact on its implementation, corresponding with the arguments 
made by an armada of scholars (see, for example, Rønn & Høffding, 2013; 
Breakspear, 2013; Alach, 2012; Corkill, 2009; Sheptycki, 2008; Brown, 2007). 
The positive finding is that the intelligence concept is generally accepted among 
the police staff. How, then, to improve its implementation? Arguably, it all starts 
with a proper definition. Thus, it was identified not only in Finland but also by 
Rønn and Høffding (2013, p.699), that intelligence often relates to the idea of 
collecting raw data from different sources. Rønn and Høffding (2013) also 
identified intelligence as an analytical product, thus anchoring it to the explicit 
knowledge domain. So which one is it? Analysis, according to Chaney (2009, 
p.57) and Cope (2004, p.188), is a systemic process aiming to identify patterns 
and correlations between crime data and other relevant information. 
Furthermore, according to Carter and Carter (2009, p. 317), analysis can 
provide integrated meaning and allow knowledge to be derived from diverse raw 
facts. It was quite clear in both countries that the police officers often want to 
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react quickly to information and disregard any analysis phase. Nonaka et al. 
(2014, pp.139-140) argued that all knowledge is rooted in tacit knowledge; thus, 
it is understandable that the police officers rely mostly to their own experience-
based knowledge. This debate further clarifies why both organisations have had 
difficulties implementing analysis and related processes. There seems to be no 
common understanding of what analysis actually is in the policing context. 
Furthermore, this research has strengthened the argument that all knowledge is 
rooted in tacit knowledge. Police officers were keen to perform their own 
analysis in a situation, collecting and placing pieces of information into their 
own, experience-based knowledge domain, and to act accordingly. This further 
explains why the current organisational structures and systems that were built 
to harvest this experience-based knowledge have failed. Police officers, who 
are action-driven, are accustomed to interpret stimuli intuitively against their 
own personal knowledge and react accordingly. If the police officer does not 
recognise the received stimuli, they are easily ignored. Therefore, this research 
provides an interesting perspective for future studies related to police education, 
culture and management studies. It also contributes to the scarce literature on 
law enforcement analysis. 
Indeed, it is important to take note of both the tacit and explicit knowledge 
domains when defining and standardising law enforcement intelligence and 
analysis. Following this separation of knowledge domains and the notion of 
Ratcliffe (2008, p.98) that intelligence is actionable knowledge leads to the 
argument that law enforcement has two types of intelligence. The first type is 
the tacit knowledge-driven intelligence analysis process in which a single piece 
of information is connected to the personal, experience-based knowledge of the 
police officers only through a mental process. The analysis is conducted 
through a fast mental process and acted on accordingly in this case. The 
second type of intelligence entails the explicit knowledge-driven intelligence 
analysis process conducted by analysts using different analytical methods. 
Thus, the multiple pieces of information are rationally combined before being 
connected into the appropriate tacit knowledge domain for conclusions and 
recommendations. Recognising intelligence as a two-tiered concept could, 
arguably, assist in improving the implementation of intelligence-led approaches 
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in the law enforcement domain. This separation can also assist in fine tuning 
the intelligence definition for law enforcement like this: 
Law enforcement intelligence is actionable knowledge derived 
either by integrating data or information into experience; or by 
integrating multi-varied set of data or information by using diverse 
set of methods and implementing this into existing tacit or explicit 
knowledge.  
This updated definition then takes specific note of the two distinct analytical 
processes, fast and slow, both aiming for action. This also resembles the notion 
of ‘Thinking, Fast and Slow’ introduced by Kahneman (2011) in his best-selling 
book, in which fast thinking relies on intuition and experience, whilst slow 
thinking is founded on methodical and rational reasoning. 
This finding on intelligence in the law enforcement, seen as a two-tiered 
process, might be the most important argument in this research. It contributes 
directly to the literature debate on what intelligence is in law enforcement. By 
doing so it clarifies and opens up a new way of understanding intelligence in the 
law enforcement domain and assists in designing knowledge-based policing 
approaches in which intelligence would be better understood and integrated into 
the policing model. This is also an important foundation for understanding the 
issues involved in designing the policing model, designing organisational 
information systems and structures and understanding what analysis is and how 
it should be understood. It also takes note of the two different knowledge 
domains, experience-based and explicit-based, and by doing so also 
acknowledges that both are needed in the law enforcement domain. This 
updated definition could certainly be understood through the Chinese 
philosophical concept of ‘yin and yang’, which describes how seemingly 
opposite forces may actually be complementary; thus, both are needed to 
succeed. 
7.2 Scene 2: Professionalism and the impact of police culture 
The findings in the Professionalism and the impact of police culture chapter 
illustrate that the IAUs in both countries have a central role in managing 
information for the police departments. Variations still exist between how these 
units are functioning, as the findings indicated, but there is also a lack of 
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standard information management models and processes in these countries. 
Furthermore, the division of tasks between the investigators and analysts 
remains unclear, although the analysts were generally regarded as essential in 
both countries. In the light of these findings, the professional knowledge base 
on analysis, as discussed in the literature (von Krogh et al., 2012, p.242; Yang 
et al., 2010, p.232; Snowden, 2002, pp.104-105), was ambiguous. An identified 
career path, standardised job description, and expected experience and 
education for the analysts were all missing, as Evans and Kebbell (2012, p.205) 
similarly identified in their study. The level of ambiguity, in relation to these 
intelligence analysis units, corresponds well with the ambiquity around the 
concepts of knowledge, intelligence and analysis. It is difficult to comprehend 
and design the scope of the IAUs when the theoretical foundations related to 
definitions and knowledge concepts are missing. These findings, thus, 
contribute to the literature around NIM implementation, but it simultaneously 
provides a contribution to the literature related to knowledge management, such 
as enterprise architecture, which are often not discussed in the literature, 
especially from policing point of view.  
There had been discussions in Finland to hire civilian analysts, but this had not 
yet been implemented. Denmark was more advanced in this regard, as they 
have already started to hire analysts with different backgrounds outside of the 
police. Still, the level of analyst professionalism is in a very early stage in both 
countries, as their role, function and tasks varied between the IAUs, and 
analysts are tasked with responsibilities that do not relate to analysis. The 
analysts with a police background are particularly often used for normal police 
duties in both countries. The implementation of case analysis that supports an 
ongoing investigation varied among police departments, although it was 
identified as an important task for analysts in these countries. The quality of 
such an analysis in Finland was considered as being higher in the serious crime 
units where it has been mostly performed. Denmark is placing a lot of focus on 
empowering the civilian analysts to work for the investigators and assist the 
investigations. These findings indicate that according to Nonaka and Takeuchi’s 
(1995, pp.152-153) definition, the analysts can arguably be considered as 
‘knowledge specialists’, despite the lack of professionalism. This study thus fills 
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the void in research concerning the professionalisation of analysts in law 
enforcement. Interestingly, this research also provides a better understanding of 
the analyst’s place in the law enforcement domain. Indeed, by looking into the 
two types of knowledge regimes discussed in the previous chapter and the 
proposed intelligence concept, what should be expected from an analyst is 
more understandable. This research, thus, assists in understanding what to 
take into account when establishing career paths for analysts and what could be 
expected from analysts in terms of their educational background and 
experience.   
Furthermore, these findings also support Nonaka et al.’s (2006, p.1192) notion, 
which argued that leadership is about enabling knowledge creation, not 
controlling it. These findings also indicate that the knowledge roles of 
‘knowledge engineers’ and ‘knowledge officers’, as classified by Nonaka and 
Takeuchi (1995, pp.152-153), are not properly understood in these countries. 
The important role of the management in the knowledge domain, also identified 
in the literature (see Darroch & Mazerolle, 2012; Goh, 2002), and their 
involvement in the intelligence and analysis process, was identified as 
inadequate in both countries. One of the major reasons for this was the 
management’s low level of knowledge on this topic; thus, their expectations 
towards this function are unclear. The positive finding is their strong support for 
analysis. This coincides with other research (Darroch, 2012) and enriches this 
area as well, which is also lacking research. Interestingly, this research confirms 
that, despite all the hype around knowledge-based policing, the management is 
still quite unaware of what this means. This is also a clear obstacle to 
impelementing knowledge-based policing models if the level of professionalism 
on intelligence and analysis is low among management. It is obvious the case 
that they do not know what to demand or how to use intelligence and analysis. 
This finding contributes to the literature around police management in this 
sense, as well. 
The findings in regard to the police officers shows that they were seen to have 
an important role in data management by ensuring the data’s quality, accuracy 
and relevancy. The role of the police officers in collecting and processing 
information was more established in Denmark than in Finland. However, a lack 
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of understanding of the information management and the importance of data 
quality was still identified in both countries. The usage of the information 
systems was also identified to be a challenge. Nevertheless, these police 
officers can be characterised as ‘knowledge operators’ in accordance with 
Nonaka and Takeuchi’s (1995, pp.152-153) knowledge role classification. 
Similar to the managers, a clear lack of understanding of intelligence and 
analysis exists among the police officers. This was identified as a generational 
issue in Denmark. Additionally, the need for the investigators to understand and 
conduct basic intelligence analysis was identified in Finland. Certainly in this 
sense, the investigators, who are solving crime cases as Dean et al. (2008, 
pp.342-343) explained, can be characterised as ‘knowledge specialists’ in 
accordance with Nonaka and Takeuchi’s (1995, pp.152-153) knowledge role 
classification.  
The findings indicate that the knowledge roles identified by this study differ 
between the police officers on the street and the investigators. In this sense the 
role of the police officers is to obtain and record information from their 
operational environment, whilst the investigators have another knowledge role. 
Indeed, having the same knowledge specialist role as the analysts is another 
major clarification in understanding the nature of the work of both roles. Having 
a better understanding of this provides possibilities to further clarify which part 
of the knowledge/intelligence creation process the analyst should be engaged 
and which part should be left to the investigators.  
The case analysis requests by the investigators in this domain make much 
more sense. Crime investigation is, arguably, the oldest knowledge process in 
policing; therefore, it is very familiar to police officers and police organisations. 
Thus, when the professionalism (expert knowledge base) is low in relation to 
intelligence analysis, arguably another similar professional domain with a more 
developed expert knowledge base can overshadow it. It is easy in this case for 
the underdeveloped law enforcement intelligence analysis domain to be 
overshadowed by the well-developed criminal investigations domain. As such, 
these findings directly contribute to the scarce literature on law enforcement 
intelligence analysis professionalism.  
 
139 
 
Regarding professionalism, these findings, particularly the survey findings, 
strongly indicate the lack of capacity building in both countries for information 
management, intelligence and analysis. There are practically no training 
opportunities for investigators, management and the majority of analysts. The 
challenge is that lack of training on analysis for police officers leads to 
unrealistic expectations of intelligence and analysis, as Cope (2004, p.194) 
argued. Missing training standards also highlight yet again the lack of 
professionalism on this topic and correspond with Stanier’s (2013, p.137) and 
Quarmby and Young’s (2010, p.38) arguments. Williams and Godson (2002, 
p.314) also argued that this will continue to hamper law enforcements’ ability to 
tackle crime and disorder, as effective anticipation requires an effective 
knowledge base. If the law enforcement profession wants to be knowledge-led, 
it surely needs to have knowledge to succeed. 
Lastly, this findings chapter also explored the organisational culture aspects. 
Marrin (2007a, p.404) argued that an intelligence culture is shaped by broader 
environmental factors, such as the culture of the decision makers and other 
stakeholders. Regarding this, the police in both countries were seen as very 
conservative, static, hierarchical and routinised. Not only the older generation of 
staff but also the local police departments were associated with these 
characteristics. Therefore, both organisations have a strong preference for 
organisational professionalism, as Evetts (2013, p.787) introduced. These 
findings show that this old way of working has a negative impact on 
implementing intelligence and analysis based work. These findings correspond 
with Lemieux (2008, p.230) who argued that the traditional vertical police 
organisation is an obstacle to carrying out knowledge-based policing. These 
findings also correspond with Gundhus (2012, p.181) and Loftus (2010, pp.16-
17), who argued that old organisational routines hinder the formation of the 
intelligence function in law enforcement. These finding also correspond to 
Braga and Weisburd’s (2006b, p.147) argument that hierarchical organisational 
structures in policing inhibit innovation, creativity and problem solving. On a 
positive note, the culture was seen to be slowly changing in both countries. 
Indeed, new ideas seemed to be more accepted nowadays, although tha also 
depends on the unit. Mistakes and communication still seemed to be challenges 
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in these countries, which seemed to be hindered by the hierarchy and was 
identified in Finland as the different information needs between management 
and staff. This is, yet again, another interesting addition to the literature related 
to organisational culture, police culture and the professionalisation of police 
organisations. This knowledge era we are living in arguably has an impact on 
the policing domain. Given this study’s findings, there is an interesting 
discussion to be held on the different knowledge roles within policing and the 
understanding of how to professionalise these roles more systematically. This 
could further assist in implementing knowledge-based initiatives, as it seems, in 
light of these findings, that police culture has been able to resist most of these 
knowledge-based initiatives. 
Another main finding relates to trust, which plays a significant role in both 
organisational culture and information sharing. Nold (2011, p.85) identified that 
trust is an essential element of organisational culture in order for individuals to 
interact and share knowledge. Indeed, the findings indicated that police officers 
use trusted contacts with whom they share information, which corresponds with 
O'Neill and McCarthy’s (2014, pp.150-151) arguments. This was particularly 
visible in Denmark, where mistrust exists towards civilian analysts with no police 
background. This clash of cultures identified in Denmark among the different 
professional groups shows that the staffs’ personal contacts play an even more 
important role. Thus, mutual working experience is important for building trust, 
as Cotter (2015, p.10) also identified. It is essential, therefore, to create 
synergies among these professional groups, as Coyne & Bell (2011, p.33) and 
Brooks (2006, p.247) also argued. Another important point came from a Danish 
interviewee, who stated that the police are often driven to have technical 
solutions to these issues and ignore the cultural aspects of information sharing. 
Thus, overall this chapter supports Aristotle’s notion, introduced by Flyvbjerg 
(2004), that phronesis is an important factor in the knowledge domain. Cultural 
ethics and values have a significant impact on knowledge management. The 
last part of this section confirmed how the police culture has resisted 
implementing information- and knowledge-related models into policing. 
Experience-based knowledge is built on learning by doing and sharing 
knowledge among people in a trusted context. The police work is built inside 
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closed groups; thus, it should be no surprise that the police culture resists the 
new culture of ‘need to share’ instead of ‘need to know’. 
7.3 Scene 3: Practical application of knowledge 
The findings illustrated in the ‘Practical application of knowledge’ chapter, under 
the section of Socialisation, indicated the challenges that exist in managing tacit 
knowledge that is isolated within the different social and professional groups, 
corresponding to Sheptycki’s (2004) and Stanier’s (2013, p.123) arguments. 
Therefore, it is essential to have social networks for flexible and fast information 
exchange. Large networks also mean more information and knowledge. The 
findings indicated, furthermore, that management often become the bottleneck 
to facilitating the information and knowledge exchange between the social 
groups, which amplifies the need for the staffs’ personal relationships and social 
networks. The analysts, therefore, need to reach out to different stakeholders to 
collect information and knowledge. Thus, the analysts are essentially then 
assuming the role of ‘knowledge operator’. In this sense the analysts are trying 
to harnest the narrative culture of the police by conducting face-to-face 
interactions in order to collect information using the reciprocal approach. At the 
same time, the analysts must assume the role of ‘knowledge operator’, which is 
an important finding, as there were no traces in the research literature of this 
issue being examined from this viewpoint. Indeed, the advantage of viewing the 
roles from a more neutral perspective helps to neutralise the cultural, 
professional, functional and organisational aspects that often blur people’s 
perceptions as their strong biases kick into the discussion. 
Trust is the key ingredient in functional networks, so establishing social 
networks takes time and requires stability in the working environment. Personal 
characteristics play a vital role in this self-initiated process. Opportunities to 
work and meet other people through meetings, training courses and seminars 
are also needed. Indeed, Nonaka et al. (2006, p.1186) identified that knowledge 
creation is a fragile process; thus, relationships among individuals impact 
organisational knowledge creation. Limited research is available about trust in 
the police organisation; thus, this is an interesting area to which this research 
also contributes. Indeed, trust was raised throughout this research on several 
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occasions and, thus, can be considered a very important and key success 
factor for implementing anything in the law enforcement context.  
Another interesting finding came from Denmark, where the analysts also often 
provide feedback, which is scarce in the police organisation. Feedback is a 
significant motivator for sharing information, so not only are the analysts also 
assuming the role of the management, but they are also acting as a ‘knowledge 
engineer’ in this sense. Indeed, Cotter (2015, p.5) identified that informal social 
networks may be relied upon to circumvent problems associated with 
information sharing via formal information networks, for good and bad. These 
findings also indicated that law enforcement personnel are mostly willing to 
share knowledge only face-to-face. In this regard these social networks then 
facilitate the sharing of tacit knowledge, which lacks official organisational 
coordination. This research also opens up a different viewpoint not only on the 
analyst’s role confusion but also on the lack of management engagement in this 
area.  
This research also highlights the important aspects of the social networks within 
the law enforcement community by providing a different perspective on the 
organisational dynamics. Although mentoring is used to transfer tacit knowledge 
from older to younger staff, the peer level knowledge transfer is coincidental 
and self-initiated. The knowledge transfer between professional groups similarly 
seems to lack structure, as it is also coincidental and self-initiated. This lack of 
attention could relate to the costs and difficulty associated with sharing tacit 
knowledge, which Hauk et al. (2013, p.357) identified; thus, this research finding 
corresponds with the research conducted in other areas in relation to 
knowledge management. Nevertheless, this research also highlights the age-
old method of partnering more senior police officers with junior police officers to 
transfer tacit knowledge. This old way of working might need some new 
adjustments; for example, introducing more matrix-like organisational structures 
to policing. This is another interesting contribution to the literature, as it provides 
a profound justification for this. 
The Externalisation section also indicated that management is not really 
engaged in the intelligence process; actually, in fact they were mostly absent in 
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the tasking process. Indeed, models exist to identify management’s role 
(Ratcliffe, 2008) in the intelligence process, but the actual research on this is 
quite scarce. Standardised collection plans and models are largely missing as a 
result, though this should be a focused activity, as Carter and Carter (2009, 
p.317) also identified. Instead, the analysts are turned into ‘knowledge 
engineers’, because they must again assume management’s role and task the 
police officers to collect data on certain themes. Against this notion, it is, thus, 
no surprise that the police officers have difficulty accepting this. Nevertheless, 
the confusion over the knowledge roles arises again in these findings, thus 
providing another viewpoint on the relations between analysts and police 
officers.   
Furthermore, this research again highlights the need for management in the 
intelligence process. A clear need exists to task and oversee the information 
sharing, as a significant number of the police officers are not storing their 
information systematically. This is considered a secondary task, which is only 
done if there is time and energy. The information at hand it is often shared 
directly with the investigator if the police officer manages to recognise its 
usefulness; the investigator can then act on this immediately. This is also 
another finding related to the police culture and organisational dynamics. 
Gundhus (2012, p.184) explained that this relates to the fact that the police 
officers consider only information for incident-led and short-term police work to 
be practical.  
The further challenge in this is that the police officers have too much discretion 
to decide not only what information they store in the systems but also how they 
store it. Therefore, the data classifications are often inadequately done, as the 
incident short-term police work overruns the quality assurance, as Gundhus 
(2012, p.184) also indicated. Furthermore, the lack of understanding of 
information management and intelligence hinders the information processing. A 
lack of professionalism related to knowledge roles is quite visible in these 
research findings. Having this confusion over knowledge roles makes it 
challenging for the management to task and control information storage. Thus, 
the decision making regarding this is transferred to the level of the police 
officers. Indeed, lack of management control and feedback were identified as 
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obstacles in both countries. Brown and Brudney (2003, p.34) identified that if 
the benefits of data collection are not immediately visible, organisations are less 
declined to invest in it. This study confirms the lack of management 
professionalism in relation to intelligence, thereby providing a new perspective 
in the management literature. 
Next, the Combination section illustrated the difficulty in relation to the 
fragmented information systems that cause challenges to performing analysis, 
similar to what Innes et al. (2005, pp.43-44) identified. The varied structure and 
content of the databases were also considered a challenge for analysis in 
Denmark, similar to what Bullock (2013, p.131) and Stanier (2013, p.80) 
indicated in their studies. This finding also confirmed some of the previous 
findings on information pathologies (Stanier, 2013; Sheptycki 2004). It also 
highlighted how the systems are built to endure the standard policing model and 
not to support more holistic, knowledge-based initiatives. Another major 
challenge for analysis is the high-paced environment of the police, which 
reduces the time for performing the analysis. This police culture-related finding 
is important for understanding when to implement knowledge-based initiatives 
in law enforcement. Eraut (2004, p.261) explained that time pressures drive the 
intuitive approach when conducting interpretations and decision making; thus, 
these findings highlighted yet again the dominance of the experience-driven 
police culture.  
Nonetheless, the interesting aspect is that around one fifth of the investigators 
in Finland and one third in Denmark are already using analytical techniques in 
their work. This is a group in the police who should be utilised when 
implementing intelligence analysis, as they can assist in changing the 
professionalism and culture. This is a significant finding in this research, as it 
also identifies the possibility and need to look beyond the professionalisation of 
the analysts and managers. Indeed, Gundhus (2012, p.189) explained that the 
distinction between knowledge producers and users is in transition, which has 
consequences for police professionalism. This important discovery provides not 
only an idea of how to organise operational analysis at the investigator level but 
also a justification as to why analysis should be introduced into the 
investigators’ educational curriculum. 
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The analysis standards must be created before this is possible to avoid 
variations in how analysis is conducted. Indeed, analysis should be developed 
to restrain the significant role of statistics in the analytical work in both 
countries. The data quality would also need attention to achieve this. Indeed, 
Cope (2004, p.193) explained that poor quality information in the systems 
inevitably limits analytical insights and increases the production of statistical 
summaries. These findings, coupled with the high-paced and short-term, 
incident-led working culture, further confirm that these police organisations also 
treat knowledge largely as an object and information access similar to what 
Alavi and Leidner (2001, p.10) explained in their study. Therefore, these 
findings also confirm that the standard policing culture has a major influence on 
how information is understood and, ultimately, resists any changes towards 
knowledge-led policing. 
Nevertheless, these findings show high acceptance of analytical reports, 
especially among the management. This could relate to the finding that all of the 
professional groups are used to produce explicit knowledge in the form of 
reports and other documents, such as the investigative dossier. However, there 
are issues with the varied standards for analytical products. Indeed, as these 
findings indicated, there seemed to be a lack of focus in the analytical reporting, 
which is quite different from Chainey and Chapman’s (2013, p.476) argument 
that different intelligence products should serve the specific purpose of 
informing how crime issues can be tackled for a particular task. This finding 
arguably confirms the lack of standards and agreed methodology for producing 
analysis. Certainly, this lack of focus is also an indication of the status of 
intelligence, which is shaped by the process through which it is generated 
(Bullock, 2013, p.134). Alavi and Leidner (2001, p.110) indicated that different 
views of knowledge (and intelligence) lead to different perceptions and 
strategies of knowledge (and intelligence) management in an organisation. In 
this case this finding confirms the immature nature of law enforcement analysis 
in these countries. 
Next, the Internalisation section highlighted the difficulties in using the 
intelligence due to cultural constraints, such as routines and lack of knowledge 
about intelligence and analysis, especially among the management. This 
 
146 
 
Internalisation section provided an interesting perspective from which to 
understand intelligence as something that organisations can use to learn. This 
is clearly not well developed in these countries, thus highlighting the dominance 
of the experience-driven police culture. Indeed, Gundhus (2012, pp.176-177) 
explained that the use of this ‘academic type’ of explicit knowledge can be 
challenging in law enforcement, which values the experience- and intuition-
based knowledge more. The findings in Denmark certainly indicated that the 
management has a tendency to accept analytical reports only if these 
correspond with their personal experience, which matches Lyles’ (2014, p.134) 
argument. Therefore, the analysts can be tasked to produce an analytical report 
that would fit into the view of the management and their predefined decision, 
which corresponds with Marrin’s (2007a, p.410) arguments. Brown and Brudney 
(2003, p. 33) identified that when the problem context lacks structure and the 
certainty of outcomes is low, decision makers tend to rely on tacit, intuitive 
knowledge. This can have a negative impact on the public confidence in 
policing, as uninformed decisions have an impact on the quality of the 
operational service (Stanier, 2013, pp.83-84). Thus, structured decision making, 
which has not been properly evaluated in the policing domain, could be one 
approach to providing an evidence base and audit trail for the decision-making 
process as well as ensuring consistency of judgments (Kebbel et al., 2010, 
p.94). These are interesting contributions to the management literature related 
to policing, as the whole domain of police management decision making based 
on available intelligence is scarcely researched; thus, this study provides a 
small contribution to fill this void.  
The findings then showed that differences among the investigators existed 
between these countries regarding the usage of analytical products. That is, 
these products were less important to the Finnish investigators than to the 
Danish. However, the Finnish findings indicated that the analytical reports sent 
to the investigators often contain only statistics or summaries of information; 
thus, their purpose and content might be inadequate for the investigators. 
Indeed, as identified in Denmark, the analysts are often tasked by the 
investigators to provide visualisations. Furthermore, as identified in Finland, the 
analytical needs of the investigators often relate to handling itemised billings 
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and crime series. Thus, very practical information management-related support 
for the investigations is needed from the analysts. The investigator in these 
instances arguably then performs the actual analysis in order to proceed with 
the case. Indeed, as identified in Denmark, the investigators often have difficulty 
accepting the analytical outcomes produced by a person with a professional 
background other than law enforcement. It was also stated in Denmark that the 
investigators are very autonomous and have wide discretion to decide whether 
to acknowledge the analytical findings or not. Personal relations also affect this, 
so if the investigators respect the analyst, they are more likely to accept the 
findings. In summary, these findings highlight the knowledge role confusion 
between the analysts and investigators. Indeed, with the investigators also 
having a knowledge specialist role, their expectations of analysis revolve 
around their investigation-related knowledge role. Thus, they mostly appreciate 
their investigation-related case analysis support. Nevertheless, given the 
previously identified challenges, it could be argued that this is not the optimal 
use of analytical capacity. Indeed, the findings also call for improving the 
professionalism of the investigators in relation to basic analysis. The 
investigators could perform most of the analysis tasks needed for the 
investigations themselves just by raising their skills and knowledge of analytical 
techniques. This is one of this study’s major findings, something that has been 
scarcely discussed, if at all, in the research literature. 
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8 Conclusions 
The overall aim of this research was to examine how intelligence analysis is 
finding its place in the policing context and understand the role it plays in the 
law enforcement knowledge management apparatus. What were the outcomes 
of this research? 
8.1 Results of the research 
Firstly, this research clearly confirmed that the standard model of policing with 
its reactive approaches to crime still dominates the law enforcement discourse 
in the countries researched, although there is a clear desire in both to be more 
knowledge-led. Nevertheless, these countries’ success in implementing 
Intelligence-Led Policing (ILP) and National Intelligence Model (NIM) structures, 
together with strategic crime management, has been modest. Nevertheless, this 
research was able to pinpoint competing knowledge paradigms in the police 
organisations under study by looking deeper into the theoretical discourse on 
knowledge, intelligence, and analysis. Experience-based, intuitive and tacit 
knowledge undeniably dominate the law enforcement ethos. This dominance is 
also visible in the way intelligence is understood as a piece of information or 
data that can be acted upon immediately.  
Indeed, this ‘fast intelligence’ often dominates the law enforcement intelligence 
domain, as police officers are keen to discover a piece of information they can 
connect to their tacit knowledge and act accordingly. Nevertheless, police 
officers occasionally have difficulty assessing the relevance of a piece of 
information. Arguably, this is because they have not acquired the necessary 
experience needed to interpret that specific piece of information. This highlights 
the organisational risk of relying only on the personal knowledge of the police 
officers and not properly designating and demanding unrecognisable 
information be reported to the ‘slow intelligence’ process. This risk has 
somewhat materialised already in both countries. The registration of information 
is considered a secondary duty; intelligence and analysis are mostly out of the 
management’s focus; and, due to the workload and time pressure on the staff, 
the police officers keep a considerable amount of information to themselves or 
do not properly share the information. Indeed, the findings indicated that there is 
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still nonreporting and nonrecording of information by the police officers, and the 
reporting that is done is often recorded with low quality. Furthermore, the 
unclear knowledge role of the police officers and their low level of 
professionalism in relation to information management, intelligence and analysis 
further amplify this problem. Indeed, their role as a knowledge operator is an 
important part of the knowledge management apparatus and should be better 
acknowledged and enforced. Thus, it is crucial for them to receive the 
necessary training opportunities. Certainly these findings indicate that the 
findings of Stanier (2013) are still current after five years of his study.  
The competing explicit knowledge paradigm, produced by the ‘slow’ intelligence 
process through methodological analysis of information and data, continues to 
be an enigma for law enforcement. This is especially true of 
knowledge/intelligence that is unconnected to any specific investigation. 
Moreover, the findings strongly indicated that analysis is mostly missing from 
the analytical reports; instead, the reports often contain information in a new 
format or as statistical figures and visualisations. Arguably, because the tacit 
knowledge domain is fast, the analysts are trying to cope with the organisation’s 
‘fast’ intelligence-related expectations and provide value quickly. This naturally 
cuts time from the thinking process and explains why the analysts were mostly 
performing information management-related activities and not creating new, 
explicit knowledge. It’s no wonder, then, that the reports they produce hardly 
contain any analysis and actionable knowledge. The result is that the analysts 
only manage information for the police officers and try to provide it in a concise 
and easily adjustable format so it can be easily connected to the police officers’ 
experience-based knowledge. Thus, the analysis might eventually happen, but 
only in the police officers’ minds.  
This role confusion and the mistaken expectations of analysis were also visible 
through the analysts’ immature level of professionalism. Indeed, there were no 
career paths, standardised expectations for education and experience or 
defined roles and tasks for the analysts. The Socialisation, Externalisation, 
Combination, Internalisation (SECI) model further illustrated the multiple 
knowledge roles of the analysts who try to gather and facilitate information 
exchange (knowledge operator), formulate new knowledge (knowledge 
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specialist), initiate the information collection, task the police officers and 
maintain their motivation with feedback (knowledge engineer). This also further 
exemplifies the immature nature of the knowledge management structures in 
law enforcement. When the level of professionalism related to knowledge is low, 
the boundaries between the knowledge roles are also low.  
Nevertheless, explicit knowledge is acknowledged, mostly as part of the 
investigative outcomes. Indeed, investigators also have the ‘knowledge 
specialist’ role, as they formulate explicit knowledge through the pretrial 
investigation record. The investigator is, arguably, one of the oldest ’knowledge 
specialist’ roles in this sense, and the investigation is one of the oldest 
knowledge processes in the police. This would certainly explain why the 
analysts are often most appreciated when they are supporting the investigators 
and acting as a sort of ‘case analyst’. With the analysts and investigators both 
having the ‘knowledge specialist’ role, it makes sense why the case analysis is 
the most understood and desired form of analysis in the police. However, there 
are also other knowledge creation tasks for the analysts that do not fit for the 
investigators. The tasks for these knowledge roles need to be specified for the 
betterment of the overall knowledge management discipline to avoid further role 
confusion between the investigators’ and analysts’ roles. Doing this also reveals 
the need to further develop the investigators’ professionalism in relation to 
knowledge creation. The investigations are, arguably, becoming more complex 
to manage due to the expansion of data, information and sources. Thus, the 
investigators would benefit from more training on systematic research methods 
and analysis. There already seems to be a group of investigators who are using 
analytical techniques from which the best practices could then be harvested. In 
this way the investigators are not then seen as direct customers of the analytical 
products, since they can perform the needed visualisation and manage the 
complex data sources themselves for their investigations. Instead, both the 
analysts’ and investigators’ knowledge specialist roles would produce explicit 
knowledge for management decision making and external stakeholders such as 
the prosecution service or policy makers. 
None of this will be possible without the management, who seem to have 
considerable knowledge gaps in their understanding of intelligence and 
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analysis. Their knowledge roles of ‘knowledge engineer’ and ‘knowledge officer’ 
imply that they should be the ‘primus motor’ of these types of knowledge 
initiatives, but the findings indicate the opposite, as their presence was largely 
absent in the intelligence process. Indeed, after observing the underdeveloped 
role of strategic analysis (especially in Finland) and the challenges in 
implementing strategies, it seems that a void of ‘knowledge officers’ exists in 
these organisations. This further explains why the analysts have needed to 
manage all of these different knowledge roles, with varying success. Therefore, 
the management group, including senior management, urgently needs to raise 
their understanding and involvement in intelligence and analysis if they want to 
improve knowledge/intelligence-led initiatives. Converting explicit knowledge 
into new knowledge is difficult if there is no management to guide and demand 
the knowledge process and issue relevant intelligence questions. Currently, 
there is a lack of decision-making frameworks and processes to ‘internalise’ 
analytical products for informed decision making. Another challenge is that 
some of the management prefer to use their own experience-based knowledge 
and routines when making decisions, which creates controversy in relation to 
their expectations and use of analytical products. Their lack of intelligence and 
analysis knowledge seemed to be a key reason for this.  
This confusion over the theoretical foundation of intelligence in law enforcement 
has, arguably, had a negative impact on the development of proper 
professionalism for the intelligence and analysis professions in these countries. 
It has also negatively impacted the whole knowledge management process, 
which is visible in the variations in the knowledge structure, roles, tasks and 
functions between the intelligence and analysis units. The role confusions 
related to intelligence and analysis in the organisation exemplified this. The 
information management models vary or are absent in these countries; the 
information in the systems is fragmented; and the tacit knowledge is fragmented 
into different social, professional and organisational groups. The vicious cycle is 
completed when no training opportunities exist among all of the professional 
groups on information-, knowledge- and intelligence-related topics. The risk is 
that this information and knowledge fragmentation will hinder or even block 
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effective knowledge creation in these organisations if these are not managed 
well.  
How this should be improved then? Modelling of analysis education and the 
background of the analysts at the law enforcement should be linked with the 
different knowledge needs/levels of the organisation. Thus analysts supporting 
senior management should have master level academic qualifications 
preferably on social science related discipline and have further training on 
management, strategic planning, business intelligence, strategic planning, key 
performance and impact assessements but also threat and risk analysis. The 
analysts supporting the middle management level would benefit bachelor level 
academic qualifications and have training on threat and risk analysis. Individual 
analysts at this level should also spesialise into a specific analysis methodology 
such as social network analysis or geographical profiling. If they do not have 
police background they would benfit targeted police related training courses as 
well. Then at the investigative level there should be case analysts supporting an 
investigation from the beginning. These analysts would ideally be trained out of 
investigators as they would require good understanding of the investigative 
process. Courses they would need are basic data integration and analysis 
technigues such as mapping, link charting, process charting and event charting. 
Furthermore all mentioned levels and police officers would need information 
management training. These courses should be built on separate modules with 
the lenght of the courses ranging from 16 hours to 120 hours. 
Acknowledging these two knowledge paradigms of tacit and explicit knowledge 
arguably makes it clear that are also two intelligence paradigms. Following this 
logic and using the introduced and updated intelligence definition to match this 
view can assist in the design of more coherent intelligence-led processes, 
business ontologies and intelligence services and products for law enforcement 
purposes. This intelligence definition will also assist in improving the overall 
intelligence doctrine in law enforcement. Thus, it will further help to understand 
how the knowledge-led structures and processes will need to be built. 
Understanding these two levels of intelligence processes will, arguably, assist in 
developing the standards for intelligence training, services and products. Doing 
so can move the whole analysis profession forward. Refining these knowledge 
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processes can then improve the professionalism in relation to intelligence and 
analysis, and the analysts can be better positioned and tasked to produce the 
meaningful and needed actionable knowledge known as intelligence. However, 
the law enforcement organisational culture presents the greatest challenge to 
‘explicit’ knowledge-led aspirations. According to these findings, that culture is 
conservative, hierarchical, static, change resistant and an obstacle to 
intelligence and analysis. Thus, the type of organisational professionalism that 
is characterised by hierarchy and control will continue to hamper the 
knowledge-led initiatives if it is not suppressed. Trust plays a significant role in 
sharing information; thus, honest and efficient communication is one important 
key ingredient for gaining trust. Therefore, in light of these findings, it can be 
concluded that understanding the police culture, and especially its dominant 
tacit knowledge domain, is an important element for succeeding with any 
knowledge-led approaches in law enforcement.  
This research indicated a lack of proper knowledge management in these 
countries, yet this research also specified that a strong knowledge-positive 
culture and curiosity exist in the police, laying a good foundation for developing 
knowledge-led approaches. Having clear knowledge roles, structures, 
processes and definitions in place ensures there will be a good chance to 
succeed with this. What should also be addressed is that the organisation has 
different knowledge needs. Identifying these will also serve as the basis for 
determining what kind of new knowledge the analysts are expected to produce 
and where. Nevertheless, the police culture is quite deeply entrenched, so this 
will require firm management attention to succeed.  
Then the question is can these findings be generalised? Firstly the literature 
used in this study is mostly coming from United Kingdom and United States and 
many of the findings of this research are comparable to these studies. 
Furthermore the experience of the researcher, who worked at Europol as an 
analyst and senior analyst with numerous European law enforcement agencies, 
coincide with these findings. Europol is a platform, a nexus, for the law 
enforcment to work toghether and exchange knowledge and best practices. 
Therefore the researcher had a unique view to see what the state of play of law 
enforcement intelligence analysis and knowledge management are around 40 
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countries. Additionally acting as the course manager and a trainer in numerous 
analysis courses, which were provided to the European law enforcement and 
beyond, the researcher observed that law enforcement mentality is fixed on 
here and now, not why and how. 
Certainly the law enforcement culture holds similar traits in the western society. 
Therefore it is no wonder that the researcher has this experience on intelligence 
analysis and knowledge management from many other law enforcement 
agencies around the world. Indeed it can be argued, based on this experience, 
that there are challenges in many countries to adopt any other policing model 
than the standard model of policing. Similar elements hinder this progress as in 
the countries in this study: cultural contsraints, information management related 
challenges, lack of definitions and understanding related to intelligence, 
analysis and knowledge. Also legislation plays a critical role in many countries 
as law enforcement is only allowed to react to incidents. Nevertheless the 
cultural element is the most critical as law enforcement adhers strongly for 
incident based routines, which will continue to drive the focus of these 
organisations even if any hindering legislation is changed.  
Though it might prove difficult to change the legislation for the benefit of 
operational work all law enforcement orgnisations can use strategic analysis to 
support their strategic planning. Yet long term strategic thinking continues to be 
a real challenge for law enforcement in many countries compared to other 
intelligence disciplines (such as military or national security). In addition to the 
cultural challenges this type of stragegic thinking is more challenging for law 
enforcement, as it needs to understand the complexities of the society where it 
operates. This is not an easy task as there is an overwhelming web of 
causalities to be understood, which is a considerable challenge even for 
academia. When looking like this it makes sense why law enforcement wants to 
focus on incidents instead of trying to understand the strategic picture. This 
argument provides also understanding why these knowledge concepts and 
definitions lack any real standardisation and the rationale behind the choice of 
of having organisational and information management related structures that do 
not properly support intelligence analysis and knowledge management. 
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Given this foundation it is no surprise that there is a lack of professionalism on 
intelligence analysis in many countries. There are isolated attempts to 
professionalise analysis and there are some law enforcement agencies where 
this is more advanced. Nevertheless, it is not uncommon that in countries, with 
multiple law enforcement agencies, one of these agencies have professional 
standards for analysis and others not.  
Furthermore the experience of the researcher supports the general appicablity 
of these findings to the third research question as well. Indeed as the law 
enforcment is often focused on ’catching the bad guy’ it does not consider how 
different roles contributes to this process. Indeed ’catching the bad guy’ is a 
knowledge process – although law enforcement officers do not often 
acknowledge this. This means that there are different elements and roles 
contributing to this process, which is far for being clear to law enforcement. 
Thus similar confusion exists in many countries on what kind of knowledge role 
is linked to a certain professional role.  
8.2 Limitations 
Like most studies, this one also has limitations. Firstly, covering a relatively 
wide area of disciplines has limited the in-depth discussion of each discipline. 
The researcher tried to find the most commonly agreed-on concepts and/or the 
most respected authors, but this might not be the case in each of the different 
disciplines. Secondly, this study was conducted in two relatively small and 
similar countries, which can limit the generalisation of these findings to a more 
global scale. Another limitation relates to language, which at times caused 
challenges in interpreting the findings. For example, there was, at times, a need 
for a contextual meta-analysis to translate the meaning from Finnish into 
English. The transcriptions of some recorded interviews given by participants 
with more limited English skills were also a challenge, as the core or essence 
was difficult to understand. This limitation also expands to the usage of the 
surveys, as the abstract survey questions allow room for interpretation. Indeed, 
researching abstract concepts such as knowledge and intelligence is already a 
challenge, even when using one’s own native language.  
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8.3 Contribution to knowledge 
The contribution to knowledge by this thesis is manifold. Firstly, knowledge 
management as a discipline has not been extensively researched for the law 
enforcement domain. The researcher experienced difficulties finding articles on 
knowledge management in law enforcement: none could be found even when 
combining the terms intelligence analysis and knowledge management. This 
research also tested Nonaka and Takeuchi’s knowledge management model 
with its later added cultural dimension and found it a very useful, practical and 
workable model to be used for a knowledge management-related topic like 
intelligence. Indeed, as the knowledge and intelligence concepts are interlinked, 
the model could also be called the Intelligence Management Model and change 
the different knowledge roles to intelligence roles. This model can certainly be 
used to test just how much a particular law enforcement organisation is 
knowledge/intelligence-led to assist in the improvement developments.  
Secondly, this research also went deeper into the theoretical foundations of law 
enforcement intelligence and was able to provide an updated definition for law 
enforcement intelligence. This contribution to knowledge has a very significant 
impact, as it can help to redesign law enforcement’s information and knowledge 
processes. Indeed, by understanding this division of intelligence, the social 
networks that are full of knowledge can be better utilised via organisational 
structures and processes to enhance intelligence work. Then, in relation to the 
slower intelligence process the analysts conduct, the possibilities in relation to 
machine learning and artificial intelligence can be taken more seriously within 
law enforcement to develop proper information management processes and 
platforms with powerful computing to reinforce the analytical function.  
The new definition, along with the SECI model, can also assist in properly 
defining the law enforcement analyst’s roles and the tasks. Indeed, the law 
enforcement analyst profession lacks attention, and this research filled some of 
these knowledge gaps. This was truly successful, as understanding the different 
intelligence levels and the tacit knowledge-driven police culture can assist in 
defining the knowledge/intelligence roles and better link these into the already 
established law enforcement roles. Moreover, the debate over an analyst’s 
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academic background versus a police background can be seen differently when 
noting the two different knowledge domains used in law enforcement. 
Nevertheless, this can help to shape the knowledge-led approach, along with 
the need to improve the professionalism of police management, patrolling 
officers and investigators.  
This research also provided a unique knowledge set on how police culture 
impacts the knowledge-led approaches, thus explaining why the ILP initiatives 
have had so many difficulties succeeding. Therefore, the change-resistant 
routines in these cultural settings need a special focus from management to 
increase success. Indeed, these findings can be turned into practical objectives 
to change the standard reactive policing model towards Intelligence-Led 
Policing or another knowledge-led policing approach. They can, therefore, serve 
as practical guidance if the law enforcement community wants to become 
knowledge-led. 
8.4 Future research opportunities 
This research revealed several new avenues for future research. Firstly, the 
whole theoretical foundation of law enforcement intelligence could benefit from 
more in-depth research to further develop the law enforcement intelligence 
doctrine. Secondly, police culture studies in relation to intelligence would be 
highly beneficial to further understand the areas to consider when engaging in a 
change management process to become more knowledge-led. Research on the 
professionalism of the intelligence discipline among the diverse roles of law 
enforcement would also bring the intelligence and analysis domain further 
along. Furthermore, the topics of organisational business ontology and the 
processes around knowledge management in law enforcement would be 
interesting research tasks for someone in the enterprise architecture domain. 
There is also the whole capability development of law enforcement in relation to 
intelligence and analysis. The research indicates a huge need exists for this; 
thus, it could be a very interesting research avenue to produce standards on 
education for intelligence and analysis. Lastly, by going through the different 
policing models, it might be interesting to investigate these from their main 
information source viewpoint. It seems that many of the different policing 
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models are designed around the information sources they use, such as 
community information (Community-Oriented Policing), crime events (Problem-
Oriented Policing) or closed information sources (Intelligence-Led Policing). In 
this multi-source, information-rich world, a need arguably exists to combine all 
of these models and their sources to formulate a holistic, all-source policing 
model and bring law enforcement properly into this knowledge era (Dawson & 
Stanko, 2016). 
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Appendices 
Appendix I: The interviewee roles per country 
Finland 
Code Role Background 
Police 
Department  
FI01 Senior Manager Post graduate education PD 4 
FI02 Manager Police officer, police education PD 5 
FI03 Analyst Police officer, police education PD 2 
FI04 Analyst  
Police officer with academic 
education 
PD 2 
FI05 Manager  
Police officer with academic 
education 
PD 6 
FI06 Senior Analyst Post graduate education PD 7 
FI07 Patrolling Officer Police officer, police education PD 1 
FI08 Investigator Police officer, police education PD 8 
FI09 Manager  Police officer, police education PD 2 
FI10 Analyst  Police officer, police education PD 1 
FI11 Investigator Police officer, police education PD 1 
FI12 Analyst Police officer, police education PD 3 
FI13 Manager Police officer, police education PD 3 
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Denmark 
Code Role Background 
Police 
Department  
DK01 Senior Manager Police background PD 2 
DK02 Analyst 
Police officer with academic 
education 
PD 1 
DK03 Manager 
Police officer with academic 
education 
PD 1 
DK04 Analyst 
Civilian with academic 
education 
PD 3 
DK05 Analyst 
Civilian with academic 
education 
PD 1 
DK06 Analyst Police officer, police education PD 4 
DK07 Investigator Police officer, police education PD 5 
DK08 Analyst 
Civilian with academic 
education 
PD 5 
DK09 Manager Police officer, police education PD 1 
DK10 Analyst Police officer, police education PD 1 
DK11 Patrolling officer Police officer, police education PD 4 
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Appendix II: The interview schedule 
 
 
Intelligence, analysis and knowledge in law enforcement 
1. How would you describe the concept of intelligence in law enforcement? Is it 
functional and needed in law enforcement? What should be improved, if any? 
2. How would you describe the aims, objectives, and function of analysis in law 
enforcement? Is it needed? What should be improved, if any? 
3. What are the advantages and/or disadvantages of police officers personal and 
practical experience compared against research type of theoretical knowledge in 
the context of law enforcement? Is theoretical/academic type of knowledge 
needed in law enforcement? 
4. How are the organisational crime management strategies, objectives and priorities 
developed? Are these clear, agreeable and reachable? How are these implemented 
in the daily work? What should be improved, if any? 
Information management 
5. Can you describe how crime and criminal related information is managed in your 
organisation?  
6. Are there limitations on who can access to certain information? Please describe. 
7. Are the systems easy to use and are the standards of information processing well 
defined? Is the legal framework around information management clear? 
Knowledge conversion 
8. Sharing personal experiences and knowledge in an organisation could be done for 
example by means of meetings, training sessions and/or social events such as team 
building. Is the staff in your organisation encouraged and willing to share their 
personal experiences and knowledge gained through their work? Please describe. 
9. How is crime/criminal related data, information and knowledge collected? What 
initiates the collection, who collects the information, what kind of sources are 
used, how is the value of information assessed, and how is it documented/stored?  
10. What is done with all of the collected and stored information? How is it used? And 
by whom? Is there a systematic process, specific methods and software’s used to 
work with the data? 
11. How is the intelligence analysis findings shared and used in your organisation? Do 
you have specific intelligence products? Please describe. 
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On knowledge workers 
12. What is the role, tasks and position of the analysts in your organisation? Do you 
consider these appropriate? Is there a need for analysts in law enforcement? 
Please justify. 
13. What is the anticipated educational background, professional experience, 
characteristics and career opportunities of the analysts in law enforcement?  
14. How do you see the role of patrolling officers, investigators and other front line 
employees in the intelligence process? Comparing against analysts, is the division 
of tasks clear between these roles or do they overlap? Please describe. 
15. What is the role of management and senior management in the 
intelligence/analysis process? Is there a systematic tasking/planning/direction 
phase for the intelligence/analytical work? Is intelligence analysis products used to 
guide decision making? Please describe. 
16. How is the training and capability building of staff on information management, 
analysis methods and intelligence organised? Is there training opportunities on 
these topics for all staff – including management? Please describe. 
Organisational issues 
17. How well new ideas are accepted in the organisation? Are staff encouraged to find 
and experiment new solutions to identified problems? Are mistakes tolerated? 
18. How would you describe the status of trust in your organisation? How would you 
improve this? 
19. How is the communication done in your organisation? How easy it is to bring up 
different issues – even conflicting and difficult ones? 
20. How would you describe your organisation? Do you consider your organisation to 
be dynamic, future oriented and change oriented? Or is it more static, conservative 
and habitual? Also is it hierarchical and departmentalised, or is it more matrix type 
flexible organisation? Or something else, what?  
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Appendix III: The survey questionnaire 
 
 
 
Institute of Criminal 
Justice Studies (ICJS) 
      
      +44 
(0)23 9284 3933 
icjsapplications@port.
ac.uk 
Researcher 
Mr Juha Syrjä 
up4686678@myport.
ac.uk 
Thesis supervisor 
Senior Lecturer 
Dr Adrian James 
Adrian.James@port.a
c.uk 
Director of ICJS  
Professor Stephen 
Savage 
steve.savage@port.ac
.uk 
 
Study Title: Law enforcement intelligence analysis: How does this knowledge 
management service survive in the crossfire of occupational culture and changing 
policing models? 
Name of researcher: Mr. Juha Syrjä 
Thesis supervisor: Senior Lecturer Dr Adrian James 
 
Invitation 
Thank you for reading this. I would like to invite you to take part in my research study 
by completing this questionnaire. It is entirely up to you whether you participate 
Survey Questionnaire 
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however your responses would be greatly valued.  This online survey is forwarded to 
you by your organisation contact person based on my indication on the potential 
respondents. If you are reading this you might have personal knowledge on the topic, 
which I am exploring through this study.  
My study aims to examine how to better establish, encourage and enable intelligence 
analysis to be utilised in law enforcement context. Through this survey I want to gather 
your perceptions on the issues relevant for my research topic. I neither need your 
name nor any identifying details; the questionnaire can be completed anonymously 
and all reasonable steps will be taken to ensure confidentiality.  In case of online 
survey it is important to note that the researcher will not collect and keep any IP 
addresses or similar data, which could identify the online respondents. Moreover such 
data will not be made publicly available or used in any ways to identify the 
respondents. 
The responses from completed questionnaires will be collated for analysis; once this is 
complete the original questionnaires will be retained for later use such as auditing or 
another study. The completed hard copies of the questionnaires will be stored in 
locked filing cabinet and the electronic results will be stored under a password 
protected private folder. The responses to this questionnaire remains anonymous, so if 
you wish to learn more about the results of the research you can send me an email 
indicating this. The contact details can be found in this survey and in the invitation 
letter attached to this survey. 
Questionnaire instructions 
 
This questionnaire will seek your perceptions on topics which include several 
statements.  
 
First please select your current role in your organisation. After this please indicate 
what other roles you might have had throughout your career. Then please select your 
educational background by selecting all the matching items. Then finally please 
indicate your age group and your gender. 
 
After this you can find 30 statements divided under separate headings. Please select 
the one which best matches your evaluation. Please fill in all the statements. You can: 
 SA = strongly agree;  
 A = agree;  
 N = neutral; 
 D = disagree;  
 SD = strongly disagree 
with these statements. 
 
In the end of this survey is a text box, which you can fill in additional comments. Please 
do not include any information, which is operational or confidential in nature as it 
violates the data protection rules and thus cannot be accepted. 
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Your current role is: 
Please 
select  
Senior Manager  
Manager   
Investigator   
Analyst  
Patrolling Officer  
Something else, what? [text box]  
 
 
 
Educational background Please select 
Vocational (police officers )  
Vocational (civilian)  
Bachelor Degree  
Master’s Degree  
Doctorate  
Other, what?  
 
Age Please select 
<29  
30>39  
40>49  
50>59  
60>  
 
Gender Please select 
Male  
Female  
 
Intelligence, Analysis and Knowledge in Law Enforcement SA A  N  D  SD 
The concept of intelligence in law enforcement is practical and needed.           
The aims, objectives and function of analysis in law enforcement is clear.      
Theoretical, academic type of knowledge is mostly not needed in 
practical police work. 
          
We have clear, agreeable and manageable organisational crime reduction 
strategies, objectives and priorities.      
Information Management SA A  N  D  SD 
I systematically share and store any crime related information (such as 
tip-offs) in my possession into our organisations information systems for           
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further use. 
I know how information stored in our systems will be used by the 
organisation.      
It is easy to use our organisation’s information systems. 
     
I have sufficient access to the information I need for my work. 
     
The information processing standards (i.e. how to store data into our 
systems) and rules (such as data protection) are clear to me.      
I am fully aware of the legal aspects of information sharing. 
          
I have had plenty of training opportunities on information management 
(i.e. how to collect, store and share information through the systems) in 
our organisation.      
On Knowledge Conversion SA A  N  D  SD 
I am used to produce different types of reports, documents and/or 
material to capture crime related information for our organisation. 
          
I am eager to discover and experience new things in order to use this new 
knowledge in my working practice. 
          
I often use different analytical techniques to the data and information 
stored in our systems to create a new awareness on a given topic. 
          
I make sure to share my professional knowledge and experience with my 
colleagues via social events, meetings, presentations and/or trainings. 
          
Our analytical products and services are well-defined and standardised.           
Our analytical products are important for the organisational decision 
making process. 
     
On Knowledge Workers SA A  N  D  SD 
I know what I can expect from an analyst in our organisation.           
The analysts are essential to our organisation.           
I think the analysts have a good career opportunities in our organisation.           
In the context of intelligence analysis process our patrolling officers and 
informant handlers can be seen as the collectors of information. 
     
The division of tasks between investigators and analysts are clear in our 
organisation. 
     
Our management is actively and systematically involved in directing the 
intelligence analysis process - for example through tasking and planning. 
     
Police should not waste its resources on generating statistics, charts, 
reports and theories. 
     
I have had plenty of training opportunities on the intelligence analysis 
process, the analytical methods and software’s used in our organisation. 
     
Organisational Culture and Strategy SA A  N  D  SD 
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I can easily present new ideas and experiment new solutions to identified 
problems in our organisation.           
Our organisation tolerate honest mistakes and see them as improvement 
opportunities.           
I have full trust to my colleagues in our organisation.           
Communication on different issues - even conflicting and difficult ones - is 
easy in my organisation.      
I consider my organisation to be non-hierarchical, dynamic and future 
oriented.      
 
 
If you wish to add any additional comments, please write these below. Please do not 
include any information, which is operational and/or confidential in nature as it 
violates the data protection rules and thus cannot be accepted. 
[Text box] 
 
Thank you for completing the questionnaire!  
 
If you have any concerns regarding this research please contact me or my thesis 
supervisor in the first instance.  You can also contact the University of Portsmouth, 
Institute of Criminal Justice Studies in relation to your concerns. The contact details of 
are:  
 Researcher: Mr Juha Syrjä up468667@myport.ac.uk 
 Thesis Supervisor: Senior Lecturer, Dr Adrian James Adrian.James@port.ac.uk 
 University of Portsmouth, Institute of Criminal Justice Studies (ICJS) +44 (0)23 
9284 3933 or icjsapplications@port.ac.uk 
 Director of Institute of Criminal Justice Studies: Professor Steven Savage 
steve.savage@port.ac.uk 
 
If you are not entirely happy with a response, please contact University of Portsmouth 
Complaints department on +44(0)2392 843642 or by email at 
complaintsadvice@port.ac.uk .  
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Appendix IV: Translated survey questionnaire statements - from 
English to Finnish. 
 
Rikostiedustelu, -analyysi ja -tieto (ymmärrys) poliisitoiminnassa 
1. Rikostiedustelun toimintamalli on käytännöllinen ja tarpeellinen. 
2. Rikosanalyysin tavoitteet ja toimenkuva ovat minulle selvät. 
3. Teoreettista ja tyyliltään akateemista tietoa ei yleensä tarvita käytännön 
poliisityössä. 
4. Poliisilla on selvä, yksimielisesti hyväksytty ja hallittavissa oleva rikosten 
vähentämiseen tähtäävä strategia, tavoitteet ja painopistealueet. 
 
Tiedon hallinta 
5. Tallennan systemaattisesti poliisin tietojärjestelmiin kaikki haltuuni saamani 
tiedot (kuten vihjeet) mahdollista tulevaa käyttöä varten. 
6. Tiedän kuinka tietojärjestelmiin tallennettua tietoa käytetään organisaatiossani. 
7. Poliisin tietojärjestelmät ovat helppokäyttöisiä. 
8. Minulla on pääsy tarvitsemiini tietojärjestelmiin. 
9. Tiedon tallentamisen standardit (oikea tallennusmuoto ja luokittelut) ovat 
minulle selvät. 
10. Tiedonkäsittelyn laillisuusvaatimukset ovat minulle selvät. 
11. Minulla on ollut hyvin mahdollisuuksia saada tiedonhallintaan ja 
tietojärjestelmiin liittyvää koulutusta. 
 
Tiedon jakaminen 
12. Olen tottunut kirjoittamaan / tuottamaan erilaisia rikoksiin ja rikollisuuteen 
liittyviä raportteja, dokumentteja ja/tai materiaalia. 
13. Olen hyvin halukas kokemaan uusia asioita ja löytämään uutta tietoa ja tapoja 
toimia joita voin sitten höydyntää työssäni 
14. Käytän usein erilaisia analyyttisiä menetelmiä poliisin hallussa olevaan tietoon 
jotta voin tuottaa uutta ymmärrystä annetusta aiheesta. 
15. Pidän huolen siitä että jaan ammatillisen tietoni, taitoni ja kokemukseni 
kollegoille erilaisten sosiaalisten tapahtumien yhteydessä (esim. kokouksissa ja 
koulutuksissa). 
16. Rikosanalyysituotteemme ovat hyvin määriteltyjä ja standardoitu. 
17. Rikosanalyysituotteemme ovat tärkeitä päätöksentekoa tukevassa prosessissa. 
 
Tietotyöläisistä 
18. Minulle on selvää mitä voin ammatillisesti pyytää ja odottaa analyytikolta. 
19. Analyytikot ovat erittäin tärkeitä poliisin organisaatiolle. 
20. Analyytikoilla on hyvät uramahdollisuudet poliisissa. 
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21. Rikostiedusteluanalyysiprosessissa järjestyspoliisilla ja järjestelmällisellä 
tiedottajatoiminnalla on samankaltainen tiedonkerääjän rooli. 
22. Rikostutkijan ja analyytikon välinen rooli- ja tehtäväjako on selvä. 
23. Yleisesti ottaen päällystö on voimakkaasti mukana rikostiedustelun ja -analyysin 
tehtävänannossa ja suunnittelussa. 
24. Poliisin ei pitäisi haaskata resursseja tilastojen, kaavioiden, raporttien ja 
teorioiden tekemiseen. 
25. Minulla on ollut runsaasti koulutusmahdollisuuksia rikostiedustelu- ja 
analyysiprosessista sekä poliisin analyysimetodeista ja -ohjelmista. 
 
Organisaatiokulttuurista 
26. Minun on helppo ehdottaa uusia ideoita työssäni ja testata niitä käytännössä. 
27. Tahattomien virheiden sieto on hyvää organisaatiossamme ja tällaiset virheet 
nähdään lähinnä oppimismahdollisuuksina. 
28. Luotan vahvasti kollegoihini. 
29. Kommunikointi - jopa vaikeiden ja ristiriitaisten asioiden - on helppoa 
organisaatiossamme. 
30. Poliisi on organisaationa joustava, dynaaminen ja tulevaisuuteen orientoitunut. 
 
Vapaa kommentti - Huom! Ei turvaluokiteltua tietoa 
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Appendix V:  Finnish survey questionnaire averages 
Survey Statements - FI
A
ll
A
n
alysts (n
=
2
1
)
In
ve
stigato
rs (n
=
8
2
)
M
an
age
m
e
n
t (n
=
1
9
)
1 The concept of intelligence in law enforcement is practical and needed. 2,26 1,86 2,34 2,32
2 The aims, objectives and function of analysis in law enforcement is clear. 2,67 2,1 2,85 2,58
3 Theoretical, academic type of knowledge is mostly not needed in practical police work. 3,47 3,62 3,44 3,58
4
We have clear, agreeable and manageable organisational crime reduction strategies, 
objectives and priorities. 3,23 3,05 3,33 2,95
5
I systematically share and store any crime related information (such as tip-offs) in my 
possession into our organisations information systems for further use. 2,85 2,43 2,9 3,05
6 I know how information stored in our systems will be used by the organisation. 2,61 2,24 2,73 2,53
7 It is easy to use our organisation’s information systems. 3,25 2,76 3,39 3,21
8 I have sufficient access to the information I need for my work. 1,77 1,52 1,88 1,58
9
The information processing standards (i.e. how to store data into our systems) and rules 
(such as data protection) are clear to me. 2,54 1,81 2,68 2,84
10 I am fully aware of the legal aspects of information sharing. 2,2 2,05 2,23 2,21
11
I have had plenty of training opportunities on information management (i.e. how to collect, 
store and share information through the systems) in our organisation. 3,14 2,52 3,35 2,84
12
I am used to produce different types of reports, documents and/or material to capture crime 
related information for our organisation. 2,28 1,67 2,37 2,58
13
I am eager to discover and experience new things in order to use this new knowledge in my 
working practice. 1,72 1,52 1,68 2,16
14
I often use different analytical techniques to the data and information stored in our systems 
to create a new awareness on a given topic. 3,09 2,14 3,3 3,21
15
I make sure to share my professional knowledge and experience with my colleagues via 
social events, meetings, presentations and/or trainings. 2,15 1,86 2,22 2,21
16 Our analytical products and services are well-defined and standardised. 3,25 3,1 3,27 3,32
17 Our analytical products are important for the organisational decision making process. 2,8 2,67 2,91 2,47
18 I know what I can expect from an analyst in our organisation. 2,84 2,14 3,13 2,37
19 The analysts are essential to our organisation. 1,97 1,48 2,12 1,84
20 I think the analysts have a good career opportunities in our organisation. 2,76 2,43 2,85 2,68
21
In the context of intelligence analysis process our patrolling officers and informant handlers 
can be seen as the collectors of information. 2,85 2,43 2,9 3,11
22 The division of tasks between investigators and analysts are clear in our organisation. 2,85 2,71 2,93 2,68
23
Our management is actively and systematically involved in directing the intelligence analysis 
process - for example through tasking and planning. 3,22 3,24 3,27 2,95
24 Police should not waste its resources on generating statistics, charts, reports and theories. 3,58 3,9 3,45 3,89
25
I have had plenty of training opportunities on the intelligence analysis process, the analytical 
methods and software’s used in our organisation. 3,67 2,95 3,85 3,63
26
I can easily present new ideas and experiment new solutions to identified problems in our 
organisation. 2,65 2,29 2,7 2,79
27 Our organisation tolerate honest mistakes and see them as improvement opportunities. 3,2 3,05 3,27 3,16
28 I have full trust to my colleagues in our organisation. 2,04 2,1 2,02 2,05
29
Communication on different issues - even conflicting and difficult ones - is easy in my 
organisation. 3,27 2,86 3,4 3,05
30 I consider my organisation to be non-hierarchical, dynamic and future oriented. 3,67 3,67 3,76 3,26  
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Appendix VI: The Finnish survey responses in percentages 
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Appendix VII:  Danish survey questionnaire averages 
Survey Statements - DK
A
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=
3
8
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rs (n
=
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)
M
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e
n
t (n
=
1
9
)
1 The concept of intelligence in law enforcement is practical and needed. 1,17 1,05 1,25 1,21
2 The aims, objectives and function of analysis in law enforcement is clear. 2,69 2,54 3 2,53
3 Theoretical, academic type of knowledge is mostly not needed in practical police work. 3,69 3,73 3,75 3,58
4
We have clear, agreeable and manageable organisational crime reduction strategies, 
objectives and priorities. 2,87 3,14 2,75 2,74
5
I systematically share and store any crime related information (such as tip-offs) in my 
possession into our organisations information systems for further use. 2,02 1,97 1,88 2,21
6 I know how information stored in our systems will be used by the organisation. 2,18 1,92 2,63 2
7 It is easy to use our organisation’s information systems. 3,21 2,81 3,5 3,32
8 I have sufficient access to the information I need for my work. 2,86 2,59 3,25 2,74
9
The information processing standards (i.e. how to store data into our systems) and rules 
(such as data protection) are clear to me. 2,42 2,43 1,88 2,95
10 I am fully aware of the legal aspects of information sharing. 2,1 2 2,25 2,05
11
I have had plenty of training opportunities on information management (i.e. how to collect, 
store and share information through the systems) in our organisation. 3,21 2,95 3,38 3,32
12
I am used to produce different types of reports, documents and/or material to capture crime 
related information for our organisation. 2,39 1,97 2,63 2,58
13
I am eager to discover and experience new things in order to use this new knowledge in my 
working practice. 1,44 1,43 1,38 1,53
14
I often use different analytical techniques to the data and information stored in our systems 
to create a new awareness on a given topic. 2,59 2,3 2,63 2,84
15
I make sure to share my professional knowledge and experience with my colleagues via 
social events, meetings, presentations and/or trainings. 2,17 2,24 2 2,26
16 Our analytical products and services are well-defined and standardised. 3,09 3,19 2,88 3,21
17 Our analytical products are important for the organisational decision making process. 2,11 2,3 2,13 1,89
18 I know what I can expect from an analyst in our organisation. 2,72 2,65 2,88 2,63
19 The analysts are essential to our organisation. 1,86 2 2 1,58
20 I think the analysts have a good career opportunities in our organisation. 2,7 2,84 2,75 2,53
21
In the context of intelligence analysis process our patrolling officers and informant handlers 
can be seen as the collectors of information. 1,72 1,65 1,63 1,89
22 The division of tasks between investigators and analysts are clear in our organisation. 3,2 3,11 3,38 3,11
23
Our management is actively and systematically involved in directing the intelligence analysis 
process - for example through tasking and planning. 3,05 3,3 3 2,84
24 Police should not waste its resources on generating statistics, charts, reports and theories. 3,81 3,97 3,5 3,95
25
I have had plenty of training opportunities on the intelligence analysis process, the analytical 
methods and software’s used in our organisation. 3,36 3,14 3,38 3,58
26
I can easily present new ideas and experiment new solutions to identified problems in our 
organisation. 2,59 2,76 2,38 2,63
27 Our organisation tolerate honest mistakes and see them as improvement opportunities. 3,09 3,11 3 3,16
28 I have full trust to my colleagues in our organisation. 2,16 2,41 1,88 2,21
29
Communication on different issues - even conflicting and difficult ones - is easy in my 
organisation. 3,15 3,08 3,25 3,11
30 I consider my organisation to be non-hierarchical, dynamic and future oriented. 3,48 3,46 3,63 3,37
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Appendix VIII: The Danish survey responses in percentages 
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Appendix IX: Favourable opinion of the Ethics Committee 
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